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Abstract
Executive functions and social cognition develop throughout childhood into 
adolescence and early adulthood (Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006). These functions are 
associated w ith frontal networks showing protracted maturation into early adulthood 
(Lebel, W alker, Leemans, Phillips & Beaulieu, 2008). Executive function and social 
cognition studies have previously focused on childhood (Pennequin, Sorel & Fontaine, 
2010), adolescence (Magar, Phillips & Hosie, 2010) or broad age ranges in adulthood 
(Dziobek et al., 2006).
This thesis reports executive function, social cognition, IQ and mood state data in a 
sequential design w ith 98 participants aged 17 (Younger group), 18 (M iddle group) and 
19 years (O lder group) at Time 1. Findings indicate non-linear development, w ith  a 
trough in ability at age 18, on strategy generation and concept formation, assessed w ith 
Letter Fluency and Sorting Tests from the Delis Kaplan Executive Function System  
(Delis, K aplan & Kramer, 2001). There were no group differences on Time 1 social 
cognition task scores.
Fifty eight participants were tested at Time 2 (interval between testing M  = 14.81 
months, SD  = 4.01). Again, the Younger group scored significantly higher than  the 
M iddle group on strategy generation at Time 2 suggesting that group differences may 
represent sample characteristics rather than age related change. There were no group 
differences in concept formation at Time 2, indicating that non-linear developm ent is 
specific to age 18 in the present sample. Inhibition, rule detection, strategy generation, 
planning and emotion recognition in dynamic stimuli showed progressively better 
longitudinal development. IQ, Age, Depression, Anxiety and executive function scores 
(rule detection, strategy generation, inhibition and planning) predicted perform ance on 
social cognition tasks assessing emotion recognition in visual static (Reading the M ind 
in the Eyes Test; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), auditory (Reading the M ind in the Voice 
Test; Golan, Baron-Cohen Hill & Rutherford, 2007), dynam ic visual and auditory 
stimuli (Movie for the A ssessment o f  Social Cognition; Dziobek et al., 2006) and self- 
report empathy (Interpersonal Reactivity Index; Davies, 1983).
Overall, results indicate linear and non-linear development o f  functions in late 
adolescence and early adulthood. C linical and educational im plications o f  these 
findings are discussed.
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Chapter 1 
Literature Review
1.1 Chapter overview
This chapter w ill review  brain development in late adolescence and early adulthood, 
focusing on the frontal networks because these undergo protracted developm ent (Lebel, 
W alker, Leemans, Phillips & Beaulieu, 2008) and are attributed to executive functions 
(Stuss & A lexander, 2007) and some aspects o f  social cognition (Carrington & Bailey, 
2009). Definitions o f  executive function and social cognition are included together w ith 
their roles in late adolescence and early adulthood. This chapter also discusses theories 
o f  executive function and social cognition, followed by a review  o f  behavioural studies 
o f  executive function and social cognition in late adolescence and early adulthood.
There is substantial executive function data across the developm ental period o f  
childhood (Carroll, R iggs, Apperly, G raham  & Geoghegan, 2012: 3-4 year olds; 
Pennequin, Sorel & Fontaine, 2010: age 4-7), m iddle adolescence (Prencipe et al., 2011: 
age 8-15: Anderson, Anderson, Northam , Jacobs & Catroppa, 2001: age 11-17), and 
adulthood (Ahmed & M iller, 2011: age 18-27; R iccio, Wolfe, Rom ine, Davis & 
Sullivan, 2004: age 16-33; Guevara, M artinez, Aguirre & Gonzalez, 2011: age 26-30; 
Barker, Andrade, Morton, Romanowski & Bowles, 2010: age 20-59). Sim ilarly, social 
cognition research has focussed on children aged from 2-12 (Baron-Cohen, 
W heelwright, H ill, Raste & Plumb, 2001; Doherty, Anderson & How ieson, 2009; 
Golan, Baron-Cohen, H ill & Golan, 2008), or adults (Dziobek et al, 2006: age 22-62; 
Heavey et al., 2000: age 22-45; Dumontheil, Apperly & B lakemore, 2010: age 19-27; 
Hallerback, Lugnegard, H jarthag & Gillberg, 2009: age 19-32). O ther work has 
investigated either executive or socio-cognitive functions w ith atypical groups for 
example, autism  (Golan, Baron-Cohen & Golan, 2008), ADHD (M artel, N ikolas & 
Nigg, 2007), head-injury (Barker et al, 2010; Barker et al; 2006; Jacobs, H arvey & 
Anderson, 2011), and schizophrenia (Kravariti, Morris, Rabe-Hesketh, M urray & 
Frangou, 2003). However, there are scant data particularly with fine-grained age groups 
on the normative development o f  social and executive functions across the important
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maturational period of late adolescence and early adulthood (Herba & Phillips, 2004; 
Moriguchi, Ohnishi, Mori, Matsuda, & Komaki, 2007).
1.2 Brain maturation in late adolescence and early adulthood
Adolescence is the transition between childhood and adulthood, associated with 
physical, psychological and social changes (Steinberg & Morris, 2001). Adolescence, 
spanning from the onset o f puberty until the late teenage years, is associated with brain 
changes as well as hormonal and other physiological changes (Steinberg & Morris,
2001). There is a growing body of evidence showing that brain development continues 
into adolescence and adulthood with converging evidence for maturational changes 
from morphological (e.g. Lebel et al., 2008; Sowell et al., 2003), behavioural (e.g. 
Dumontheil, Apperly & Blakemore, 2010; Romine & Reynolds, 2005; Waber et al.,
2007) and neuropathological research (Paus, Keshevan & Giedd, 2008). Until the last 
few decades, the predominant viewpoint was that brain maturation was complete in 
childhood. More recently, post mortem histological studies on human brains have 
provided evidence for structural brain changes occurring in adolescence (e.g. 
Huttenlocher, 1979; Yakolvlev & Lecours, 1967). Frontal networks undergo a 
protracted course o f development, characterised by synaptogenesis with later synaptic 
pruning (Huttenlocher, 1979) and myelination o f neurons (Yakovlev & Lecours, 1967). 
Synaptogenesis is the formation of new synapses, resulting in a synaptic density greater 
than adult levels, whilst synaptic pruning strengthens the frequently used synapses and 
eliminates the infrequently used synapses. The protracted phase o f synaptic pruning in 
frontal networks leads to more efficient functioning and complex behaviour (Giedd,
2008). Frontal regions are also thought to play an important role in executive functions 
(Barker et al., 2010; Lebel et al., 2008) and some aspects o f social cognition (Carrington 
& Bailey, 2009; Castelli, Happe, Frith & Frith, 2000; Frith & Frith, 2006; Gallagher et 
al., 2000) that are crucial to adaptive goal-oriented behaviour.
1.2.1 MRI studies
Understanding of brain maturation was revolutionised by Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 
a way of investigating brain changes in vivo. This non-invasive technique enables 
longitudinal studies with living participants and informs the time-course o f maturational
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processes (Toga, Thompson & Sowell, 2006). MRI reveals grey matter, composed of 
cell bodies, synapses and neuropil, and white matter, myelinated axons.
Sowell, Thompson, Tessner and Toga (2001) conducted an MRI study mapping post­
adolescent brain maturation by region; they compared three age groups (7-11 years, 12- 
lb  years and 23-30 years) and reported that grey matter loss predominantly occurred in 
dorsal frontal and parietal networks between childhood and adolescence. Grey matter 
loss accelerated in frontal networks between adolescence and adulthood, whilst there 
was a less pronounced decline in parietal networks. It is likely that parietal networks are 
associated with visuospatial functions, whereas frontal networks are associated with 
executive functions, resulting in visuospatial skills maturing earlier than executive 
functions (Sowell et al., 2001). Brain growth also occurred in the regions o f grey matter 
loss, with the authors suggesting that myelination occurs in the space created by 
synaptic pruning. These findings show brain changes in late adolescence, specifically in 
frontal networks, indicating that maturation is dynamic, with both regressive (synaptic 
pruning) and progressive (myelination) processes (Sowell et al., 2001). The authors 
noted that synaptic pruning may lead to improved accuracy on cognitive tasks because 
unused synapses are pruned, leading to a more efficient arrangement o f neurons, and 
myelination may result in faster reaction times due to the myelin sheath increasing 
transmission speed around brain regions. Sowell et al. (2001) acknowledged that 
pubertal status may affect brain maturation in adolescence, yet no measure o f this was 
taken.
Gogtay et al. (2004) conducted a longitudinal MRI study with repeat scans every 2 
years for 8 to 10 years, resulting in a total age range spanning 4 to 21 years. The authors 
reported that lower order sensorimotor regions matured earliest, followed by parietal 
regions (language development and spatial orientation) and then higher order 
association regions (frontal networks). The protracted development o f frontal networks 
is notable because this region mediates complex cognitive and emotional functions 
(Stuss & Alexander, 2007). Focusing specifically on the frontal networks, maturation 
occurred in a posterior to anterior direction, commencing in the primary motor cortex, 
and then progressing to the superior and inferior frontal gyri, with the prefrontal 
networks maturing last. In late adolescence, there is loss o f grey matter in the
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dorsolateral prefrontal network, thought to govern executive functions, with the 
orbitofrontal network maturing until age 21, the oldest age in this study (Gogtay et al.,
2004).
1.2.2 Diffusion Tensor Imaging studies
A further advance in imaging is Diffusion Tensor Imaging (DTI); this uses magnetic 
resonance signals to show water movement in axons, providing a sensitive measure of 
microstructure changes (Bamea-Goraly et al., 2005). DTI yields measures o f fractional 
anisotropy (FA), the direction of diffusion in water molecules, and mean diffusivity 
(MD), the average magnitude of water diffusion. Myelin sheath orientation in white 
matter leads to anisotropic diffusion (movement along one axis), because the myelin 
sheath prevents water molecules from moving perpendicularly, resulting in water 
movement along the axon (Thomsen, Henriksen & Ring, 1987). Grey matter shows 
isotropic diffusion, equal movement in all direction, because it lacks fibre structure 
(Beaulieu, 2002). DTI research provides evidence for the different maturational rates o f 
brain regions and supports the notion o f brain changes occurring in adolescence and 
beyond. Schmithorst and Yuan (2010) conducted a review of adolescent DTI studies, 
with the age range of 12 to 18 years, and concluded that white matter continues to 
develop, particularly in frontal regions, as shown by increases in FA and decreases in 
MD.
In a large DTI study with 202 participants aged 5 to 30 years, Lebel et al. (2008) 
reported a significant increase in FA with age in 17 out o f 20 brain structures, with most 
structures showing a sharp increase in FA followed by linear development and levelling 
off in late teens or twenties. Beaulieu (2002) noted that it is not clear whether the 
increasing FA values found in development are due to greater coherence o f fibre tracts 
and/or the additional myelin sheath covering. Lebel et al. (2008) found different 
developmental rates; FA increased early in the corpus callosum, thought to increase the 
efficiency of communication within frontal networks (Nagy, Westerberg & Klingberg,
2004), whilst fronto-temporal connections displayed a more protracted development. 
Indeed, the cingulum and uncinate fasciculus, important fronto-temporal connections, 
show a protracted maturation, reaching 90% of development after age 25 (Lebel et al.,
2008). A positive aspect o f this study was the large sample size in comparison to other
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imaging studies. Males and females were analysed together due to only slight 
differences in developmental trajectories and in accordance with previous research (e.g. 
Sowell et al., 2003) suggesting that hormones do not greatly impact brain development, 
although see Chapter 2 section 2.2 for contrasting results. These findings provide 
support for the protracted development o f frontal networks into late adolescence and 
early adulthood. However, the authors did not elucidate the consequence of protracted 
maturation in frontal networks on behaviour.
1.2.3 Functional connectivity
Functional connectivity is another aspect of brain structure showing changes during late 
adolescence. This refers to distributed brain networks showing strongly correlated 
neural activity patterns due to transmission via long distance white matter tracts 
(Fingelkurts & Kahkonen, 2005) with the growth of widely distributed, functionally 
integrated networks leading to efficient higher order cognition (Goldman-Rakic, 1988). 
Neural constructivism posits that greater interconnection between neural networks leads 
to age related cognitive development (Stevens, 2009). In addition to the protracted 
maturation of prefrontal networks, the late expansion of functional connectivity between 
the prefrontal networks and posterior networks also plays a fundamental role in the 
development o f executive functions (Luna & Sweeney, 2004).
Stevens et al. (2007) compared functional connectivity and performance between
adolescents (aged 11 to 17 years) and adults (aged 18 to 37 years) on an inhibition
executive function task. Participants completed a go/no go task requiring them to press a
button when presented with an “X” on a computer screen and to inhibit this response on
presentation of a “K”. The authors identified three distinct, functionally integrated
networks associated with response inhibition: 1) parietal-premotor network comprising
bilateral dorsolateral and right inferior frontal regions, 2) fronto-striatal-thalamic
network comprising right inferior frontal, parietal and temporal regions 3) frontal-
parietal network comprising right inferior frontal gyrus, right dorsolateral and bilateral
frontopolar and bilateral inferior parietal regions. Adolescents displayed less functional
connectivity between fronto-striatal-thalamic and frontal-parietal networks compared to
adults and took significantly longer to respond than adults. The functional connectivity
strength between fronto-striatal-thalamic and frontal-parietal networks negatively
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correlated with the number o f incorrect responses (i.e. not inhibiting a button press on 
presentation of K) only in the adolescent group. Adolescents showed greater activation 
in the right ventromedial prefrontal cortex compared to adults, to compensate for less 
efficient networks undergoing rewiring (Stevens et al., 2007). Together, these findings 
indicate that adolescents have less functional connectivity in networks associated with 
inhibition and this manifests behaviourally by adolescents taking significantly longer to 
respond.
Burnett and Blakemore (2009) demonstrated functional connectivity changes between 
adolescence and adulthood in a social cognition study. Eighteen adolescents aged 11 to 
18 years and ten adults aged 22 to 32 years read scenarios designed to evoke basic 
emotions (fear or disgust) or social emotions (embarrassment or guilt). Participants were 
cued with what emotion should be elicited in the scenarios and rated the extent that they 
would feel the emotion on a scale o f one (would not feel emotion) to four (would feel 
emotion very much). Greater functional connectivity was found between the anterior 
rostral region o f the medial prefrontal cortex and left posterior temporal sulcus / 
temporo-parietal junction during social relative to basic stimuli in adolescents than 
adults. Activation of medial prefrontal cortex and posterior temporal sulcus adjacent to 
the temporal parietal junction provides support for the social cognition network, brain 
regions activated during social cognition (see Section 1.15). The finding of an age 
related decrease in functional connectivity is inconsistent with previous research 
reporting age related increases in functional connectivity, e.g. Stevens et al. (2007). 
Burnett and Blakemore (2009) argued that this discrepancy could be due to their study 
being the first to explore functional connectivity during a social cognition task, with 
previous research restricted to non-social stimuli, e.g. executive function. A possible 
explanation is that adults utilise a more automatic strategy when considering mental 
states (Burnett & Blakemore, 2009). A decrease in functional connectivity is consistent 
with non-linear adolescent brain maturation, for example synaptic pruning. Boersma et 
al. (2011) proposed that a reduction in functional connectivity could reflect synaptic 
pruning of unused connections and strengthening o f frequently used synapses, leading 
to a more efficient network, with a developmental shift from diffuse extensive 
activation to focal activation (Durston & Casey, 2006).
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1.3 The association between brain morphology and cognition
This section reviews a range o f  studies including normative and neuropathological data 
to illustrate the association between morphology and cognitive function. B lakemore and 
Choudhury (2006) related morphological findings to behaviour and proposed that the 
protracted m aturation o f  prefrontal and parietal networks would result in changes during 
adolescence in social cognition and executive functions mediated by these regions. 
Synaptogenesis and synaptic pruning, leading to a more coherent and efficient 
arrangement o f  neurons in frontal networks, underpin development o f  social cognition 
and executive function in adolescence (B lakemore & Choudhury, 2006). This is 
relevant because studies reviewed in section 1.1 show  that frontal regions continue to 
develop into late adolescence and early adulthood.
In comparison to cross sectional studies, longitudinal designs allow  the study o f  brain 
m aturation over time (Toga et al., 2006). Bava et al. (2010) reported a longitudinal DTI 
study w ith participants aged between 16.2 and 20.6 years at time point 1 w ith  follow-up 
16 months later. The results show  protracted white matter m aturation in late 
adolescence w ith refinement o f  association fibres, connecting networks w ithin  one 
hem isphere, and projection fibres, connecting networks in another brain  region. A 
notable aspect o f  this study is that several behavioural measures were also adm inistered 
including the W echsler Abbreviated Scale o f  Intelligence vocabulary subtest (W echsler,
1999), assessing Verbal IQ, Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System  (D -KEFS) Verbal 
Fluency and Trail M aking Tests (Delis, Kaplan & Kramer, 2001a), m easures o f  strategy 
generation and sequencing, and W echsler Adult Intelligence Scale D igit Span 
(W echsler, 1997). Despite DTI scans at Time 1 and Time 2, the tasks were adm inistered 
only at Time 2, resulting in one behavioural assessment. There were no explanations for 
the selection o f  specifically the Verbal Fluency and Trail M aking Tests to assess 
executive function. G reater increases in FA in the posterior limb o f  the internal capsule 
were associated w ith higher scaled scores on the D-KEFS Letter F luency Test, 
indicating that white matter m aturation in late adolescence leads to improved strategy 
generation (Bava et al., 2010).
Barker, Andrade, Morton, Romanowski and Bowles (2010) compared patients who had 
frontotemporal head injuries before the age o f  25 (early injury group) during a
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maturationally sensitive period with those injured after the age of 28 (late injury group). 
This work is based on the latent deficit hypothesis, the notion that early brain injury will 
result in deficits to functions that emerge later in development. The early injury group 
were more impaired on functions associated with frontal networks, e.g. on the DEX 
(Wilson, Alderman, Burgess, Emslie & Evans, 1996), a measure of behavioural insight. 
The early injury group were also more impaired than the late injury group compared to 
matched controls on a Serial Reaction Time Task, a measure o f implicit cognition. 
Participants completed the Hayling and Brixton Tests (Burgess & Shallice, 1997), 
assessing inhibition and rule detection, and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Heaton, 
1981), a measure of set shifting. There was a significant relationship between executive 
functions and insight for the early injury group (low EF score and high DEX insight 
score showing poor insight) with no significant relationship evident in the late injury 
group. The relationship between executive and other functions was more impaired in the 
early injury group compared to the late injury group because the early injury group had 
endured their head injury in late adolescence / early adulthood when frontal networks 
are still maturing (Barker et al., 2010). Hierarchical regression analyses with DEX 
insight (Wilson et al., 1996) as the dependent variables showed that the Behavioural 
Assessment o f the Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS; Wilson et al., 1996) was a 
significant predictor, injury group was not a significant predictor and the interaction 
between BADS and age at injury was significant. The authors suggested that age at 
injury moderated the relationship between executive function and behavioural insight. 
This work includes only fronto-temporal head injuries enabling the examination of 
deficits specific to this region. However, a limitation is that there was variation in the 
age at injury between the early and late injury group, because o f the difficulty in 
recruiting patients who were the same age at injury (Barker et al., 2010). These results 
suggest that age at frontal brain injury confers vulnerability to processes associated with 
frontal regions including executive functions.
To summarise, protracted brain maturation into adolescence and early adulthood is 
likely to be associated with protracted cognitive development. In a DTI study, Bava et 
al. (2010) found that higher Fractional Anisotropy values, an index of greater white 
matter coherence, are associated with better strategy generation (Bava et al., 2010) in 
adolescence and early adulthood.
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1.4 L inear and non-linear development of cognitive functions
Classic theories o f  development are characterised as either developing continuously, 
following a smooth curve and adding to existing skills, or developing discontinuously, 
involving step-like progression through qualitatively different stages (e.g. Piaget, 1952; 
Erikson, 1950). However, Van Geert (2009) criticised the field o f  Developmental 
Psychology for over emphasising linear development. Figure 1.1 presents different 
developmental trajectories, including linear and non-linear development w ith peaks and 
troughs in ability.
Figure 1.1. Different developmental trajectories.
Events or Age
F igu re  1.1. Three grow th curves based on the same model 1) linear developm ent, 2) 
stage-like development w ith peaks and troughs, 3) fluctuating development. 
Reproduced from  Fischer & B iddell (2006).
Line 2 at age 250 in Figure 1.1 shows an example o f  a peak in ability and at age 300 
shows a trough in ability. Non-linear development, troughs in development follow ing a 
peak in ability (F ischer & Kennedy, 1997), is thought to parallel non-linear brain
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maturation (Lampl & Johnson, 1998; Lebel et al., 2008; Paus, 2005; Sowell et al.,
2003).
1.5 Definition of executive functions
Executive functions initiate, co-ordinate, maintain and inhibit other cognitive functions 
(Miyake et al., 2000) and are vital for adaptive functioning (Stuss, 1992). Executive 
functions are recruited in novel or demanding situations to perform goal-directed 
behaviour when routine behaviour is inadequate (Burgess, 2003). Executive functions 
include planning, problem solving, attention allocation, abstract thinking, concept 
formation and inhibitory control (De Luca et al., 2003; Strauss, Sherman & Spreen, 
2006; Stuss & Alexander, 2000; Wilson et al., 1996; Burgess, 1997; Shallice & 
Burgess, 1991). Executive functions control the execution of complex activities and 
interact with non-executive processes including language, memory and visuospatial 
abilities (Royall et al., 2002). Executive functions are the capacity to plan and organise 
ways to solve complex problems, shift problem solving strategies when required, and 
monitor and evaluate behaviour (Gioia & Isquith, 2004). Goldberg (2001) used an 
analogy of a conductor to explain executive functions, with the conductor directing and 
integrating the players o f the orchestra.
1.6 Role o f executive functions in late adolescence and early adulthood
Whilst research has previously focused on executive function deficits (e.g., Barker et 
al., 2010; Jacobs, Harvey & Anderson, 2011; Odhuba, van den Broek & Johns, 2005; 
Robinson et al., 2009), executive functions are also important in normal functioning. 
Considering late adolescence and early adulthood specifically, executive functions are 
necessary for completion o f academic work and the successful transition to employment 
or Higher Education. For example, when the goal is writing an essay, the student must 
generate and implement a plan, monitor their performance, and inhibit distractions so 
they focus on the task until it is complete. Formation of new friendship groups is 
another aspect associated with this age range, again requiring executive functions so 
that inappropriate responses are inhibited. Generally, executive functions are important 
for independence and autonomy.
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1.7 Executive function dysfunction
The following section on executive function deficits, or executive dysfunction, 
following head injury (HI) emphasises the importance of executive functions. Executive 
dysfunction has a major impact on a person’s ability to attend school or work, also 
affecting home life and social relationships (Grafman & Litvan, 1999). The most 
frequently reported symptoms of executive dysfunction by carers of head injured 
patients are planning problems and distractibility, with patients most commonly 
reporting distractibility and restlessness (Burgess & Robertson, 2002). These particular 
deficits may manifest in everyday activities, e.g. distraction by irrelevant environmental 
stimuli when planning and cooking a meal resulting in the patient focusing less on a 
particular task. Problems in the school or work place include disorganisation and being 
unable to prioritise the importance of different tasks (Burgess, 2003).
Odhuba, van den Broek and Johns (2005) assessed participants who had sustained a HI 
with the Hayling Test (Burgess & Shallice, 1997), a measure o f inhibition. Sentences 
with the last word omitted were read aloud and participants were required to complete 
the sentences with words that made sense (section one) and words that were completely 
irrelevant (section two). Chapter 3 describes the Hayling Test in more detail. Odhuba et 
al. (2005) reported a significant positive correlation between job status and response 
initiation time in section one, indicating how important fast initiation time is for 
employment. However, Odhuba et al. (2005) did not note whether participants had 
sustained widespread or localised brain injuries. A quick response initiation time in 
section one may reflect less severe brain injury or possible impulsivity. Changes in 
social skills associated with HI include inappropriate or aggressive comments and 
disobeying social rules (Grafman & Litvan, 1999). Odhuba et al. (2005) reported a 
significant positive correlation between social integration scale o f the Community 
Integration Questionnaire (Wilier, Ottenbacher & Coad, 1994) and number o f errors on 
section two o f the Hayling Test (Burgess & Shallice, 1997), reflecting how inhibition is 
a vital skill in social situations.
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1.8 Executive function brain regions
In a review of imaging studies, Collette, Hogge, Salmon and Van der Linden (2006) 
concluded that executive functions, specifically inhibition, updating and shifting, were 
associated with activation in both prefrontal and parietal networks. Another study by 
Collette et al. (2005) examined the unity and diversity o f neural networks recruited 
during executive function tasks. Typically developing participants completed measures 
o f inhibition, updating and shifting. The battery used three measures to index the 
purported underlying construct, meeting recommendations by Miyake et al. (2000) to 
use multiple measures. Common areas activated by inhibition, updating and shifting 
were the left superior parietal gyrus and right intraparietal sulcus, and to a lesser extent, 
the inferior frontal gyrus (Collette et al., 2006). Updating was associated with activation 
in frontal regions (frontopolar, superior, middle, inferior and orbitofrontal), intraparietal 
sulcus and the cerebellum. The shifting tasks recruited the left superior parietal network 
and to a lower extent, the right intraparietal sulcus and inferior frontal gyrus. Inhibition 
was associated with activation in the regions common to other executive functions, in 
addition to the right inferior frontal gyrus. Collette et al. (2005) posited that attentional 
processes involve posterior regions, whereas executive processes are associated with 
frontal regions. These findings provide evidence for the recruitment o f both frontal and 
posterior regions in executive function tasks, although an alternative explanation is that 
executive function tasks are not process pure because the completion o f executive 
function tasks also require non-executive functions, including other cognitive functions.
The next section includes brain regions associated with two executive function tasks 
often employed in the literature, the Letter Fluency Task, assessing strategy generation, 
and the Tower o f London, assessing planning. Figure 1.2 presents brain regions 
associated with strategy generation and planning.
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Figure 1.2. Brain regions associated with Letter Fluency Task performance (Baldo 
et al., 2006; blue) and Tower of London (Wagner et al., 2006; red).
Letter fluency requires “an initial mapping o f  the letter cue to phonologic and/or 
orthographic information and checking that the orthography o f  the retrieved word 
matches the initial letter cue” (B irn et al., 2010, p. 1106). Baldo, Schwartz, W ilkins and 
Dronkers (2006) used voxel based lesion symptom  mapping to determ ine regions 
associated w ith letter fluency in left hem isphere stroke patients. B lue areas in Figure 1.2 
indicate that frontal regions (BA 4, BA 6 and BA 44), parietal areas (BA  1-3, BA39 and 
BA40) and anterior temporal regions (BA 22) are associated w ith strategy generation on 
the Letter Fluency Task (Baldo et al., 2006). Parietal networks, associated w ith verbal 
working memory (Jonides et al., 1998), are crucial for remembering task  rules and 
avoiding repetition o f  responses.
Wagner, Koch, Reichenbach, Sauer and Schlosser (2006) reported a fMRI study w ith  17 
participants completing the Tower o f  London task. Participants solved the task  m entally  
and pressed a button to record the m inimum  number o f  moves. Red areas in F igure 1.2 
indicate that the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA47), bilateral dorsolateral 
prefrontal (BA 46), left rostrolateral prefrontal (BA 10), parietal (BA 7) and prem otor 
regions (BA 6, BA 8) are associated w ith planning on the Tower o f  London. BA 6, 
thought to be involved in planning and speech (Petrides et al., 1993), was a common
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area associated with strategy generation and planning. Newman, Carpenter, Varma and 
Just (2003) proposed that right dorsolateral prefrontal networks are associated with 
generation o f a plan whereas executing a plan recruits left dorsolateral prefrontal 
networks. Right superior parietal networks were associated with attention processes and 
left superior parietal networks are thought to be involved in visuo-spatial processing 
(Newman et al., 2003).
1.9 Executive functions: conceptual frameworks
Researchers have different views on executive functions; for example, Lezak et al.
(2004) considered executive functions to be comprised o f volition, planning, purposive 
action and effective performance. Alternatively, Delis et al. (2001) conceptualised 
executive functions as planning, problem solving, inhibition, flexibility in thinking, 
impulse control, concept formation and creativity, operationalised in their Delis Kaplan 
Executive Function System test battery. Jurado and Rosselli (2007) argued that despite 
many definitions o f executive functions, they all share the following: in a constantly 
changing environment, individuals are able to plan and persevere with a task while 
inhibiting inappropriate behaviours. In a review of executive function research, Best, 
Miller and Jones (2009) noted that there is now a growing interest in typical executive 
function development, specifically the age at which abilities reach optimal performance.
Issues in executive function research are their operationalisation and measurement
because basic domain-specific functions, including memory, language, socio-emotional
and visuospatial skills are measured in addition to executive functions, resulting in the
need to extract the executive function component (Gioia & Isquith, 2004). Another key
debate in this area o f research is regarding the unity or diversity o f executive functions
(Jurado & Rosselli, 2007; Stuss & Alexander, 2007). This is concerned with whether
executive functions are conceptualised as a single ability or related, yet distinct
components. Collete et al. (2005) conducted a Positron Emission Tomography study
and found the left middle frontal gyrus and left inferior frontal gyrus are commonly
activated on updating, shifting and inhibition tasks, indicating unity o f executive
functions. In contrast, behavioural and neuroimaging studies show the multi-faceted
nature o f executive functions. Double dissociations in performance on executive tasks
provide evidence that executive functions are not solely unitary, for example a person
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performing poorly on the WCST but performing successfully on the Tower o f Hanoi 
(Miyake et al., 2000). The inter-correlations of executive function tasks are often lower 
than r = 0.4 and not significant (Huizinga et al., 2006). Moreover, Miyake et al. (2000) 
reported that Confirmatory Factor Analysis produces moderately correlated but 
separable factors, highlighting both the unity and diversity of executive functions. The 
finding of executive functions following different developmental trajectories (see 
Romine & Reynolds, 2005) provides further evidence for executive functions being 
conceptualised as distinct processes, instead of a unitary process. The next section 
reviews theories o f executive function.
1.10 Theories of executive function
1.10.1 Theory o f higher cortical functions (Luria, 1963,1973)
Luria considered how the interaction of multiple neuroanatomical regions mediates 
executive functions. Luria proposed three functional units corresponding to different 
neuroanatomical regions, with the first functional unit of physiological function 
associated with the brain stem and subcortex. The second unit is comprised of temporal, 
parietal and occipital networks, which receive, analyse and store visual, auditory and 
tactile information. According to Luria’s integrative theory of cognitive function, the 
anterior region o f the brain acts as a controlling agent, regulating higher cognitive 
functions and comprises the third functional unit.
Luria (1966) proposed that the interaction between typical brain maturation, social, 
historical and cultural environmental stimuli lead to the development o f executive 
functions. Development of higher cognitive functions follows five stages (Luria, 1980). 
The stage most relevant to the age group in this study is the final stage, proposed to 
begin from age eight throughout adolescence. In this stage, the continued maturation of 
frontal networks leads to executive function development. Andres (2003) criticised the 
methods used because only clinical observations with no control participants informed 
the theory and the lack of imaging data may have resulted in inaccurate lesion 
localisation.
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1.10.2 Theory of willed and automatic action (Norman & Shallice, 1986)
This model makes a distinction between automatic (routine) and controlled (non-routine 
or novel) behaviour. The process of contention scheduling, selecting the most 
appropriate automatic schema and inhibiting competing schemas, completes routine 
tasks. This theory suggests that schemas are methods for achieving goals and there is a 
schema network composed of nodes that activate when excitation exceeds a threshold. 
Novel tasks require more complex cognitive processing, e.g. a general planning 
component. According to this model, the Supervisory Attentional System (SAS) is 
engaged in novel or uncertain contexts instead o f relying on schemas. The SAS also 
monitors behaviour. Norman and Shallice (1986) associated the SAS with the frontal 
networks and contention scheduling with the basal ganglia. Andres (2003) criticised 
Norman and Shallice’s (1986) theory for not acknowledging that posterior brain regions 
are also important in novel behaviour.
Cooper and Shallice (2000) developed a computational model to test Norman and 
Shallice’s (1986) theory when applied to the control o f action in typically developing 
participants and Action Disorganisation Syndrome, associated with disorganised goal 
directed behaviour and frequent errors. The model accounted for the control o f action in 
typically developing participants and the presence o f omissions, perseveration, additions 
and substitutions in head-injured patients. However, this model was criticised for 
relating to simple tasks e.g. making a cup of coffee (Cooper et al., 2005).
1.10.3 Hierarchical feedback feed forward model (Stuss, 1992)
Alternatively, Stuss (1992) proposed a three level model: the first level of processing is
concerned with automatic, routine daily activities, the second level describes executive
functions and the third level is self-awareness. The first level of processing is thought to
be associated with basal regions and parallels contention scheduling. The second level,
executive control, integrates information and directs lower systems leading to goal
directed behaviour. The third level, self-awareness refers to “the ability to be aware o f
oneself and the relation of self to the environment” (p. 12). Incoming information is
assessed by a comparator at each level and compared to values developed from previous
experience and training. Change is triggered e.g. more information from the
environment or direction from higher levels if  incoming information is different to
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existing comparator values. Stuss (1992) suggested that the first level o f processing 
(automatic routine activity) matures earlier than executive functions, which develop at 
different rates. Morphological and behavioural data support this model. For example, 
Gogtay et al (2004) reported that phylogenetically older basal regions, associated with 
automatic routine activity, matured before frontal regions, thought to be involved in 
executive functions. Furthermore, executive function studies in late adolescence and 
early adulthood show that executive functions develop at different rates (Magar, Phillips 
& Hosie, 2010; Romine & Reynolds, 2005; Waber et al., 2007).
1.10.4 Multi-component model o f working memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974;
Baddeley, 1986)
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) suggested a working memory model composed of a central 
executive, phonological loop and visuo-spatial sketchpad. The central executive is 
thought to switch attention and co-ordinate the functions of the slave systems, the 
phonological loop and visuo-spatial sketchpad (Baddeley & Logie, 1999). The 
phonological loop processes speech-based information and the visuo-spatial sketchpad 
processes visual and spatial information. In the original model, the central executive 
was thought to be associated with frontal regions, although Baddeley (1998) suggested 
that the central executive was likely to involve other brain regions in addition to frontal 
regions. Baddeley (2000) added an episodic buffer to the model that stores and 
integrates information from various sources. The central executive is able to influence 
the content of the episodic buffer by focusing attention on a particular source.
1.10.5 Multiple domain model (Goldman-Rakic, 1996)
Goldman-Rakic (1996) proposed a multiple domain model through studies with 
primates. According to this model, different regions o f the frontal networks process 
different types o f information (spatial, object or semantic), with each network including 
parietal and temporal, premotor and limbic networks. Whilst Baddeley and Hitch 
(1974) viewed the central executive as one processor served by two slave systems, 
Goldman-Rakic (1996) proposed that the central executive might govern the interaction 
of multiple domain-specific processors. An important point about this model is that it is 
consistent with the anatomical connections of the frontal networks that extend to
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posterior regions. Research by Collette et al. (2006) in section 1.8 supports this model 
and the importance of both frontal and posterior brain regions.
1.10.6 Cascade model of cognitive control (Koechlin & Summerficld, 2007)
Koechlin and Summerfield (2007) criticised existing executive function theories for not 
fractionating executive function into location-specific subsystems that enable functional 
integration within and between these regions and sensory areas. The cascade model 
suggests that executive function fractionates into contextual, episodic and sensorimotor 
control and these are associated with specific lateral prefrontal regions. Koechlin, Ody 
and Kouneiher (2003) conducted an imaging study with participants completing an 
inhibition task that varied by manipulating the context, episodic and stimulus factors. 
Contextual control refers to signals in the immediate context that guide behaviour and is 
thought to be associated with the posterior lateral prefrontal cortex. Koechlin et al. 
(2003) suggested that the anterior lateral prefrontal cortex is associated with episodic 
control that guides action selection based on previous events. Sensorimotor control 
selects motor actions based on signals from contextual control, episodic control and the 
stimulus and is thought to be associated with premotor regions. A strength o f the 
cascade model is that it is more detailed than previous models by associating contextual, 
episodic and sensorimotor control with distinct regions in the lateral prefrontal network. 
However, future research should aim to understand how the lateral prefrontal cortex 
interacts with the medial prefrontal cortex in the model and the role o f bottom-up 
processing (Koechlin & Summerfield, 2003).
1.10.7 Summary of executive function theories
Ward (2010) identified a number o f similarities and differences between the models. 
These models concur that processes must be flexible to cope with changes and novel 
situations require automatic behaviour to be overridden. The models differ in how they 
conceptualise executive functions, for example unitary vs. modular. Strengths o f the 
Goldman-Rakic (1996) and Koechlin and Summerfield (2007) models are that they are 
more detailed compared to Baddeley’s (2000) working memory model and Norman and 
Shallice’s (1986) model in terms of how information is processed and anatomical 
regions. A criticism of existing theories is that they are unable to explain the broad
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range of behaviour of executive dysfunction. The only models to include the 
development o f executive functions are Luria (1980) and Stuss (1992), with other 
models not elucidating when executive functions reach adult levels o f performance.
1.11 Development o f executive functions in late adolescence and early adulthood: 
Behavioural studies
Romine and Reynolds (2005) conducted a meta-analysis o f cross sectional executive 
function studies and proposed a model for the development o f executive functions by 
analysing effect size differences across age groups (5-8 years, 8-11 years, 11-14 years, 
14-17 years and 17-22 years). The meta-analysis included measures of planning (Tower 
of London, Tower of Hanoi and the NEPSY Tower), inhibition of perseveration 
measures (perseverative responses and errors from the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task; 
WCST), set maintenance measures (categories achieved on the WCST), Verbal and 
Design Fluency. Studies in the meta-analysis used different measures o f planning; 
Anderson et al. (2001) administered a Tower o f London Task that consisted o f 12 
problems requiring 2 to 5 moves, with participants allowed a second attempt if  they 
could not achieve the target pattern with three beads. Welsh, Pennington and Groisser 
(1991) administered Tower o f Hanoi tasks with three and four discs, with repeat 
attempts until completion. On the NEPSY Tower (Korkman, Kirk & Kemp, 1998), 
suitable for 3 to 12 year olds, participants moved three balls on pegs to a target pattern 
with only 2 to 6 moves permitted.
Romine and Reynolds (2005) concluded that executive functions follow divergent 
developmental trajectories, with some executive functions such as inhibition of 
perseverative responses, showing optimal performance before other executive functions. 
Rapid development o f planning, verbal fluency, design fluency and inhibition of 
perseveration occurs between 5 to 8 years and 8 to 11 years. Two executive functions 
showing protracted development are verbal fluency and planning (indexed by Tower o f 
Hanoi), which continue to mature between 17 and 22 years (Romine & Reynolds, 
2005). Figure 1.3 presents the developmental trajectory o f executive functions of 
planning, verbal fluency, design fluency, inhibition of perseveration and set 
maintenance. Whilst this meta-analysis presents a linear developmental trajectory o f
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executive functions, it is plausible that some functions may be temporarily  dim inished 
during brain maturation in late adolescence and early adulthood.
Figure 1.3. Developmental course of executive functions based on average effect 
sizes.
F igu re  1.3. From  Romine and Reynolds (2005). This depicts the different 
developmental trajectories o f  executive functions showing the continued development 
o f  verbal fluency and planning into late adolescence and early adulthood.
Rom ine and Reynolds (2005) reported that inhibition o f  perseverative responses, 
m easured w ith the WCST, continued to develop between 11 and 14, but showed no 
further improvements up to 22 years, the oldest age included in the study. Research w ith 
the WCST has found inconsistent results. Chelune and Baer (1986) assessed 6 to 12 
year olds and an adult group and reported that 10 year olds showed sim ilar perform ance 
to adults, w ith  no significant improvements after age 10, on mean perseverative errors 
and failure to maintain set. W elsh et al. (1991) supported this and found adult 
performance on perseverative errors was again evident by age 10 in a sample o f  3 to 12 
year olds. A conflicting finding proposed that number o f  categories, perseverative 
responses and failure to maintain set continued to improve in 9 to 14 year olds and had 
not attained adult levels (Paniak, M iller, Murphy, Patterson & Keizer, 1996). The 
authors did not explain why their results may contrast w ith Chelune and Baer (1986), 
but noted that their sample size o f  685 participants was much larger than the sample size 
o f  105 in the Chelune and Baer (1986) study.
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Normative data from the D-KEFS supports Romine and Reynold’s (2005) model for 
executive function. Performance on the Verbal Fluency Task improves rapidly between 
8 and 19 years, with performance peaking in the 30-39 year age group illustrating 
continued development into adulthood (Delis, Kaplan & Kramer, 2001b). For the Tower 
Task, normative data showed that accuracy peaked in the 16-19 age group remaining 
relatively constant in the twenties, and rule violations were lowest in the 13-19 age 
group (Delis et al., 2001b). The D-KEFS normative data and the studies in the meta­
analysis by Romine &  Reynolds (2005) utilised cross sectional designs. Romine and 
Reynolds (2005) recommended the use o f other executive function measures and 
longitudinal designs in future research to identify individual differences. Romine & 
Reynolds (2005) questioned whether the slowing of maturation o f executive functions 
in adolescence and early adulthood was due to the actual neurocognitive development or 
limitations o f the tests, such as ceiling effects. The authors noted that as the model is 
based on specific executive function tasks the developmental trajectory o f each function 
might not be fully represented e.g. development o f inhibition o f perseveration might not 
be fully captured by performance on the WCST. The use o f wide age ranges in the 
meta-analysis by Romine and Reynolds (2005) might mask non-linear development (i.e. 
peaks and troughs in ability) occurring during late adolescence and early adulthood. 
Non-linear development would correspond to dynamic brain maturation in late 
adolescence, including synaptic pruning (e.g. Gogtay et al., 2004), increased white 
matter connectivity (Lebel et al., 2008; Paus, 2005; Sowell et al., 2003) and non-linear 
functional synchronisation (Uhlhaas et al., 2009).
Magar, Phillips and Hosie (2010) examined the development o f inhibition (go-no go 
task; Hooper, Luciana, Conklin & Yarger, 2004), updating (n-back task; Cohen et al., 
1997) and switching (number-letter switching task; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) in a 
sample o f 149 participants aged between 11 to 17 year olds (65 males and 84 females). 
In the computerised version of a Go-no Go Task, participants pressed the space bar on 
presentation of a number that was not a four or a nine. The n-back task required 
participants to decide whether a number presented on the computer was the same as the 
number presented immediately before (one back condition) or two numbers earlier (two 
back condition). In the number-letter switching task, participants decided if  the number 
was odd or even in number-letter pairs presented at the top comers o f a computer
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screen, or whether the letter was a vowel or a consonant in stimuli presented in the 
lower comers. Results showed that inhibition, associated with orbitofrontal networks, 
did not significantly change across the age range, whilst updating and switching, 
underpinned by dorsolateral prefrontal networks, continue to improve over adolescence 
(Magar et al., 2010). The authors suggested that the earlier development o f inhibition 
might be due to the earlier maturation o f orbitofrontal networks. This finding conflicts 
with work by Gogtay et al. (2004), reviewed in section 1.2.1, who reported synaptic 
pruning continues in orbitofrontal networks until the age of 21.
Age was a significant predictor o f updating and switching, but not for inhibition, 
accounting for approximately 7% o f variance in task performance (Magar et al., 2010). 
Stage of pubertal development did not explain any additional variance and there were 
no significant gender differences on any tasks. This study supports the findings by 
Romine and Reynolds (2005) o f executive functions following divergent developmental 
trajectories, with some continuing to develop into adolescence. However, as no graphs 
were included showing the developmental trajectories o f executive functions, the 
precise nature of development is unclear. The authors did not assess possible 
confounding variables, including IQ and drug use. With the oldest participant aged 17, 
this omits the development o f executive functions in late adolescence and early 
adulthood.
Magar et al. (2010) employed the go-no go task to assess inhibition. The Hayling Test is 
an alternative task, assessing verbal inhibition instead of motor inhibition, and is 
associated with activation in medial orbitofrontal networks in the initiation section and 
left dorsolateral prefrontal networks in the inhibition section (Nathaniel-James & Frith,
2002). Inhibition of a prepotent response develops in preschool years and continues to 
progress into adolescence, when improvements are noticeable in speed and accuracy 
(Best, Miller & Jones, 2009). Developmental studies mainly extend to middle childhood 
and have shown that response inhibition continues to improve to this age, but the oldest 
participants often do not attain adult levels o f performance so it is unknown when 
maturation is complete (Luna & Sweeney, 2004).
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Using a sequential design, Waber et al. (2007) investigated brain structure and 
neuropsychological task performance in a sample of 385 typically developing 
participants aged between 6 and 18 years. The sample size o f the six-year-old age group 
was 64; however only 2117  year olds and six participants aged 18 years were included 
in the sample. The authors recruited more participants at ages when they expected rapid 
developmental changes and fewer at ages when they thought development was more 
stable. However, imaging research has demonstrated that dynamic brain maturation 
continues into late adolescence and early adulthood (e.g. Gogtay et al., 2004; Lebel et 
al., 2008; Sowell et al., 2001), suggesting that these age ranges were under-represented 
in this study.
The test battery used in the Waber et al. study included the WASI (Wechsler, 1999), a 
modified version of the NEPSY Verbal Fluency Task (Korkman, Kirk & Kemp, 1998), 
spatial span, working memory tasks, the Intradimensional / Extradimensional Shift Task 
from the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Battery (CANTAB; CeNeS, 1998) and 
the Behaviour Rating Inventory o f Executive Functions (Gioia et al., 2000). 
Standardised scores give the performance o f a participant in relation to peers o f the 
same age and despite portraying individual differences, they are not sensitive to 
developmental differences. Therefore, Waber et al. (2007) analysed raw scores because 
they correlate with absolute task performance. The authors reported the effects o f age, 
gender and socioeconomic status on task performance. Socioeconomic status was based 
on family income and classified into three groups: low (less than $35,000 per year), 
medium ($35,000 to $75,000 per year) and high (over $75,000 per year). Age was a 
highly significant predictor for verbal fluency and number of shifts on the CANTAB 
intradimensional/extradimensional task, whereas gender and income were not 
significant predictors.
Performance on tasks assessing basic information processing, e.g. digit span and spatial 
span developed linearly between 6 to 18 year olds (Waber et al., 2007). Phonemic, 
semantic and total verbal fluency showed a linear increase into late adolescence (see 
Figure 1.4 left), supporting the findings reported by Romine and Reynolds (2005). 
Other tasks, e.g. female performance on ID/ED task, showed non-linear trajectories, 
with development increasing from age 6, levelling off around age 10 with a decline for
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females, followed by another spurt o f development at approximately age 14 (see Figure
1.4 right). Waber et al. noted that the cross sectional results must be considered 
preliminary data because it is not clear whether non-linear trajectories are typical or 
whether some adolescents diverge, with some levelling off while others continue to 
develop. The authors suggested that longitudinal data would elucidate these findings 
and show the natural development of performance on these tasks.
Figure 1.4. The development o f performance on Verbal Fluency and 
Intradimensional/Extradimensional shift task
V e rb a l F luency  ID /E D  S h if t  b y  S e x
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Figure 1.4. Left: The development o f verbal phonemic, semantic and total verbal 
fluency in a sample o f 6 to 18 year olds. Right: an example of a non-linear 
developmental trajectory for performance by females on 
Intradimensional/Extradimensional shift task. Reproduced from Waber et al. (2007).
Dumontheil, Houlton, Christoff and Blakemore (2010) demonstrated non-linear 
development on a relational reasoning task with a dip in accuracy in middle 
adolescence. Relational reasoning requires inhibition and cognitive flexibility 
(Diamond, 2013) and is associated with activation in the rostrolateral prefrontal cortex 
(Kroger et al., 2002). Shapes that varied by either shape or texture were presented on a 
computer. Participants aged between 7.3 and 27.5 years identified whether the top two 
shapes differed by the same dimension as the lower two shapes. Dumontheil et al. 
(2010) reported that performance peaked at 9-11 years with the attainment o f adult 
levels, followed by a dip in ability at age 11-13 and 14-17 years, with performance o f 19 
year olds returning to adult levels.
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The authors conducted fMRI scans to investigate the relationship between functional, 
structural and behavioural development. They found a combination o f linear and non­
linear age-related changes in prefrontal activity. There was significantly greater 
activation in the posterior part o f the rostrolateral prefrontal cortex in the mid adolescent 
group (14.8 to 18.6 years) compared to the adult group (22.5 to 30.4 years), indicating 
non-linear changes in rostrolateral prefrontal cortex activation, which the authors argued 
are possibly due to performance and brain maturation with age. There were no group 
differences for IQ, although this was assessed differently in the behavioural and 
imaging studies, with Verbal IQ and no assessment o f Performance IQ reported for the 
behavioural data, and Full IQ reported for the MRI data. In the behavioural study, adults 
completed the vocabulary subtest from the WASI (Wechsler, 1999) and children 
completed the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Burley, 
1997), whereas participants in the MRI study completed the Vocabulary and Matrix 
Reasoning subtests from the WASI (Wechsler, 1999).
Kalkut, Han, Lansing, Holdnack and Delis (2009) analysed the development of set 
shifting from childhood to adulthood using D-KEFS normative data (Delis et al., 2001). 
Trail Making, Design Fluency, Verbal Fluency, Colour-word interference and Card 
Sorting Task data were analysed for the following age groups: 8-9, 10-11, 12-13, 14-15, 
16-17, 18-24 and 25-30 year olds. The Trail Making Test, assessing visual scanning, 
sequencing and motor speed, requires participants to connect numbers, letters and a 
combination of numbers and letters in a visual array. In the Design Fluency Test, 
participants join filled dots, unfilled dots and a combination, providing an assessment o f 
non-verbal fluency and cognitive flexibility. The Verbal Fluency Task assesses strategy 
generation and comprises o f letter fluency (generating words beginning with a particular 
letter), category fluency (words belonging to a category e.g. naming animals) and 
category switching (fruits and furniture). The Colour-word Interference Task assesses 
inhibition with four sections to the task: naming colours, colour words, ink colour o f 
incongruent stimuli and switching between naming incongruent ink colour and word. In 
the Card Sorting Test, a measure o f concept formation, participants sort cards into 
groups (free sorting) or describe how the examiner has sorted the cards (sort 
recognition) based on verbal or perceptual features of the cards.
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The authors conducted five regression analyses, with IQ entered in step one, any 
component task data in step two (e.g. time taken to connect filled and unfilled dots on 
the Design Fluency Task), age and gender in step three and age-gender interaction in 
step four. IQ and age significantly predicted performance on each task. Gender was a 
significant predictor for four tasks; females outperformed men on trail making 
switching, design fluency switching, verbal fluency switching and Card Sorting Tests 
indicating that females are more cognitively flexible than males (Kalkut et al., 2009). 
Figure 1.5 shows the development o f sort descriptions, with the 18 to 24 year old group 
scoring more poorly compared to the 16 to 17 year old group, indicating non-linear 
development.
Figure 1.5. The development o f Description Score on the D-KEFS Card Sorting 
Test between childhood and adulthood. Reproduced from Kalkut et al. (2009).
Age
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The authors suggested, given equivocal previous research regarding gender differences, 
that gender differences may only be apparent on the more complex executive function 
tasks involving switching. Post-hoc comparisons between age groups indicated that 
switching ability continued to develop until middle adolescence, with no further 
improvement after the age of 15. Kalkut et al. (2009) recommended future research 
should investigate other executive functions, including inhibition, utilise a longitudinal
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design and assess pubertal development. Table 1.1 summarises studies indicating when 
executive functions mature.
Table 1.1. Maturation of executive functions
Executive function Task Age of maturity Reference
Set maintenance WCST -  categories 
achieved
14 Romine & Reynolds 
(2005)
Inhibition of WCST - 14 Romine & Reynolds
perseveration perseverative errors (2005)
Task switching D-KEFS Trail 
Making switching, 
Design Fluency 
switching and Verbal 
Fluency switching
15 Kalkut et al. (2009)
Strategy Semantic Fluency 14-15 Matute, Rosselli, Ardila
generation Test & Morales (2004)
Planning Tower Test Continues into 
early adulthood
Romine & Reynolds 
(2005)
Strategy Verbal Fluency Test Continues into Romine & Reynolds
generation early adulthood (2005)
Table 1.1 shows that research suggests some executive functions, such as set
maintenance, task switching and strategy generation (Semantic Fluency) do not develop 
further after age 14 to 15. Romine and Reynolds (2005) reported that planning, assessed 
with the Tower Test, and strategy generation, assessed with the Verbal Fluency Test 
continue to develop into early adulthood.
To summarise, behavioural studies have shown that executive functions follow different
developmental trajectories, with some showing no development after age 14 (e.g. set
maintenance; categories achieved on the WCST) while planning and letter fluency
continue developing into late adolescence and early adulthood (Romine & Reynolds,
2005). There is evidence of non-linear development o f some executive functions; 18 to
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24 year old males and females scored lower on D-KEFS Sorting Test description score, 
indicating poorer performance relative to 16-17 year olds (Kalkut et al., 2009) and 
relational reasoning in middle adolescence (Dumontheil et al., 2010). Gender 
differences are inconsistent, with females outperforming males on switching (Kalkut et 
al., 2009), whilst Magar et al. (2010) reported no gender differences on updating, 
switching and inhibition.
1.12 Definition of social cognition
Social cognition encompasses the perception and interpretation o f social situations 
(Fiske & Taylor, 2008). Scourfield, Martin, Lewis and McGuffin (1999) defined social 
cognition as “aspects o f higher cognitive function which underlie smooth social 
interactions by understanding and processing interpersonal cues and planning 
appropriate responses” (p. 559). Another definition by Carrington and Bailey (2009) 
specified that the consideration of facial expressions, body postures and prosody are 
important in understanding others' behaviour. The broad term social cognition 
incorporates a range of abilities including emotion recognition, empathy and perspective 
taking (Frith, 2007). Theory of Mind, the ability to impute a range o f mental states, 
including beliefs, desires and intentions to self and others (Premack & Woodruff, 1978), 
is also a key component o f social cognition (Carrington & Bailey, 2009; Kalbe et al., 
2010; Vollm et al., 2006). Empathy, an important element o f adaptive social cognition, 
is the “the tendency to be aware o f and react to the mental or emotional states o f other 
people.” (Davis & Franzoi, 1991, p. 72).
1.13 Role o f social cognition in late adolescence and early adulthood
Social cognition is vital in late adolescence and early adulthood because it allows 
individuals to conduct themselves appropriately at school or work and with friends 
(Rubin et al., 2005). An example o f when adolescents require social cognition skills in 
school and university is group work. An individual may need to employ his or her 
Theory o f Mind skills to understand another group member’s perspective. Late 
adolescence to early adulthood is an important transition phase, accompanied with 
changes in education, e.g. sixth form to university, or commencing employment. 
Another situation when social cognition skills are important is in job interviews, when a
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person must behave in an appropriate manner. Social cognition skills are in demand 
during adolescence when peer influence replaces parental influence. If  social cognition 
skills are weak, this could impede success at school, university or work and making 
friendships, possibly leading to isolation, anxiety and depression (Ahmed & Miller, 
2011 ).
1.14 Social cognition dysfunction
The next section discusses the transition between adolescence and adulthood for 
participants with Asperger’s Syndrome, because this emphasises how impairments in 
social cognition affect everyday life. Asperger’s Syndrome is associated with 
impairments in social cognition (e.g. Dziobek et al., 2006; Heavey et al., 2000) and the 
diagnostic criteria for Asperger’s Syndrome are impairment in social interaction and 
restricted, repetitive behaviour or interest (APA, 1994). However, see section 2.5.2 for 
discussion of recent changes in DSM V (APA, 2013).
Portway and Johnson (2005) interviewed 25 participants aged between 18 and 35 years 
with Asperger’s Syndrome. O f these, seven participants were in employment, although 
the authors did not specify full time or part time, four attended college and 14 were 
unemployed, indicating how Asperger’s Syndrome may affect employment prospects. 
Only one participant lived independently; other living arrangements included living 
with parents, alone with daily support, in care homes or hostels. Difficulty in making 
friendships, due to participants not understanding others and being misunderstood 
themselves, led to loneliness. These findings illustrate how impaired social cognition 
manifests in a lack o f understanding with peers and this can result in isolation or 
bullying (Attwood, 2006).
To summarise, social cognition is essential at all ages, but particularly in demand in late 
adolescence and early adulthood, during the transition to independence and autonomy 
including changes in friendship groups, education and employment. Knowledge of 
social cognition generally stems from studies of abnormal functioning. Considering the 
consequences o f Asperger’s Syndrome has illustrated the effect of impairments in social 
cognition on everyday life.
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1.15 Neural regions associated with social cognition
Brain imaging studies have consistently implicated the medial prefrontal cortex, 
superior temporal sulci and temporal poles, termed the social cognition or m entalising 
network, in social cognition task performance (Blakemore, 2008a; Frith & Frith, 2006; 
Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Moriguchi et al., 2007). Figure 1.6 presents the social 
cognition network.
Figure 1.6. The social brain  network. Reproduced from Golan, Baron-Cohen, Hill 
& Golan (2006)
In a review  o f  social cognition MRI studies, Carrington and Bailey (2009) reported that 
the medial prefrontal and orbitofrontal regions were recruited in 93%  o f  studies, 
followed by the temporo-parietal junction  in 58%, anterior cingulate cortex in 55%  and 
superior temporal sulcus in 50% o f  studies. Several studies have shown that different 
social cognition tasks recruit the 'social brain netw ork .’ The tasks used in these studies 
include stories and non-verbal cartoons requiring mentalising ability (G allagher et al.,
2000), animations o f  shapes (Castelli, Flappe, Frith & Frith, 2000), film  clips from  the 
Movie for the Assessment o f  Social Cognition (Dziobek et al., 2006), sentences about 
social or basic emotions (Burnett & B lakemore, 2009) and intentions (B lakemore, den 
Ouden, Choudhury & Frith, 2007). These studies have included adult participants, w ith 
the exception o f  the studies by Burnett and B lakemore (2009) and B lakemore et al. 
(2007), who included an additional adolescent group. This highlights the lack o f  social 
cognition data in late adolescence.
Carrington and Bailey (2009) concluded that the w ide range o f  tasks employed in 
imaging studies is unlikely to account for the differences in recruitm ent o f  different 
regions o f  the social brain network. It is likely that each region o f  the social cognition
o
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network contributes to social cognition in a particular way (Carrington & Bailey, 2009). 
For instance, Gallagher and Frith (2003) suggested that the medial prefrontal cortex is 
activated when determining a person’s mental state (e.g. a belief) that may be different 
from reality. The anterior cingulate cortex is thought to be involved in understanding 
intentions specifically in social interaction (Walter et al., 2004). The orbitofrontal 
network, located in the ventral region o f the prefrontal network (Kringelbach & Rolls,
2004), is implicated in social decision making with negative facial emotions (Willis, 
Palermo, Burke, McGrillen & Miller, 2010). The superior temporal sulcus is thought to 
be associated with the interpretation of others’ actions and intentions by analysing 
biological motion, including eye and body movements, together with static images of 
eyes and faces (Allison, Puce & McCarthy, 2000). The perception of faces is associated 
with activation in the fusiform face area, part o f the fusiform gyrus, at the junction of 
the temporal and occipital lobes (Kanwisher, McDermott & Chun, 1997) and the 
amygdala seems to be involved in visual emotion processing (Heberlein & Adolphs,
2005).
Figure 1.7 is adapted from Amodio and Frith (2006) and presents regions associated 
with social cognition. Mentalising (blue diamond), person perception (green triangle) 
and self-knowledge (yellow circle) are associated with anterior frontal regions. White 
circles indicate regions activated (Wolf, Dziobek & Heekeren, 2010) during the Movie 
for the Assessment o f Social Cognition (Dziobek et al., 2006) a dynamic social 
cognition task including social interaction (see Chapter 3 for task description). Wolf, 
Dziobek and Heekeren (2010) reported that several independent but synchronous 
networks were associated with task performance including occipito-parietotemporal 
networks, associated with face processing and recognition, temporal networks, lateral 
prefrontal networks and precuneus, implicated in language comprehension, and 
dorsomedial prefrontal networks and precuneus involved in self-referential mental state 
attribution. Figure 1.7 shows that both frontal and posterior networks mediate social 
cognition.
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Figure 1.7. Regions associated with social cognition.
O  A c t io n  m o n ito r in g
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P M e n t a l t 2 in g
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Posterior
F igu re  1 .7. The white circles added show regions associated w ith completing a dynam ic 
social cognition task (Wolf, Dziobek & Heekeren, 2010). D iagram  adapted from  
Amodio and Frith (2006).
Comparing the neural substrates associated w ith executive function task  perform ance in 
Figure 1.2 w ith social cognition task performance in Figure 1.7, common yet distinct 
neural substrates are involved in executive function and social cognition. Frontal 
regions are associated w ith both executive function and social cognition. However, 
diverse neural substrates, including posterior regions, contribute to perform ance on the 
MASC (W olf et al., 2010). The implication o f  distinct neural substrates being involved 
in executive function and social cognition is that they follow  different developmental 
trajectories.
Bird, Castelli, Malik, Frith and Husain (2004) reported a study where findings were not
consistent w ith the importance o f  medial prefrontal cortex in social cognition. A 62-
year-old patient, GT, who had suffered a rare form o f  stroke resulting in extensive
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bilateral damage to anterior regions of the medial frontal lobes, completed a range of 
social cognition and executive function tasks. GT attained an IQ of 102, within the 
average range, on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (Wechsler, 1981). 
Whilst some studies have found performance on Theory o f Mind stories tasks decreases 
into older age (Maylor, Moulson, Muncer & Taylor, 2002; Slessor, Phillips & Bull, 
2007), GT performed at ceiling on the mental state and physical state understanding 
questions on the short stories task (Happe, 1995), indicating no impairment on this 
advanced social cognition task. GT scored in the normal range for her age and IQ on the 
Animations Task (Castelli et al., 2000) requiring the attribution o f mental states to 
moving objects. The Faux Pas test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999) is comprised o f twenty 
short passages, with half including an inappropriate comment from a character. GT 
scored at the low end of the normal range, sometimes showing insensitivity to how a 
character would feel in a scenario.
Regarding executive function, the patient scored in the normal range on the F-A-S 
Letter Fluency Test (Benton & Hamsher, 1989), Trail Making Test (Army Individual 
Test Battery, 1944) and the Stroop Test (Trenery et al., 1989). GT attained a moderate- 
average score on section one of the Hayling sentence completion task (Burgess & 
Shallice, 1997), but failed to complete section two, requiring inhibition of the correct 
word and generation of a completely irrelevant word. Given the participant’s 
performance in the normal range on the Stroop Test, Bird et al. (2004) suggested poor 
performance on Hayling section two was due to a failure in generating an appropriate 
strategy. The finding o f intact social cognition and impaired performance on the 
Hayling Test indicates that social cognition and executive functions are functionally 
dissociable.
To summarise, imaging studies with typically developing participants have consistently 
highlighted the importance of medial frontal regions during social cognition task 
performance (Carrington & Bailey, 2009 Burnett & Blakemore, 2009; Castelli, Happe, 
Frith & Frith, 2007; Gallagher et al., 2000; Wolf, Dziobek & Heekeren, 2010). This is 
inconsistent with the case study o f GT, who showed intact social cognition skills 
following extensive damage to bilateral medial frontal regions. Possible explanations 
for GT’s intact social cognition skills are that the social cognition network was re ­
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organised or the recruitment o f other networks during task performance (Bird et al.,
2004).
1.16 Theories o f social cognition
This section introduces and evaluates theories o f social cognition including a model for 
the development of social cognition (Pelphrey & Perlman, 2009), Social Information 
Processing Network (Nelson, Leibenluft, McClure & Pine, 2005) and the Socio- 
cognitive Integration of Abilities Model (Beauchamp & Anderson, 2010).
1.16.1 Ontogeny of social cognition (Pelphrey & Perlman, 2009)
Pelphrey and Perlman (2009) proposed a model for the ontogeny o f social cognition 
from childhood through adolescence underpinned by increases in functional 
connectivity and aided by myelination and synaptic pruning. Figure 1.8 presents the 
model for the development o f social cognition by Pelphrey and Perlman (2009).
Figure 1.8. Model for the development of social cognition.
Figure 1.8. FFA = fusiform face area (occipital lobe), EBA = extrastriate body area 
(occipital lobe), STS = superior temporal sulcus (temporal lobe), AMY = amygdala 
(temporal lobe), TPJ = temporoparietal junction (temporal / parietal lobes) and mPFC = 
medial prefrontal cortex (frontal lobes). Reproduced from Pelphrey & Perlman (2009).
A strength o f the model for the development o f social cognition presented above 
(Pelphrey & Perlman, 2009) is that it attempts to match function to brain structure.
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There is supporting evidence from neuroimaging studies for the specified regions of 
interest. The most advanced stage of social cognition denoted in the model is belief 
representation, commonly assessed with false belief tasks. This seems to be inconsistent 
with behavioural data indicating that false belief tasks are completed successfully 
around the age of four (Happe, 1995), yet Pelphrey and Perlmann (2009) suggested 
belief representation continues to develop into adolescence. Furthermore, the model 
lacks detail because there are no ages specified for either the development o f social 
cognition stages or brain regions. The model omits some aspects o f social cognition 
e.g., empathy and perspective taking are not included, resulting in the model including a 
narrow range of abilities.
1.16.2 Social Information Processing Network (Nelson, Leibenluft, McClure & 
Pine, 2005)
The Social Information Processing network (SIPN) model, as described by the authors, 
posits that social information processing involves three “nodes” named the detection, 
affective and cognitive-regulatory nodes. Figure 1.9 presents the Social Information 
Processing Network (Nelson et al., 2005).
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Figure 1.9. Social Information Processing Network. Reproduced from Nelson, 
Leibenluft, McClure & Pine (2005)
The detection node, thought to be composed o f  the inferior regions o f  the temporal 
cortex, inferior occipital cortex, superior temporal sulcus and fusiform  face area, first 
processes a stimulus. The detection node decides whether a stimulus is animate, a 
conspecific (o f the same species) and considers its actions and intentions. I f  the stimulus 
is social, further processing is thought to occur in the affective node, comprised o f  the 
amygdala and hypothalamus, and a decision is produced about whether the stimulus 
should be avoided or approached. The cognitive-regulatory node o f  the model is 
considered to be comprised o f  the medial and dorsal prefrontal networks and the 
orbitofrontal network; this node is thought to be involved in mental state understanding, 
inhibition o f  prepotent responses and generation o f  goal-directed behaviour. Inform ation 
processing is prim arily thought to lead from  the detection node, to affective and 
cognitive-regulatory nodes, although bi-directional information processing has also 
been suggested, e.g. mental state monitoring during social interaction would involve 
both the detection and cognitive-regulatory nodes to detect the actions and mental state 
o f  the other person and then act appropriately.
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The authors proposed that the detection node matures in the first few years of life, with 
the maturation o f the affective node continuing into adolescence. The protracted 
maturation of frontal regions (e.g. Gogtay et al., 2004; Sowell et al., 2001) is thought to 
result in the cognitive-regulatory node developing into late adolescence. Secondary 
effects o f hormones may occur due to the interaction between affective and cognitive 
nodes. Hormones are thought to influence affective node maturation, whilst cognitive 
node development is independent o f hormonal status, instead being due to myelination 
and pruning o f neural networks. In addition, greater functional connectivity also 
develops between the components, resulting in greater top-down control. Nelson et al.
(2005) suggested rewiring of the affective and cognitive-regulatory nodes leads to 
changing social behaviour during adolescence, including romantic interest, with more 
time spent in the company of peers instead of family (Steinberg & Morris, 2001) and an 
increase in risk taking (Steinberg, 2008).
Strengths o f the SIPN model are that it specifies brain regions, when regions mature and 
how stimuli are processed. Nelson et al. (2005) noted that this model is speculative and 
needs further behavioural research, for example changes that occur in the SIPN. 
Choudhury et al. (2006) commented that the SIPN model does not distinguish between 
emotion processing about the self and another person and suggest an agency node for 
processing this information before the limbic node. A further limitation o f the model is 
that social information processing is not fragmented into separate components, e.g. 
visual / auditory information, and some aspects o f social cognition, for example 
empathy, are omitted. The model emphasises the development o f social information 
processing during adolescence being due to brain maturation but does not acknowledge 
that the environment may also contribute to development. Environmental factors 
applicable to adolescence may include starting or changing secondary schools or college 
and different friendship groups.
1.16.3 SOCIAL: Socio-cognitive Integration of Abilities Model (Beauchamp & 
Anderson, 2010)
This improves on previous models and adopts a multidisciplinary approach by 
integrating biological and psychological factors; the authors proposed that social
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cognitive development is dependent on normal brain maturation, cognition and 
behaviour, together with the influence of environmental and other factors. The SOCIAL 
model posits that internal and external factors influence social cognition, mediated by 
the environment and biological factors interacting bi-directionally with brain 
maturation. The outcome of the model is social function, defined as “overall 
performance across many everyday domains (e.g. independent living, employment, 
interpersonal relationships, recreation” (Yager & Ehmann, 2006, p. 48). Figure 1.10 
presents components o f the SOCIAL model.
Figure 1.10. SOCIAL: Socio-cognitive integration of abilities model. Reproduced 
from Beauchamp & Anderson (2010)
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The first component of the model is comprised of internal and external factors and brain 
development. Internal factors (e.g. personality, temperament or physical attributes) 
influence how an individual behaves during social interaction, with external factors 
affecting the quality and nature o f social interactions experienced by an individual, 
including family environment, socio-economic status or culture. A key aspect o f the 
SOCIAL model is that it includes the development and integrity of brain regions 
associated with social cognition skills, yet in explaining the model, the authors do not 
elaborate specific brain regions.
The SOCIAL model differentiates between social cognition and other aspects o f 
cognition, e.g. executive functions. Cognitive functions involved in social cognition 
form the second component: attention-executive and communication (cold processes)
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and socio-emotional (hot processes), with cold processes referring to cognitive and 
rational decision making and hot processes concerned with affective decision making 
(Seguin, Arseneault & Tremblay, 2007). The authors suggest that the attention- 
executive component includes attentional control, cognitive flexibility and goal setting, 
following the definition o f executive function by Anderson (2008). The communication 
component includes various aspects o f language thought to be related with social 
cognitive development, e.g. semantic ability (Slade & Ruffman, 2005), syntactical 
ability (de Villiers & Pyers, 2002), and pragmatic ability, the use and interpretation of 
language in communication (Milligan, Astington & Dack, 2007). The socio-emotional 
component ranges from basic social cognitive skills, the interpretation of facial 
expressions, to more complex abilities of Theory of Mind and empathy, the ability to 
infer and share others’ emotional experiences (Gallese, 2003).
Beauchamp and Anderson (2010) related the SOCIAL model to atypical social 
cognition development in Autism Spectrum Disorders, Schizophrenia and TBI. They 
consider this model as a conceptual framework for understanding typical and atypical 
social cognition development. The authors suggested that standard psychological 
measures for clinical utility should assess each component of the SOCIAL model. 
However, currently there are no data supporting this model.
1.16.4 Summary of social cognition theories
A strength o f the model for the development of social cognition (Pelphrey & Perlman,
2009) is that it attempts to match function to brain structure, although the model does
not indicate ages when social cognitive development occurs. The Social Information
Processing Network (Nelson et al., 2005) omits environmental factors because they are
difficult to operationalise and measure, whereas these are included in the SOCIAL
model by Beauchamp and Anderson (2010). While Beauchamp and Anderson (2010)
provided a descriptive account applying the SOCIAL model to atypical development, at
present, no empirical data supports this model. Samson and Apperly (2010) argued that
Theory of Mind is not unitary, composed instead of several processes culminating in
mental state understanding. However, current models o f social cognition do not fully
capture this or the diverse range o f abilities (i.e. Theory of Mind, empathy, perspective
taking etc.) or differentiate between different modalities (visual/auditory,
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static/dynamic). Furthermore, existing theories do not inform tasks appropriate for use 
in late adolescence or early adulthood.
1.17 Development of social cognition in late adolescence and early adulthood: 
Behavioural Studies
Social cognition research has until recently predominantly focused on children e.g. 8 to 
12 year olds (Golan, Baron-Cohen, Hill & Golan, 2008) or adults e.g. 22 to 62 year olds 
(Dziobek et al, 2006), resulting in a dearth o f studies investigating social cognitive 
development in adolescence (Moriguchi et al, 2007; Herba & Phillips, 2004). The 
following section reviews existing adolescent social cognition studies, with reference to 
whether development follows linear or non-linear trajectories.
Several studies have investigated emotion recognition development. Thomas, De Beilis, 
Graham and LaBar (2007) presented morphs o f Ekman faces (Ekman & Friesen, 1976) 
showing neutral to anger, neutral to fear and solely fear to children (mean age = 10.4 
years), adolescents (mean age = 15.7 years) and adults (mean age = 39.2 years). Adults 
showed greater sensitivity to the morphs compared to adolescents, who performed 
similarly to children. A linear developmental trajectory was reported for fear to anger 
morphs, whilst neutral to anger morphs showed a quadratic trend, indicating a sharp 
increase in sensitivity between adolescents and adults. These data provide preliminary 
evidence for ongoing development o f emotion recognition from adolescence to 
adulthood. This study also assessed pubertal development using a questionnaire (Tanner 
& Davies, 1985), although correlations with the child and adolescent groups between 
sensitivity to the morphs and pubertal development were not significant, indicating that 
emotion recognition is not related to pubertal development. This finding is inconsistent 
with Burnett, Thompson, Bird and Blakemore (2010) who found that pubertal 
development in 9 to 16 year old females, assessed with the self-administered rating 
scale for pubertal development (Carskadon & Acebo, 1993), was positively related to 
mixed emotion understanding, the ability to acknowledge that several emotions can be 
experienced in one situation. Thomas et al. (2007) suggested that future research should 
be conducted with other emotions because only anger and fear were examined in the 
present study.
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Dumontheil, Apperly and Blakemore (2010) found linear improvement when comparing 
child I (13 -9 .1  years), child II (9.8-11.4 years), adolescent I (11.5-13.9 years), 
adolescent II (14.0-17.7 years) and adult (19.1-27.5 years) groups on a spatial 
“Director” Perspective Taking Task. Participants viewed shelves with objects on, with 
some occluded from the director positioned on the other side of the shelves. In the 
Director condition, participants were required to move items following the director’s 
rules, taking into account his viewpoint. The No Director condition required participants 
to ignore objects in slots with a grey background, instead focusing only on the objects in 
clear slots. Groups did not differ on Verbal IQ, assessed with the British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale (Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Burley, 1997) or the WASI (Wechsler,
1999). The group aged 7.3 to 9.7 years made significantly more errors in the Director 
and No Director conditions compared to the adolescent group aged 14 to 17.7 years, 
who showed a significant trend with more errors than the adult group aged 19.1 to 27.5 
years only in the Director trials. Reaction times were also measured; the group aged 7.3 
to 9.7 years took significantly longer to respond than adolescents aged 11.5 to 13.9 
years and adults aged 19.1 to 27.5 years.
Dumontheil et al. (2010) suggested that the improvement in perspective taking between 
late adolescence and early adulthood was due to the maturation o f inhibiting a prepotent 
response. The authors concluded that an interaction between social cognition 
(perspective taking) and executive functions develops into late adolescence, yet no 
measure o f executive function, a possible confounding variable, was administered. In 
addition, they proposed an alternative explanation; as reaction times were significantly 
faster in the Director condition relative to the No Director condition, it is possible that 
the lower errors rates in adults were not because of an increase in perspective taking 
efficiency, but rather a greater tendency to consider the directors’ perspective. Positive 
aspects o f this study are that Dumontheil et al. (2010) assessed perspective taking ability 
beyond childhood into adolescence and adulthood utilising a task that avoided ceiling 
effects. However, a shortcoming of this study is that only Verbal IQ was assessed, with 
no assessment o f Performance IQ, so Full Scale IQ was not calculated; Gore, Bames- 
Holmes and Murphy (2010) reported that Full Scale IQ significantly correlated with 
perspective taking.
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Non-linear social cognitive ability is evident in early adolescence on the Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes Test, a visual assessment o f emotion recognition (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001). In this test 36 photographs o f eye regions are 
presented and the participant is required to select one of four mental states that best 
describes how the person is thinking or feeling. Children aged 11+ significantly 
outperformed children below 11 years of age, with scores increasing significantly from 
59% to 74% between ages 9-11, yet decreasing to 68% for 14 to 15 year olds (Tonks, 
Williams, Frampton, Yates & Slater, 2007). Vocal prosody tests from the Florida Affect 
Battery, assessments o f auditory emotion recognition, were also administered. 
Participants heard 20 sentences with neutral content expressing happiness, sadness, 
anger, fear or neutral emotions and selected the appropriate answer. Nine year olds 
attained a mean of 78% on this task, and performance improved with age with both 11 
and 12 year old groups scoring a mean of 88%. For ages 13 and 14 plus, there was a 
slight decrease in ability, with a mean score o f 83% reported, although there were no 
significant group differences on the vocal prosody test. However, participants ranged in 
age from nine to 15 years, so it is not possible to conclude how emotion recognition 
develops in late adolescence or early adulthood. The authors suggested that the study 
could be extended by utilising a longitudinal design instead o f a cross sectional design. 
Social cognitive development has previously been considered as linear and occurring in 
progressive stages (Beauchamp & Anderson, 2010), but the results from Tonks et al.
(2007) show a decline in ability during adolescence.
McGivem et al. (2002) found stronger evidence for non-linear development o f reaction 
times to emotional information on a match-to sample task. Participants were presented 
with stimuli depicting words, faces and a combination of words and faces categorised as 
happy, angry, sad or neutral, and had to decide whether the stimuli matched the original 
reference stimulus. The authors found that males and females in early adolescence 
showed a 10-20% increase in reaction times compared to participants one year younger. 
McGivem et al. (2002) suggested that the increase in reaction time responses around 
puberty might reflect inefficient frontal networks prior to synaptic pruning. Although 
brain morphology was not measured in this study, imaging research provides evidence 
to support this. For instance, in a cross sectional MRI study previously detailed, Sowell 
et al. (2001) reported grey matter loss in frontal and parietal networks between ages 7 to
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11 and 12 to 16. Furthermore, DTI research also indicates that synaptic pruning begins 
around puberty (Schmithorst & Yaun 2010).
A study investigating emotional perspective taking by Choudhury, Blakemore and 
Charman (2006) used a task requiring participants to read sentences presented in the 
first person perspective, e.g. “You are not allowed to go to your best friend’s party. 
How do you feel?” or third person perspective “A girl is not allowed to go to her best 
friend’s party. How does she feel?” Participants selected their answer from a choice of 
two cartoon faces showing very happy, happy, neutral, sad, angry and afraid 
expressions. Children (mean age 8.6 years), adolescents (mean age 12.8 years) and 
adults (mean age 24.0 years) completed the task. Choudhury et al. (2006) calculated the 
difference in reaction time between responding to a third person perspective and a first 
person perspective item. Larger differences for children and adolescents indicated a less 
systematic processing strategy relative to adults. Reaction time differences approached 
zero between age 20 and 30, suggesting a more proficient perspective taking strategy 
develops in adulthood. The authors reported a significant main effect o f age, but not of 
gender, with reaction time decreasing significantly with age. Choudhury et al. suggested 
that proficient perspective taking ability in adulthood is due to the maturation of the 
social cognition brain network and greater experience of social situations. Whilst this 
study provides evidence for linear development o f social cognition skills between 
adolescence and adulthood, the broad age ranges between the adolescent and adult age 
groups results in a lack of data specifically for late adolescence. In addition, participants 
selected from a choice o f two stimuli, increasing the likelihood o f ceiling effects.
The next section reviews empathy, a component of social cognition often measured. 
Empathy consists o f cognitive empathy, intellectual understanding o f another person’s 
mental state, and affective empathy, appropriate emotional response after considering 
the experiences o f another person and attributing a mental state to them (Lawrence, 
Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen & David, 2004). Scores on the Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index (IRI), a widely used measure o f empathy (Davis, 1983; see Chapter 3), increased 
in a sample o f 505 participants aged 13 to 15 years old with follow-up testing one year 
later (Mestre, Samper, Frias & Tur, 2009). The authors reported significant gender 
differences, with females scoring higher than males on all sub-scales o f the IRI. The
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gender difference increased at Time 2. However, as this study has a cut-off o f 16 years, 
it is not clear if  cognitive and affective empathy develops after this age. Extreme Male 
Brain Theory (Baron-Cohen, 2002) provides a possible explanation for gender 
differences in empathy based on the concepts o f empathising, a drive to understand 
another person’s emotions and respond appropriately, and systemising, a drive to 
understand rules that govern a system, e.g. syntax, a computer program or a business. 
Baron-Cohen (2002) argued that male brains are characterised by systemising > 
empathising whereas female brains are defined by empathising > systemising.
Davis and Franzoi (1991) assessed 205 participants on the IRI (Davis, 1983) aged 15 
and 16 years old at Time 1 at one-year intervals over three consecutive years. The 
authors reported significant increases in Perspective Taking, the tendency to consider 
another person’s point o f view, and Empathic Concern, the tendency to experience 
compassion and sympathy towards others, whereas ratings o f Personal Distress, the 
tendency to experience uneasiness in tense social situations, significantly decreased. 
These results highlight the multidimensional nature o f empathy, with different aspects 
o f empathy showing different developmental trajectories. Davis and Franzoi (1991) 
explained the results by Hoffman’s (1975; 1976) Theory of Empathy. Hoffman posited 
that during childhood Personal Distress and Perspective Taking develops and then 
Personal Distress decreases with age because self-oriented distress transforms to other 
oriented sympathy and compassion, or Empathic Concern. There were significant 
gender differences on all IRI sub-scales, with females scoring significantly higher than 
males. Davis and Franzoi (1991) acknowledged that participants may have adhered to 
demand characteristics specific to their gender, but suggested that the one-year interval 
between testing was enough time to minimise participants remembering their previous 
responses. They noted that a limitation of their study was that all the participants were 
from the same school in America, possibly leading to a narrow demographic range.
1.18 Relationship between executive functions and social cognition
Executive functions and social cognition are commonly considered interrelated (Carlson 
& Moses, 2001; Charlton et al., 2009; Doherty, 2009; Hughes & Ensor, 2007). Pemer 
and Lang (1999) proposed five theories about the relationship between executive
66
functions and social cognition; social cognition is a prerequisite for executive function, 
or executive function is a prerequisite for social cognition. Alternatively, social 
cognition tasks require executive functions, both types of tasks are completed using the 
same embedded control reasoning, or both types of tasks recruit common brain regions 
(Pemer & Lang, 1999). A limitation of these theories is that they are only relevant to 
childhood; the suggestion that executive function is a prerequisite for social cognition is 
inconsistent with the notion that executive functions follow a protracted development 
into adolescence. Furthermore, it is necessary to understand the relationships between 
executive functions and social cognition beyond childhood (Best, Miller & Jones,
2009). Carlson and Moses (2001) suggested that executive functions, for example 
inhibitory control, contribute to the development o f social cognition because executive 
functions and social cognition show similar developmental increases around preschool 
and are thought to recruit frontal networks. False belief tasks e.g. Sally Anne Test 
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985) require participants to inhibit their own knowledge 
of the situation and consider the characters’ beliefs.
Ahmed and Miller (2011) examined the relationship between executive function and 
social cognition in participants aged 18 to 27 years. The authors focused on which 
executive functions predict social cognition because Hughes (1998) found that 
executive functions predicted social cognition rather than social cognition predicting 
executive functions. The sample consisted o f typically developing participants because 
the relationships between executive function and social cognition are easier to infer 
(Ahmed & Miller, 2011). Participants completed all subtests from the D-KEFS (Delis, 
Kaplan & Kramer, 2001; see Chapter 3 for test descriptions). The Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), Strange Stories Test (Happe, 1994) and the 
Faux Pas Test (Stone et al., 1998) assessed social cognition. The Wechsler Test o f Adult 
Reading (Wechsler, 2001) provided an estimation o f Full Scale IQ. The researchers 
collected demographic information about age, gender, ethnicity, United States 
geographical region and family income. There were no significant correlations between 
scores on the social cognition tasks. Three separate hierarchical multiple regression 
analyses were conducted with the social cognition tasks as single dependent variables. 
Demographic variables that significantly correlated with the dependent variable were 
entered in the first step as independent variables, followed by any executive function
67
tasks that significantly correlated with the dependent variable. Estimated IQ was the 
only significant predictor o f performance on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, 
with no executive function scores being significant predictors. No demographic 
variables were significant predictors of performance on the Strange Stories Task. Scores 
on the Verbal Fluency Test measure o f strategy generation, and the Word Context Test, 
a measure o f deductive reasoning, significantly predicted performance on the Strange 
Stories Test. Gender was a significant predictor for performance on the Faux Pas Test, 
with females scoring significantly higher than males. Verbal Fluency and the number o f 
confirmed correct sorts on the Sorting Test, a measure o f concept formation, also 
predicted Faux Pas Test scores.
Ahmed and Miller (2011) concluded that different executive functions are associated 
with different aspects o f social cognition. A positive point about this study was the 
inclusion o f a wide range of executive function tasks and social cognition tasks with 
different formats (e.g. visual format for the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test and 
written format for the Strange Stories and Faux Pas Tests). This study also focused on 
social cognition and executive function in early adulthood, when the majority o f 
previous research has involved children or older adults. However, the authors noted that 
participants with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) were not excluded from the study 
and gave no indication of the number of participants with ASD. This may have had an 
impact on the results because ASD is associated with deficits in social cognition (Brent, 
Rios, Happe & Charman, 2004; Dziobek et al., 2006; Golan, Baron-Cohen, Hill & 
Golan, 2006; Heavey, Phillips, Baron-Cohen & Rutter, 2000).
1.19 IQ
The next sections consider IQ because many studies suggest that executive function,
social cognition and IQ are related (Ardila, Pineda & Rosselli, 2000; Charlton et al.,
2009; Obonsawin, Crawford, Page, Chalmers, Cochrane & Low, 2002). Spearman
(1927) proposed g  or general intelligence, the notion that cognitive tasks often correlate
highly and share a common factor. Duncan, Johnson, Swales and Freer (1997) reported
that Cattell’s Culture Fair, an assessment o f g, correlated positively with executive
function tasks including the Verbal Fluency Task (Benton & Hamsher, 1978), Six
Elements Task (Shallice & Burgess, 1991) and a Letter-monitoring Task (Duncan et al.,
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1996) in HI patients, indicating that these tasks share a common element (Duncan et al.,
1997). These results have been replicated in studies with typically developing 
participants (Obonsawin et al., 2002) and HI patients (Wood & Liossi, 2006) with a 
range of executive function tasks e.g. Hayling and Brixton (Burgess & Shallice, 1997), 
Card Sorting Test (Milner, 1963) and Tower of London (Shallice, 1982).
Horn and Cattell (1967) proposed the fluid and crystallised intelligence dichotomy. 
Fluid intelligence continues to increase into the late teens or early twenties, followed by 
a decline (Wechsler, 1981). The Block Design and Matrix Reasoning sub-tests o f the 
WASI assess fluid intelligence, higher mental abilities including reasoning (Bugg, 
Zook, DeLosh, Davalos & Davis, 2006). The development o f crystallised intelligence is 
more protracted, peaking around the late twenties with a very gradual decline 
(Salthouse, 1992). Crystallised intelligence refers to knowledge acquired through 
education and culture, measured with the Vocabulary and Similarities sub-tests from the 
WASI.
1.20 Relationship between EF, social cognition and IQ
In a review of studies, Garcia-Molina, Tirapu-Ustarroz, Luna-Lario, Ibanez and Duque 
(2010) concluded that executive functions and intelligence overlap but not in all aspects. 
Ardila, Pineda and Rosselli (2000) examined the relationship between executive 
function measures and intelligence in 13 to 16 year olds. The authors reported a 
significant positive correlation of approximately 0.3 between phonological verbal 
fluency and both Verbal IQ and Full Scale IQ, assessed with the Wechsler Intelligence 
Scale for Children (Wechsler, 1991). Verbal and Full Scale IQ showed a significant 
negative correlation with perseverative errors on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task. The 
only executive function measure to correlate significantly with Performance IQ was a 
negative correlation with time on the Trail Making Test. Ardila et al. (2000) noted that 
the sample was from a region with low socio-economic status, yet no measure was 
reported.
Friedman et al. (2006) reported further evidence for some executive functions being
unrelated to intelligence. Participants, who were 234 twins aged between 16 and 18
years, completed tasks o f inhibition, updating and shifting. Inhibition was assessed with
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the Antisaccade Task (Roberts, Hager & Heron, 1994), requiring participants to inhibit 
looking at a cue, the Stop-signal Task (Logan, 1994) in which participants attempt to 
withhold a motor response on particular trials and the Stroop Task (Stroop, 1935), 
involving the naming o f incongruent font colours and inhibiting reading the colour 
words. The updating tasks required the recall o f information previously presented using 
auditory and spatial tasks. Shifting tasks required participants to switch between 
classifying numbers and letters, and shapes and colours. Raven’s Progressive Matrices 
Test, a multiple-choice vocabulary test (DeFries, Plomin, Vandenberg & Kuse, 1981) 
and the Block Design and Information sub-tests from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale (Wechsler, 1997) provided a measure of intelligence. Updating significantly 
correlated with Performance IQ, whereas inhibition and shifting did not. Updating, 
shifting and inhibition significantly correlated with Verbal IQ. The authors reported no 
demographic information about the sample. Plomin et al. (2001) questioned the 
generalisability o f twin studies and whether samples of twins are representative o f the 
human population, given that twins are often bom prematurely (Philips, 1993), usually 
with a lower birth weight compared to single babies (MacGillivray et al., 1988) and are 
reported to experience language delay (Sutcliffe & Derom, 2006).
There is debate about whether social cognition and IQ are related or independent 
cognitive domains (Rajkumar, Yovan, Raveendran & Russell, 2008). For example, 
Golan et al. (2007) reported a significant positive correlation between WASI Verbal IQ 
and scores on the Reading the Mind in the Voices Test. Dziobek et al. (2006) found a 
significant positive correlation between the Strange Stories Test and Verbal IQ, assessed 
with the Shipley Institute of Living Scale (Prado & Taub, 1966). Verbal IQ did not 
correlate with scores on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (Golan et al., 2007) or 
the MASC (Dziobek et al., 2006). Performance IQ did not correlate with scores on the 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test and Reading the Mind in the Voices Test (Golan et 
al., 2007). These findings indicate that performance on some social cognition tasks that 
require less verbal processing may be independent from general intelligence, although 
inconsistent findings could be due to different tasks used to assess IQ (Heavey et al., 
2000 ).
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A review of the literature reveals a dearth o f research into social cognition and 
executive function development in late adolescence and early adulthood (Moriguchi et 
al., 2007; Herba & Phillips, 2004), with the majority of studies in this area including 
children or older adults. Research has predominantly focused on children e.g. 8 to 12 
year olds (Golan, Baron-Cohen, Hill & Golan, 2008) or had age cut-offs so that late 
adolescence and beyond are not included (e.g. executive function in 11 to 17 year olds; 
Magar et al. (2010), or social cognition in 14 to 18 year olds; Thomas et al., 2007). 
Given that histological and imaging studies have provided consistent evidence for post­
adolescent brain changes, specifically synaptogenesis and synaptic pruning in frontal 
networks (e.g. Huttenlocher & Dabholkar, 1997; Schmithorst & Yuan, 2010), the 
present research focuses on the cognitive implications of this protracted maturation. 
Whilst imaging studies suggest white and grey matter maturation during adolescence, 
the majority do not report behavioural data.
First-episode psychosis, anxiety, depression and eating disorders often occur in late 
adolescence, suggesting that a combination of rapid rates o f brain maturation, 
psychosocial, hormonal and environmental factors confer vulnerability at these ages 
(Paus, Keshevan & Giedd, 2008; Barker et al., 2010). Protracted brain maturation into 
late adolescence and early adulthood increases susceptibility to neuropathology, 
summarised in the phrase “moving parts get broken” (Paus et al., 2008, p. 954). Studies 
of executive function ability have previously included participants with atypical 
development, such as HI (e.g. Barker et al., 2010; Barker, Andrade, Romanowski, 
Morton & Wasti, 2006) and schizophrenia (Royer et al., 2009). Social cognition studies 
have also involved participants with atypical development, e.g. children and adolescents 
with Asperger’s Syndrome (e.g. Kaland et al., 2008) and TBI (e.g. Stronach & Turkstra,
2008). There is a lack o f research into the typical developmental trajectory o f social 
cognition and executive functions in late adolescence and early adulthood (Romine & 
Reynolds, 2005).
Moreover, head injuries are also frequent in this age group. A 25 year longitudinal study 
into the prevalence o f head injuries with an initial cohort of 1,265 found the highest 
incidence of head injuries were in the 15 to 20 year old group, with approximately 30%
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1.21 Rationale for present research
of participants experiencing a head injury by the age o f 25 (McKinlay et al., 2008). In 
addition, head injuries are frequent in childhood; Crowe, Anderson, Catroppa and Babl 
(2010) reported 406 six to 16 year olds had attended hospital for head injury treatment 
in one year. The number o f head injuries sustained in childhood is important because it 
is possible that deficits following childhood head injury become evident in late 
adolescence or early adulthood, defined as the “latent trajectory o f impairment” (Tranel 
& Eslinger, 2000, p. 275). Eslinger, Grattan, Damasio and Damasio (1992) reported a 
case study o f DT, who sustained damage to her left prefrontal network and white matter 
at age 7, followed by improvement and then a delayed onset of deficits in adolescence, 
including empathic ability and social development. Currently, it is unknown what social 
cognition and executive function abilities are typical in late adolescence and early 
adulthood. It is possible that certain functions go offline temporarily and this would be 
evident in non-linear trajectories, with a peak in ability followed by a trough and then 
improvement. It is important to understand the development o f executive functions in 
typically developing adolescents because this has implications for rehabilitation 
following head injury (Reynolds & Horton, 2008). Therefore, deficits seen in pathology 
in this age group could then be reliably ascribed as ‘deficits’ rather than due to typical 
non-linear developmental trajectories.
1.22 Aims of the Thesis
This thesis examines executive function and social cognition specifically in a typically 
developing late adolescent and early adulthood group, with participants aged 17 years 0 
months -  17 years 8 months, 18 years 0 months -  18 years 8 months and 19 years 0 
months -  19 years 8 months at Time 1. De Luca et al. (2003) recommended the use o f 
fine-grained age groups because broad age groups decrease sensitivity. No previous 
research has concurrently measured executive function and social cognition in this fine­
grained age range. As previous research has recommended a longitudinal design (Kalkut 
et al., 2009; Romine & Reynolds, 2005; Tonks et al., 2007; Waber et al., 2007), this 
study adopted a sequential design, allowing cross sectional and longitudinal data 
analyses. It was hypothesised there would be changes in executive functions and social 
cognition with age, with some functions developing linearly and others following a non­
linear developmental trajectory in late adolescence and early adulthood.
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Chapter 2 reviews literature on considerations of research in late adolescence and early 
adulthood. Chapter 3 is a methodology review including the sequential design and task 
selection. Chapter 4 presents demographic data from Time 1 and Time 2. Chapter 5 
presents and discusses cross sectional Time 1 executive function and social cognition 
data. Chapter 6 includes cross sectional Time 2 executive function and social cognition 
data and longitudinal analyses. Chapter 7 reports IQ, mood, gender and executive 
function predictors o f social cognition task scores. Chapter 8 summarises and discusses 
the findings in relation to previous research. Implications of the research are considered 
together with ideas o f future research.
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Chapter 2 
Considerations of research in late 
adolescence and young adulthood
2.1 Chapter overview
The rationale for this chapter is to review  issues that confound research in late 
adolescence and early adulthood including the effect o f  pubertal developm ent and mood 
on executive function and social cognition. This chapter also reviews how  drug use, 
specifically alcohol, cannabis and ecstasy, affects brain m aturation and cognitive 
function. Statistics are included to indicate the prevalence o f  drug use in late 
adolescence and early adulthood. The impact o f  atypical development, including Head 
Injury, Autism  Spectrum  Disorders, Depression, Anxiety and Obsessive-compulsive 
D isorder on cognitive function is discussed. Participants w ith head injury and autism  
spectrum  disorders were excluded from  the study; executive function and social 
cognition research in these populations is reviewed to provide a rationale for their 
exclusion.
2.2 Pubertal development
Whilst there is evidence o f  sex hormones resulting in neuronal re-organisation during
prenatal development (Genazzani et al., 2007), it is now  thought that increasing
hormones during puberty results in another phase o f  neuronal re-organisation (Romeo,
2003). In a review  o f  studies into pubertal m aturation and white m atter development,
Ladoucer, Peper, Crone and Dahl (2012) concluded that pubertal hormones influence
tim ing and re-organisation o f  white m atter w ith gender differences evident. Hormones
are also thought to have an organisational effect on grey m atter resulting in sexual
dimorphism . In a sample o f  8 to 15 year olds, Neufang et al. (2009) found that males
towards the end o f  puberty (Tanner stage 4 or 5) had larger grey m atter volumes in the
left amygdala, whereas females showed higher grey matter volumes in the hippocampus
and right striatum , compared to earlier stages o f  puberty. Testosterone levels positively
correlated w ith grey m atter volumes in the hypothalamus, whilst testosterone negatively
74
correlated with grey matter volumes in the left parietal cortex. Neufang et al. (2009) 
noted that it is not clear whether hormones affect neural organisation directly or whether 
social experiences are also involved.
The role o f hormones and pubertal development is often overlooked in developmental 
research (Kalkut, Han, Lansing, Holdnack & Delis, 2009; Blakemore, 2008a) due to 
measurement issues o f assessing puberty, a protracted process instead o f a single event 
(Blakemore, Burnett & Dahl, 2010; see Chapter 3 for a review of pubertal development 
measures). Some researchers have investigated the effects o f pubertal development on 
executive function and social cognition. In one study, 8 to 28 year olds completed the 
Stroop Task, occulomotor Response Inhibition Task and the 5-move Stockings of 
Cambridge measure o f planning (Olaguni-Jones, Luna & Asato, 2007). Participants 
completed the Tanner Maturation Scale (Marshall & Tanner, 1970) and rated how 
similar their bodies were to photographs showing progressive pubertal development. 
Early maturers were the youngest 25% of participants at each Tanner stage, late 
maturers were the oldest 25% of participants at each Tanner stage and the ‘on time’ 
group were the remaining participants. Early maturing females showed lower response 
inhibition performance on the Stroop Task and an oculomotor response inhibition task 
compared to on time and late maturers. In males, there was no relationship between 
pubertal development and inhibition. There were no pubertal group differences on the 
spatial planning task, indicating pubertal development does not affect this executive 
function.
Research indicates that the phase o f the menstrual cycle can affect executive function 
task performance. Maki, Rich and Rosenbaum (2002) assessed females aged 18 to 28 
years in their early follicular (lowest oestrogen and progesterone) and midluteal phases 
(high oestrogen and progesterone). A Rhyme Fluency Task required participants to 
generate words that rhymed with two difficult cue words (e.g. curls) and a cue word 
with a large number o f possible rhymes (e.g. name). The Phonemic Fluency Test 
required participants to generate words beginning with the letters C and L and category 
fluency assessed with the generation o f words belonging to a semantic category (e.g. 
vegetables). For the Mental Rotations Test (Vandenberg &  Kuse, 1978) participants 
selected two out o f four 3-D drawings that were mental rotations o f an original image.
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The Grooved Pegboard Test (Reitan & Davison, 1974) assessed fine motor performance 
and dexterity. Participants completed the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (Watson, 
Clark & Tellegen, 1988) to assess possible intra-individual differences in mood. 
Participants generated significantly more rhymes and performed significantly faster on 
the Grooved Pegboard Test during midluteal relative to follicular phases. In contrast, 
mental rotation was significantly better during the follicular phase compared to the 
luteal phase. Oestrogen positively correlated with scores on the Phonological and 
Category Fluency Tasks and was negatively related to performance on the Mental 
Rotations Task. Positive and Negative Affect did not correlate with task scores and did 
not differ significantly between follicular and midluteal phases. This indicates that 
menstrual cycle differences in strategy generation, mental rotation and fine motor skills 
are likely due to oestrogens’ effect on the hippocampus and parietal lobes, not due to 
hormonal effects on mood (Maki et al., 2002).
In a social cognition study, Burnett, Thompson, Bird and Blakemore (2011) found that 
performance on an emotion-understanding task related to pubertal development instead 
of age. Participants aged 9 to 16 years were assigned to early, mid or post puberty 
groups based on their scores on a questionnaire adapted from Carskadon and Acebo's 
(1993) Rating Scale for Pubertal Development (see Chapter 3). The stimuli were 
scenarios designed to elicit social emotions requiring representation of mental states 
(guilt or embarrassment) or basic emotions (fear or anger). Participants rated on visual 
analogue scales to what extent they would experience guilt, embarrassment, fear or 
anger in the scenarios. The authors reported an increase in mixed emotion reporting 
between early and post puberty groups for only social emotion scenarios. However, 
Burnett et al. (2011) noted that their method for assessing the experienced emotions has 
not been previously used and requires validation. Moreover it is not clear how mixed 
emotion reporting relates to more traditional social cognition tasks e.g. the Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Contrasting results show that 
pubertal development measured with the Tanner questionnaire (Tanner & Davies, 1985) 
in 7-13 and 14-18 year olds was not correlated with performance on an emotion 
recognition task (Thomas, De Beilis, Graham & LaBar, 2007). Furthermore, Magar, 
Phillips & Hosie (2010) reported stage of pubertal development in a group o f 11 to 17
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year olds explained no more variance beyond age on executive function measures of 
inhibition, updating and switching.
To summarise, pubertal development is often not assessed in adolescent research 
(Blakemore, 2008a). Pubertal development has been found to affect inhibition (Olaguni- 
Jones, Luna & Asato, 2007) and emotion understanding assessed with a visual analogue 
scale (Burnett et al., 2011) although other studies reported pubertal development did not 
relate to emotion recognition (Thomas et al., 2007) or executive functions (Magar et al.,
2010). Equivocal findings might be explained by variability in methodologies and age 
of participants.
2.3 Mood
Moods are coherent affective states and range in duration from minutes to hours, 
whereas emotions can be experienced in seconds or less (Lazarus, 1994). Behavioural 
studies o f executive function often fail to examine participants’ moods, even though 
research shows that small changes in mood can affect executive function (Mitchell & 
Phillips, 2007). Three theories that explain how mood influences executive functions 
are explained. Capacity limitation theories (e.g. Seibert & Ellis, 1991) suggest that both 
positive and negative moods utilise cognitive resources resulting in a reduction in 
available resources and impair executive function task performance. The “mood as 
information” model posits that positive mood may lead to a heuristic processing style, 
hindering executive function performance; negative mood leads to a realisation that 
there is a problem in the environment, increasing motivation resulting in more analytic 
processing and more effective executive function performance (Park & Banaji, 2000). 
An alternative theory is that positive mood could facilitate executive functioning 
through activation of the dopaminergic system (Ashby, Isen & Turken, 1999) although 
this may be restricted to when tasks are interesting (Isen, 1999).
Oaksford et al. (1996) examined the effect o f mood on planning, assessed with a four-
move Tower o f London Task (Shallice, 1982). Participants attempted to change their
mood by using images and memories and viewed a film appropriate to their group
(good/happy, bad/unhappy or neutral, together with a control group). Prior to and
following the film, participants completed a mood state measure from Isen et al. (1987)
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with a 9-point likert scale and five items (calm-anxious, alert-unaware, positive- 
negative, refreshed-tired and amused-sober). This measure provides a less 
comprehensive mood assessment than the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (Watson, 
Clark & Tellegen, 1988). The positive mood group employed significantly more moves 
compared to the negative mood group and controls, although there was no difference in 
planning time between the positive mood group and controls. The negative mood group 
employed the same number o f moves as the control group, although there was a non­
significant trend with longer planning times in the negative group relative to controls. 
Oaksford et al. (1996) explained the greater number o f moves evident in the positive 
mood group by depleted central executive resources leading to a less efficient plan. The 
negative mood group compensated for their depleted cognitive resources by taking 
longer to formulate their plans. However, caution must be taken in interpreting this 
finding due to the lack of significant group differences. The authors noted that 
participants may not fully engage with attempting to create a bad mood. Overall, 
positive mood had a greater effect on task performance, resulting in less efficient 
planning. These findings partially support capacity limitation theories (Seibert & Ellis, 
1991) and the mood as information model (Park & Banaji, 2000), although there was no 
significant effect o f negative mood on executive function.
In another executive function study, Phillips, Smith and Gilhooly (2002) compared a 
group o f younger adults (aged 1 9 - 3 7  years) and older adults (53 -  80 years) who 
completed three trials o f the 5 disk Tower o f London planning task (Ward & Allport, 
1997) following positive, neutral or negative mood induction procedures consisting o f a 
film clip and music. Participants completed the Positive Affect and Negative Affect 
Scale (Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988) on arrival, following the film clip and five 
minutes o f music and after the Tower o f London task. Only the younger group findings 
are reported here because their age is more similar to late adolescence / early adulthood. 
The younger group in a positive mood solved fewer trials in the minimum number o f 
moves than the negative mood group, whilst there were no differences between mood 
conditions in the number o f extra moves. The younger positive mood group spent less 
time planning compared to the neutral mood group. These findings indicate that 
planning is impaired by positive mood but is unaffected by negative mood in young 
adults. The finding that positive mood impairs performance on Tower tasks (Phillips,
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Smith & Gilhooly, 2002; Oaksford et al., 1996) supports a mood as information model. 
A possible explanation is that happy people are less motivated to employ a systematic 
approach unless the task directly affects their wellbeing or is interesting (Bodenhauser, 
Kramer & Susser, 1994).
Phillips, Bull, Adams and Fraser (2002) examined the effects o f happy or neutral mood 
induction on performance on a Letter Fluency Task, with participants (mean age 29 
years) producing as many words as possible beginning with “A” in one minute. Mood 
ratings taken after task completion significantly correlated with number o f words 
produced, with a more positive mood associated with the production o f more words. In 
contrast to planning tasks, there is evidence that positive mood may facilitate Verbal 
Fluency Task performance. This finding conflicts with the mood as information model 
(Park & Banaji, 2000) and capacity limitation theory (Seibert & Ellis, 1991) because a 
broad search space is needed for successful performance on Letter Fluency Tasks.
Mood also affects social cognition; for example, Converse, Lin, Keysar and Epley
(2008) induced happy or sad moods with music and then participants, who were 
university students, completed a modified false belief task. Participants induced to feel 
happy were less likely to use their Theory o f Mind, instead being influenced more by 
their own private knowledge, than participants in the sad condition. Participants also 
completed the Director Perspective Taking Task, requiring the consideration o f a 
director’s viewpoint when following instructions. Converse et al. (2008) found 
participants in a happy condition elicited more egocentric behaviour than the sad 
condition, shown by a participant moving an object visible only to them and not the 
director. In summary, the groups induced to feel sad were more likely to use knowledge 
about others when making mental state inferences.
To overcome the problem of short-lived emotion induction lasting for less than 10 
minutes, Chepenik, Comew and Farah (2007) administered an initial emotion induction 
followed by two further inductions throughout the testing sessions. Using a within 
participants design, a sad emotion was elicited by thinking o f the death o f a loved one 
and a neutral emotion involved thinking about food shopping. The task battery was 
comprised of an emotion recognition task (the Ekman static photographs portraying
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anger, afraid, neutral, happy and sad faces), the Stroop, Go/No-Go, digit span and object 
2-back tasks. Participants in the neutral condition scored significantly higher in 
comparison to the sad condition on the emotion recognition task, while there were no 
group differences on the other tasks. A possible explanation is that the mood induction 
procedure did not create moods with enough strength to affect executive function or 
perhaps a broader selection o f executive function tasks should have been included 
(Chepenik, Comew & Farah, 2007). The finding of the sad participants scoring 
significantly lower than the neutral condition is inconsistent with the above study by 
Converse et al. (2008) when a sad mood was associated with higher scores. A possible 
explanation is the different tasks employed; the Director Perspective Taking task 
required visuo-spatial skills, whereas the social cognition task in the study by Chepenik 
et al. (2007) involved mental state attribution.
To summarise, participants in a positive mood made more moves on the Tower o f 
London planning task relative to participants in a negative mood (Oaksford et al., 1996; 
Phillips et al., 2002). In tasks that are novel, such as innovative word searching in 
Verbal Fluency Tasks, motivation causes positive mood to improve performance 
(Phillips, Bull, Adams & Fraser, 2002). Normal fluctuations in negative mood do not 
greatly affect executive function, but this may be due to negative mood inductions being 
mild and experienced for a short time (Mitchell & Phillips, 2007). A suggestion for 
future research is to examine the effects o f mood on inhibition, because few studies 
have focused on this (Mitchell & Phillips, 2007). With regard to social cognition, 
Converse et al. (2008) found sad mood related to better performance on the Director 
Perspective Taking Task whereas Chepenik et al. (2007) reported sad mood was 
associated with lower emotion recognition relative to neutral mood.
2.4 Drug use and impact on brain maturation and cognitive function
2.4.1 Alcohol use in late adolescence / early adulthood
In 2013, alcohol statistics indicated 52% of 16-24 year old males and 50% o f 16-24 year 
old females reported drinking alcohol in the previous week (Office for National 
Statistics, 2013). In the 16-24 year old age range, 22% of males reported drinking more 
than eight units o f alcohol on one day in the previous week and 19% of females reported
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drinking more than six units on one day in the previous week. These statistics indicate 
that alcohol use is prevalent in late adolescence and early adulthood.
In a DTI study assessing the effects o f binge drinking on white matter, Mcqueeny et al.
(2009) compared scans o f 16 to 19 year olds who were binge drinkers (at least 4 drinks 
for females and at least 5 drinks for males in one sitting during 3 months prior to 
participation) to controls matched on age, gender, education, ethnicity and Verbal IQ. 
Binge drinkers had significantly lower FA, an index of white matter coherence, in 18 
white matter pathways in frontal, cerebellar, temporal and parietal regions compared to 
the control group. A study reviewed in Chapter 1 showed that greater FA is associated 
with more efficient strategy generation (Bava et al., 2010). Therefore, reduced white 
matter coherence in binge drinkers relative to controls is likely to impact on executive 
function.
Parada et al. (2012) reported a study investigating the effects o f binge drinking in early 
adulthood. The authors divided first year university students (mean age = 1 8  years 9 
months) into binge drinkers and non-binge drinkers according to scores on the Alcohol 
Use Disorders Identification Test (Varela, Brana, Real & Rial, 2005). Binge drinkers 
consumed six or more alcoholic drinks on one occasion, consuming three or more 
drinks per hour, one or more times per month. Non-binge drinkers never consumed six 
or more alcoholic drinks on no more than one occasion per month, drinking two or 
fewer drinks per hour. Participants completed the Spanish version of the Letter Fluency 
Task (Fortuny, Hermiosillo-Romo, Heaton & Pardee, 1999), a measure o f response 
generation requiring participants to say as many words as possible in one minute 
beginning with the letters P, M and R. The Zoo Map subtest o f the Behavioural 
Assessment o f Dysexecutive Syndrome (Wilson et al., 1996), a measure o f planning, 
required participants to follow a set o f instructions and rules to plan a route around a 
zoo. The Backward Digit Span Test (Wechsler, 1999), an assessment o f verbal working 
memory, required participants to listen to a sequence of numbers and recall them in 
reverse order. The Self-ordered Pointing Test (Petrides & Milner, 1982) assessed 
planning and self-monitoring. In this task, participants pointed to a design on each page 
without repeating their previous responses in a booklet with abstract designs. 
Participants completed the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 3 (Robinson, Kester, Saykin,
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Kaplan & Gur, 1991), a short version of the WCST with 64 cards, assessing concept 
formation. Binge drinkers scored significantly lower on the backward digit span test, a 
measure o f verbal working memory, and made more perseverative errors on the Self- 
ordered Pointing Test, a measure o f self-monitoring, compared to non-binge drinkers. 
No group differences were evident on strategy generation, planning or concept 
formation, assessed with the Letter Fluency Task, Zoo Map and WCST. Parada et al.
(2012) summarised the results by suggesting poorer performance of binge drinkers 
relative to non-binge drinkers was evident on executive function tasks associated with 
the dorsolateral prefrontal networks. However, no group differences were evident on the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test or Letter Fluency and these tasks are associated with 
dorsolateral networks (Wang, Kakigi & Hoshiyama, 2001; Baldo, Schwartz, Wilkins & 
Dronkers, 2006). Parada et al. (2012) suggested future research should employ a 
longitudinal design because the cross sectional design does not elucidate the directional 
relationship between executive function and alcohol use.
Other studies have investigated how alcohol affects social cognition. However, social 
cognition and alcohol studies presently involve older participants beyond late 
adolescence and early adulthood. One study is reviewed here because the demographic 
data at the start of this section show that alcohol use is prevalent in late adolescence and 
early adulthood and this could affect social cognition.
Uekermann et al. (2005) investigated facial and prosodic emotion recognition in 
alcoholic and control groups (mean age = 42 years) who were similar with regards to 
age, education level and estimated IQ (alcohol group IQ = 110 and control group = 
113). Participants completed the Tubingen Affect Battery, a German version o f the 
Florida Affect Battery Revised (Blonder et al., 1991) comprised of three sections. The 
facial emotion recognition tasks show anger, happiness, fear, sadness and neutral 
emotions and include the naming of emotions and matching a stimulus photograph with 
a reference photograph. The second section assesses prosodic understanding of basic 
emotions and the tasks involve naming emotions and deciding whether the semantic 
content is congruent or incongruent with prosody. Participants were also required to 
match prosody with the correct facial expression and vice versa. The authors 
hypothesised that the alcohol group would show deficits in both visual and prosodic
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emotion processing. These findings partly support the hypothesis because the alcohol 
group only demonstrated impairment in processing prosodic information and not for 
facial affect processing. The authors proposed that the alcohol group scored lower when 
naming incongruent semantic prosody compared with the controls because successful 
completion o f this task requires inhibition o f semantic information. Uekermann et al.
(2005) argued that inhibition is impaired in alcoholics, although Guillot et al. (2010) 
found no impairment o f inhibition in alcoholics compared to controls.
To summarise, both neuroimaging and behavioural data have demonstrated impaired 
functioning in alcoholics relative to healthy controls. McQueeny et al. (2009) reported 
lower FA, an index of white matter coherence, in frontal, cerebellar, temporal and 
parietal regions in binge drinkers relative to controls. Parada et al. (2012) found that 
binge drinkers made more perseverative errors on a measure of planning and self­
monitoring compared to non-binge drinkers. There is also evidence of impaired social 
cognition in alcoholics. Uekermann et al. (2005) found a deficit in emotion processing 
only for prosodic information not facial emotion recognition in alcoholics relative to 
controls. While some studies included older age groups, they can be related to the 
present study because alcohol use is common in late adolescence and early adulthood.
2.4.2 Cannabis use in late adolescence / early adulthood
The 2011/2012 British Crime Survey stated that 15.7% of 16 to 24 year olds reported 
using cannabis in the previous year (Home Office, 2012). The most frequently reported 
age of first cannabis use was 16 years. These statistics illustrate that cannabis use is 
prevalent in late adolescence and early adulthood.
Heavy cannabis use in adolescence may detrimentally interfere with brain maturation. A 
PET study showed frontal networks contain high densities o f cannabinoid CB1 
receptors (Bums et al., 2007). Dmgs affect chemical neuromodulation including 
dopaminergic and serotonergic transmitters in frontal networks (Robbins, 2000); this is 
notable because frontal networks are associated with executive function (Stuss & 
Alexander, 2007) and social cognition (Frith & Frith, 2006). Pattij, Wiskerke and 
Scoffelmeer (2008) proposed that cannabis use in adolescence leads to vulnerability o f
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lasting deficits in executive function because cannabinoid receptors show increased 
sensitivity and brain maturation is protracted, continuing into late adolescence and early 
adulthood. In a DTI study, Ashtari et al. (2009) found reduced FA and increased Radial 
Diffusivity in fronto-temporal connections in adolescents aged between 17 and 21 years 
with heavy cannabis use compared to controls, suggesting heavy cannabis use leads to 
myelin deficiencies. However, a limitation o f this study is that results could reflect a 
combination of alcohol and cannabis use because alcohol intake was not controlled for, 
despite five participants in the drug group previously meeting DSM IV criteria (APA,
1994) for alcohol abuse (Ashtari et al., 2009).
In an MRI study, Lopez-Larson et al. (2011) reported behavioural data showing the 
effects o f cannabis use on neuropsychological task performance with 18 heavy cannabis 
users, defined as using the drug at least 100 times in the previous year, and 18 non­
cannabis users aged 16 to 19 years. Participants completed a Verbal Fluency Task, 
although it is not apparent which version o f the task was administered. O f interest, the 
cannabis users scored significantly higher on the Verbal Fluency Task compared to non­
users, although McHale & Hunt (2008) found the opposite (see below). The cannabis 
users showed decreased cortical thickness in the bilateral superior frontal cortex and 
right caudal middle frontal area in comparison to non-users. Lopez-Larson et al. (2011) 
noted that the reduction in grey matter evident in cannabis users might be due to grey 
matter not reaching peak thickness in cannabis users, or perhaps the toxicity o f cannabis 
leading to grey matter loss. Cannabis users also showed increased cortical thickness in 
bilateral lingual, right superior temporal, right inferior parietal and left paracentral 
regions compared with non-users; the authors proposed this was due to a delay in 
pruning. Some regions with increased cortical thickness, including the inferior parietal 
and lingual regions, are associated with performance on Verbal Fluency Tasks 
(Gauthier, Duyme, Zanca & Capron, 2009) and so it is possible that greater thickness in 
the cannabis users was an advantage on this task. Furthermore, groups were not 
matched on IQ at baseline and IQ was not assessed in this study so a possible 
explanation is that the higher letter fluency in cannabis users was due to higher IQ 
compared to the control group.
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McHale and Hunt (2008) compared performance of recent cannabis users, abstinent 
cannabis users and a control group, who had never used cannabis, and reported 
contrasting results. University students completed a phonemic Verbal Fluency Task 
requiring participants to write down words beginning with “C” in one minute. Inclusion 
criteria for recent cannabis users were that they had used cannabis during the previous 
week, but not on the day prior to testing, whilst abstinent cannabis users had smoked 
cannabis in the last four weeks, but not in the week before testing. Self-report data from 
the recent cannabis users showed that they smoked cannabis five to six times a week 
and the abstinent group reported using cannabis twice a week, with both groups 
smoking an average of two joints per session. The control group scored significantly 
higher on the Verbal Fluency Task compared to both o f the cannabis user groups and 
the abstinent cannabis user group scored significantly higher than the recent cannabis 
users. The authors suggested future research should employ a longitudinal design to 
elucidate whether longer periods o f abstinence result in similar executive function 
performance to non-users, although age cannabis use started and age at test are likely to 
be crucial variables. The extent to which descriptive statistics for the Verbal Fluency 
Task performance can be compared to other studies may be limited by different task 
formats. In the study by McHale and Hunt (2008), participants wrote down their 
responses to the letter C, whereas other versions o f the Verbal Fluency Task use the 
letters F, A and S, with the examiner recording the items instead o f the participant (e.g. 
D-KEFS Letter Fluency; Delis et al., 2001). The task format may have contributed to 
group differences because cannabis use is associated with impaired motor control 
(Ramaekers et al., 2006) possibly resulting in cannabis users writing at a slower rate.
Pope et al. (2003) investigated the effects o f commencing cannabis use before age 17 
and after. Participants ranging in age from 30 to 35 years formed three groups: current 
heavy users (smoke daily, used at least 5,000 times), former heavy smokers (used at 
least 5,000 times but less than 12 times in previous 3 months) and comparison group 
(used cannabis less than 50 times and no more than once during the previous year). All 
participants remained abstinent for 28 days prior to completing the study and this was 
monitored with urine samples. Cannabis users who started using the drug before age 17 
attained a significantly lower Verbal IQ (WAIS; Wechsler, 1981) than both users who 
started after age 17 and the control group (Pope et al., 2003). The early cannabis onset
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group also scored significantly lower than the control group on the number o f semantic 
categories given on the Controlled Oral Word Association Test, or FAS Task (Lezak,
1995) measure o f strategy generation. Pope et al. proposed three explanations for these 
results; it is possible that early onset cannabis users had a lower innate IQ before they 
began using cannabis. Alternatively, differences in motivation to complete education 
(32% of early onset users, 60% of late onset users and 82% of controls had graduated 
from college) could affect Verbal IQ scores because assessment was with a vocabulary 
test and vocabulary skills in early onset users may not be fully developed. Another 
suggestion is that early onset cannabis use is toxic and leads to potentially irreversible 
deficits (Pope et al., 2003). A limitation of this study is that the authors did not explain 
why the age o f 17 was selected to form the early onset and late onset groups, when the 
brain continues to mature beyond this age into late adolescence and early adulthood.
There is a lack of research into the effects o f cannabis on social cognition in contrast to 
the many studies into executive function performance o f cannabis users. Platt, Kamboj, 
Morgan and Curran (2010) developed the Dynamic Emotional Expression Recognition 
Task, showing dynamic stimuli o f neutral facial expressions changing to happiness, 
sadness and anger. Participants were required to identify the emerging emotions as 
quickly and accurately as possible. The sample consisted of frequent cannabis users, 
who used the drug at least 15 days per month and had used it over 50 times altogether, 
and non-cannabis users, who had a lifetime use o f less than 10 times. Participants 
completed the Dynamic Emotional Expression Recognition Task and the Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes Task (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). There were no significant group 
differences on the Eyes Task. Accuracy of emotion recognition for the dynamic 
emotions was also similar for both the cannabis and non-users; however, the cannabis 
group was significantly slower at recognising emotions in the dynamic clips compared 
to non-users. Platt et al. (2010) recommended that future research should examine the 
remaining basic emotions in different populations of cannabis users including infrequent 
users and previous chronic users.
To summarise, there is evidence of atypical white matter brain maturation in fronto- 
temporal connections in cannabis users in comparison to controls (Ashtari et al., 2009). 
Cannabis users have shown deficits on executive function tasks, for example, Letter
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Fluency (McHale & Hunt, 2008), although Lopez-Larson et al. (2011) reported higher 
performance in cannabis users compared to non-users on a Letter Fluency Task, a 
measure o f strategy generation. Cannabis users and non-users have performed similarly 
on the Eyes task and the Dynamic Emotional Expression Recognition Task, although 
the cannabis users took significantly longer than the control group on the latter task 
(Platt et al., 2010).
2.4.3 Ecstasy use in late adolescence /  early adulthood
Ecstasy (3, 4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine, MDMA) is the second most 
commonly used illegal drug after cannabis in the general population, particularly in 
adolescence and early adulthood (De Win et al., 2008). The 2011/2012 British Crime 
Survey reported that 3.3% o f 16 to 24 year olds had used ecstasy in the previous year 
and the most frequently reported age of first use was at age 18 (Home Office, 2012).
De Win et al. (2008) recruited a sample o f young adults who had never used ecstasy but 
were at a relatively high risk o f starting to use the drug assessed by an intention to 
probably or certainly use ecstasy for the first time in the near future and/or having one 
or more friends who currently use ecstasy. Diffusion Tensor Imaging at 12 and 36 
months following baseline showed new ecstasy users had reduced FA in frontoparietal 
white matter tracts, whereas non-users had an increase in FA, suggesting that ecstasy 
prevents white matter maturation in frontoparietal tracts (De Win et al., 2008). This 
could affect executive (Collette et al., 2006) and social functions (Carrington & Bailey, 
2009). The authors concluded that a low to moderate dose of ecstasy (1 to 80 tablets) 
affects brain structure.
Behavioural studies investigating the effects o f ecstasy use on executive function ability 
are inconsistent. De Sola Llopis et al. (2008) compared ecstasy and cannabis polydrug 
users (mean age = 23.6 years), cannabis users (mean age = 22 years) and non-users 
(mean age = 22 years) on the Tower o f London Task (Shallice, 1982), a measure of 
planning, and a semantic Verbal Fluency Task requiring the generation o f words in the 
category o f animals. Participants were asked to abstain for 72 hours before testing with 
urine and hair samples used to screen for drugs. No group differences were evident for
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the total number o f moves or first move time on the Tower of London Task. Lifetime 
ecstasy use positively correlated with number o f moves on the Tower o f London Task, 
indicating that greater ecstasy use was associated with a less efficient planning strategy 
than lower ecstasy use. The ecstasy group scored significantly lower compared to 
controls on the semantic Verbal Fluency Task. A notable part o f this study is the 
longitudinal design; at a 2-year follow up, both the ecstasy and control groups showed 
improved performance on the Verbal Fluency Task, although scores for the ecstasy 
group remained significantly lower than the control group. This indicates development 
of functions underpinning performance on the Verbal Fluency Task in early adulthood. 
A confounding variable is the level o f cannabis use between groups; the ecstasy and 
cannabis polydrug group used on average 4,368 joints over their lifetime, compared to 
the cannabis groups who smoked on average 1,670 joints in their lifetime.
In another study, Piechatzek et al. (2009) administered executive function tasks to 
participants in four groups with a mean age o f 25 years: those who had used ecstasy, 
individuals with a history o f more than five uses o f cannabis and no ecstasy use, alcohol 
use (minimum of a single occasion of 7 drinks for 6 or more months with no more than 
5 uses o f cannabis and no ecstasy use) and participants who did not excessively 
consume alcohol or use drugs. The task battery included a Verbal Fluency Task and a 
Non-Verbal Fluency Task, the Intra/extra Dimensional Shift Task (Owen et al., 1990), 
an assessment of set shifting and the Stockings o f Cambridge, a measure o f planning 
similar to the Tower o f London, from the CANTAB (Cambridge Cognition, 2004). 
Higher error rates in shifting on the Intra/extra Dimensional Shift Task were associated 
with more prolific cannabis and ecstasy use. There was no relationship between ecstasy 
use and planning ability measured with the Stockings o f Cambridge test or letter and 
semantic verbal fluency. A possible explanation is that the average dose o f ecstasy was 
too low to cause impairment in executive function (Piechatzek et al., 2009). The authors 
acknowledged that their data analyses were limited to correlations and suggested future 
research should employ prospective longitudinal studies.
Other studies have assessed the effects o f ecstasy on social cognition. Yip and Lee
(2006) assessed abstinent ecstasy users and non users with visual static and prosodic 
emotion recognition tasks composed o f an identification section (saying which emotion
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a stimulus portrays) and discrimination section (selecting which o f two stimuli show a 
particular emotion). The stimuli portrayed basic emotions of happiness, sadness, anger, 
surprise, disgust and fear. Abstinent ecstasy users scored significantly lower than non­
users on overall facial and prosodic emotion recognition and identification with specific 
impairments for sadness and disgust. Participants completed category Verbal Fluency 
Tests with categories o f fruit and vegetables, animals and instruments. The Ruff Figural 
Fluency Test (Ruff, 1996) assessed non-verbal fluency, with participants required to 
generate unique designs on different configurations of dots. Abstinent ecstasy users 
scored significantly lower than non-users on these executive function tasks. Time since 
ecstasy was last taken negatively predicted facial and prosodic emotion recognition and 
disgust recognition. However, the length o f abstinence was not clear because there were 
no descriptive statistics reported for this variable or participants’ age. Another limitation 
noted by Yip and Lee (2006), applicable to all research on the cognitive effects of 
ecstasy, is that ecstasy users often take other drugs and ecstasy tablets also contain other 
substances, with an estimation of tablets containing around 50% MDMA (Cheng, Poon 
& Chan, 2003). A notable part o f this study is that the authors conducted regression 
analyses to identify whether executive functions significantly predicted social cognition 
in abstinent ecstasy users. Scores on the animal Verbal Fluency Test measuring strategy 
generation significantly predicted disgust recognition. Performance on the Figural 
Fluency Test measuring non-verbal fluency significantly predicted overall facial and 
prosodic emotion identification and sadness and disgust recognition. These findings 
suggest that executive functions predict social cognition in these groups, although it is 
o f interest whether other executive functions, beside fluency measures, predict 
performance on a wider range of social cognition tasks including more complex 
emotions and dynamic stimuli.
Overall, greater ecstasy use is associated with impaired planning and strategy generation 
(De Sola Llopis et al., 2008) although other studies have found no planning deficits in 
ecstasy users compared to non-users (Piechatzek et al., 2009) possibly due to a lower 
dose o f ecstasy. Yip and Lee (2006) found ecstasy users were impaired in overall facial 
and prosodic emotion recognition and identification, specifically sadness and disgust, 
compared to non-users. Findings from ecstasy studies are much more clear-cut than
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cannabis studies indicating that ecstasy use is possibly more detrimental to cognitive 
functioning overall than cannabis use.
2.5 Brain maturation and atypical development o f social cognition and executive 
function in late adolescence and early adulthood
The combination of rapid rates of brain maturation, psychosocial, hormonal and 
environmental factors confer vulnerability to mental illness in late adolescence and 
early adulthood (Paus, Keshevan & Giedd, 2008). This section outlines prevalence of 
mental illness in late adolescence and early adulthood. More recent statistics that do not 
include a breakdown of prevalence in late adolescence and early adulthood are omitted. 
The review includes an evaluation of the exclusion criteria of head injury and autism 
spectrum disorders, followed by depression, anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorder.
2.5.1 Head Injury
Head Injuries (HI) are common in late adolescence and early adulthood. Butterworth, 
Anstey, Jorm and Rodgers (2004) collected self-report HI statistics, defined as at least 
15 minutes unconscious, from 7,488 randomly selected Australian residents from 
cohorts in their 20’s, 40’s and 60’s. Lifetime prevalence o f HI and report o f multiple HI 
was highest in the youngest age group. It is plausible that the youngest cohort may be 
more likely to experience HI through sport or accidents and are more likely to survive a 
HI compared to older cohorts (Butterworth et al., 2004).
Research has shown that HI affects both executive functions and social cognition. For
example, Jacobs, Harvey and Anderson (2011) assessed executive functions in 79 HI
participants aged 7 to 16 years including traumatic brain injuries, strokes and tumours.
This study is included here because adult HI studies often have broad age ranges with
participants much older than adolescence, whereas the age group in this study is nearer
to late adolescence. Three groups of HI participants including frontal patients with
damage only to prefrontal regions, extra-frontal patients with damage to regions other
than frontal areas, and a generalised group with damage to frontal and posterior regions
were compared to an age-matched control group on executive function measures.
Participants completed the Contingency Naming Test (Taylor et al., 1987), an
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assessment o f attentional control, self-monitoring, response inhibition and cognitive 
flexibility. The stimuli consisted o f three rows of coloured shapes inside another shape. 
Participants were required to name the colour o f the shapes and then name the outside 
shape. A rule or contingency was introduced specifying colour naming if  the inside and 
outside shapes were congruent and naming the outside shape when incongruent. A 
further rule required this to be reversed on presentation o f an arrow. In addition, 
participants completed the Tower o f London (Shallice, 1982) measure o f planning and 
Controlled Oral Word Association Test (COWAT; Benton & Hamsher, 1989) measure 
of letter fluency.
Frontal and generalised HI groups made significantly more rule breaks on the Tower o f 
London and more errors on the CO WAT Letter Fluency Task than the control group. In 
comparison to controls, all HI groups generated significantly fewer words on the Letter 
Fluency Task, a measure o f strategy generation, made more failed attempts on the 
Tower o f London planning task and performed worse on the Contingency Naming Test 
requiring attentional control, self-monitoring, response inhibition and cognitive 
flexibility. A strength of this study is that the effect o f damage to different regions on 
executive functions was assessed and the finding o f deficits, irrespective o f pathology 
region, provides support to the notion that the integrity o f the whole brain is crucial to 
executive function (Jacobs, Harvey & Anderson, 2011). However, confounding factors 
o f age at HI and time since injury could not be examined due to the sample size (Jacobs, 
Harvey & Anderson, 2011).
In another study, Muller et al. (2010) compared 15 participants (mean age 32 years) 
who had sustained a HI with a control group matched for age, gender and years o f 
education on social cognition tasks. Despite the participants being marginally older than 
late adolescence / early adulthood, this study is included because a wide range o f social 
cognition and executive functions were assessed. The interval between injury and 
testing was wide and ranged from nine to 443 months. Participants completed the 
following social cognition tasks: the Faux Pas Test (Stone et al., 1998) requiring 
detection of when a character made a faux pas, first and second order false belief stories 
(Rowe et al., 2001), an assessment o f emotion recognition (Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes Test; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and a self-report measure o f empathy
(Interpersonal Reactivity Index; Davis, 1983). The HI group scored significantly lower 
compared to the control group on the second order false belief tasks, Faux Pas Test and 
the Eyes Test.
Participants also completed executive function tasks including the Trail Making Test 
(Reitan & Walfson, 1993), assessing mental flexibility, Verbal Fluency Test (Cardebat 
et al., 1990), a measure o f strategy generation, and the Stroop Test (Bruyer et al., 1995), 
an assessment o f inhibition. The majority of correlations between social cognition and 
executive function task performance were not significant, with the authors noting that 
social cognition and executive functions dissociate. This notion is supported by imaging 
data showing separate neural pathways are recruited in social cognition (Carrington & 
Bailey, 2009) and executive function tasks (Collette et al., 2006). Muller et al. (2010) 
commented that future research with a larger sample size would provide results that are 
more conclusive. The HI group scored lower than standard scores on the executive 
function tasks; however, Muller et al. (2010) did not note whether these differences 
were significant or if  there were any significant differences between the HI and control 
group on measures of executive function. A further limitation is that there was no 
assessment o f IQ in the control group so groups could not be compared for this variable. 
In addition, groups were not matched for IQ, which is common in other HI studies. The 
HI group had sustained injuries to a variety of brain regions including mostly frontal, 
sometimes in addition to other regions, and so direct association cannot be made 
between lesion site and functional impairment.
To summarise, participants with HI show impaired strategy generation and planning 
relative to a control group (Jacobs, Harvey & Anderson, 2011). Furthermore, deficits 
are evident on social cognition tasks requiring faux pas understanding, visual emotion 
recognition and false belief attribution (Muller et al., 2010). Findings from these studies 
support the idea that executive functions require whole brain integrity and that executive 
function and social cognition are dissociable. They also indicate a special role o f frontal 
networks to executive function and social cognition. However, confounding variables 
including lack o f IQ assessment, differing age at injury and time since injury should be 
noted.
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Brugha et al. (2009) reported a prevalence of 1.1% for Autistic Spectrum Disorders 
(ASD) in 16 to 44 year olds diagnosed by a score o f greater than 10 on the Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule (Lord et al., 2002). However, this statistic is based on 
the Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey of adults living in private households and could 
underestimate the prevalence of ASD because adults with severe impairment may not 
participate in the survey. In DSM IV (APA, 2000) ASD could be classified as Autistic 
Disorder, Asperger’s Disorder, Childhood Disintegrative Disorder or Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise Specified. The diagnostic criteria for 
Asperger’s Syndrome, at the high-functioning end of the autistic spectrum, are based on 
impairments in social interaction and repetitive stereotyped behavior or interest (APA, 
2000). Impairments in social interaction include a pronounced deficit in non-verbal 
behaviour, e.g. eye contact and facial expressions and an inability to show emotional or 
social reciprocity, e.g. impaired or inappropriate responses to others’ emotions (APA, 
2000). DSM V (APA, 2013) combines all ASD into one category. Wing, Gould and 
Gillberg (2011) criticised the diagnostic criteria for ASD in DSM V because symptoms 
must be present from early childhood and in some cases patients may not have anyone 
who can inform a clinician about childhood behaviour. Mayes, Black and Tierney
(2013) found that the DSM V criteria did not identify 25% of children previously 
diagnosed with ASD, with the authors questioning whether these children will lose 
support services. ASD are associated with deficits in social cognition (Kaland et al., 
2002) and some executive functions (Robinson, Goddard, Dritschel, Wisley & Howlin,
2009).
Robinson et al. (2009) compared 54 participants diagnosed with Asperger’s Syndrome 
or High Functioning Autism to 54 control participants aged 8 to 17 years matched 
according to age, gender, receptive verbal ability (British Picture Vocabulary Scale; 
Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Burley, 1997) and IQ (Wechsler Abbreviated Scale o f 
Intelligence; Wechsler, 1999) in an executive function study. Participants completed a 
semantic Verbal Fluency Task requiring naming animals, fruit, vegetables and clothes 
and the Junior version o f the Hayling Test (Shallice et al., 2002), a measure of 
inhibition. Computerised versions of the Tower o f London planning test (Culbertson & 
Zillmer, 2005), Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Heaton, 2003) and Stroop Test
93
2.5.2 Autism Spectrum Disorders
(Stroop, 1935) were administered to reduce social demands. The ASD group made 
significantly more moves to complete towers and made more rule violations on the 
Tower of London planning Task relative to the control group. The ASD group correctly 
inhibited significantly fewer items on incongruent trials of the Stroop Test and made 
more perseverative errors on the Verbal Fluency Test relative to the control participants. 
There were no significant group differences on the WCST or Hayling Test, although the 
ASD group showed a trend towards longer response times and incorrect responses on 
the Hayling Test. Cognitive impairment confounded previous executive function studies 
(Hill, 2004) but a strength o f the Robinson et al. (2009) study is that all participants had 
IQ in the normal range.
Research with ASD participants has found inconsistent results on social cognition tasks 
possibly due to different task formats. Kaland et al. (2002) compared performance on a 
Theory o f Mind stories task between ASD and control participants aged 10 to 20 years. 
Verbal IQ from the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (Wechsler, 1998) was 
entered as a covariate because the ASD group scored significantly higher than control 
participants on this variable. The ASD group scored significantly lower on the mental 
inference stories questions, taking longer to complete the task and showing a tendency 
to give answers based on physical causation instead of mental states relative to the 
control group.
Beeger, Malle, Nieuwland and Keysar (2010) reported conflicting findings on the 
Director Perspective Taking Task, showing ASD participants performed comparably to 
a control group. There were no group differences for errors or reaction times in 
participants with a mean age of 16 years. However, the authors commented that these 
particular findings do not generalise to other social situations and suggested that 
participants may not have used their Theory o f Mind when completing the task, instead 
possibly employing an alternative strategy and ignoring any objects with a shaded 
background.
To summarise, behavioural social cognition data is inconsistent, with some studies 
reporting deficits in ASD (e.g. Kaland et al., 2002) and others finding no impairment 
(Beeger et al., 2010). An explanation for the conflicting findings is different task
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demands required to complete the Stories Task compared to the Director Perspective 
Taking Task. Impairments in planning, inhibition and self monitoring relative to 
controls can be attributed to autistic symptomatology rather than deficits in IQ or verbal 
ability (Robinson et al., 2009).
2.5.3 Depression
In a longitudinal study, Franko et al. (2005) reported that 20.3% of 17 year olds and 
10.8% of 18 year olds scored above 24 on the Centre for Epidemiological Studies 
Depression Scale (Radloff, 1977) indicating a diagnosis of depression. The National 
Comorbidity Survey (Kessler & Walters, 1998) reported a similar epidemiological 
pattern with 14.3% of 17-18 year olds and 8.8% of 19-20 year olds having a minor 
lifetime depression diagnosis assessed by the Composite International Diagnostic 
Interview.
Favre et al. (2009) compared participants with major depression and a control group 
aged 8 to 17 on set shifting (WCST; Grant & Berg, 1948), strategy generation 
(Controlled Oral Word Association Test; Benton & Hamsher, 1976), visual scanning, 
sequencing and motor speed (Trail Making Test; Reitan & Wolfson, 1985) and 
inhibition (Stroop test; Stroop, 1935). The depression group made slightly more errors 
on section B of the Trail Making Test requiring the participant to connect alternating 
numbers and then letters (e.g. 1, A, 2, B etc), although there were no significant group 
differences for other executive function tasks. These findings were inconsistent with the 
authors’ hypothesis o f executive function deficits in major depression. Favre et al.
(2009) suggested that their sample of outpatients had less severe depression compared 
to previous studies including inpatients and bipolar or psychotic depression. The sample 
had a broad age range spanning late childhood and adolescence when it is likely 
participants would live with their parents and be less autonomous compared to early 
adulthood.
In contrast, Uekermann et al. (2008) reported a significant difference in the number of 
words produced on a semantic Verbal Fluency Task, an assessment o f strategy 
generation, requiring participants to give as many surnames as possible. Depressed
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participants, selected from inpatients at a hospital, produced significantly fewer words 
than the control group (mean age = 37 years). Participants also completed a measure of 
set shifting, the Trail Making Test (Reitan, 1992), requiring participants to connect 
numbers in ascending order and then alternate between numbers and letters. In a social 
cognition stories task, participants chose one of four endings that completed the passage 
to form a joke as a measure o f the cognitive component o f humour processing. They 
also rated how funny and logical the four endings were forming an affective index of 
humour processing. Participants with depression were impaired on the affective and 
cognitive aspects o f humour processing. They completed significantly fewer jokes 
correctly, instead giving more incorrect slapstick responses, and rated the correct and 
slapstick responses as being less funny than the control group. Set shifting and strategy 
generation significantly predicted the number o f correct punchlines, providing further 
support o f an association between executive functions and social cognition. Set shifting 
is relevant to the social cognition stories task because participants shift between 
alternative answers and meanings (Uekermann et al., 2008). Strategy generation, the 
ability to flexibly generate responses, might be utilised to consider the alternative 
responses and whether they reflect a logical answer.
Mild to moderate depression (dysphoria) in university students was found to be 
associated with greater visual emotion recognition accuracy relative to control 
participants (Harkness, Sabbagh, Jacobson, Chowdrey & Chen, 2005). Sixteen 
participants (M  age = 18 years 11 months, SD  = 0.61) with a score over 12 on the Beck 
Depression Inventory (Beck & Steer, 1987) formed the dysphoria group whilst the 
control group consisted of 27 participants who scored 12 or below on the Beck 
Depression Inventory. Participants completed the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) to assess visual emotion recognition skills together with 
control tasks requiring participants to state the gender o f actors in the Eyes Test and 
consider which mental state was evident from animal photographs. The dysphoric group 
scored significantly higher on the Eyes Test compared to control participants. Whilst the 
dysphoric participants took significantly longer to respond compared to non-dysphoric 
participants, after controlling for reaction times the higher Eyes Test scores remained 
showing improved accuracy was not due to longer reaction times. Limitations o f the
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study were the small sample size, participants did not have a formal diagnosis of 
depression and no measure o f anxiety was included (Harkness et al., 2005).
A second study with 92 participants (M  age = 19.79, SD  = 3.65) accounted for these 
limitations by assessing both depression and anxiety symptoms with the Mood and 
Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (Watson & Clarke, 1991). Harkness et al. (2005) 
reported higher dysphoria scores were associated with higher Eyes Test scores after 
controlling for anxiety, but were not related to accuracy on the animal or gender control 
tasks. Structural Equation Modelling showed higher anxiety scores were associated with 
lower Eyes Test scores. A possible explanation for the main finding of dysphoric 
participants showing improved accuracy on a visual emotion recognition task relative to 
a control group is that mild to moderate depression is associated with vigilant social 
information processing due to a drive to understand and control the social environment 
(Weary & Edwards, 1994).
To summarise, previous research into the effect o f depression on executive function and 
social cognition shows inconsistent results likely due to differences in symptom 
severity. Favre et al. (2009) reported no significant differences on executive function 
tasks assessing set shifting, strategy generation and inhibition in 8 to 17 year olds, 
whereas Uekermann et al. (2008) found a depressed inpatient group scored significantly 
lower than a control group on a semantic Verbal Fluency Task. Thus, the literature 
indicates that more extreme deficits in executive function are evident in depressed 
patients who are hospitalised. Mild to moderate depression, dysphoria, is associated 
with improved social cognition. Harkness et al. (2005) reported greater accuracy on a 
visual emotion recognition task in students with mild to moderate depression compared 
to a control group. In the current study, the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
(Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) was included to assess depression because research indicates 
depression may affect executive function (Uekermann et al., 2008) and social cognition 
(Harkness et al., 2005).
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Wittchen, Nelson and Lachner (1998) assessed 14 to 24 year olds with a computer 
assisted personal interview of the Munich Composite Diagnostic Interview and found 
16.8% had a lifetime prevalence o f depression and 14.4% had a lifetime prevalence of 
anxiety.
Airaksinen, Larsson and Forsell (2005) reported a population-based sample 
investigating the effects o f a range of anxiety disorders on verbal fluency, executive 
function, episodic memory and psychomotor speed. As previous research reported 
inconsistent findings, Airaksinen et al. (2005) examined whether cognitive function 
varied by anxiety subgroup. Demography, health and mental illness questionnaires were 
sent to 19,742 Swedish citizens aged 20 to 64. The total anxiety group comprised 112 
participants with panic disorder with and without agoraphobia, social phobia, 
generalised anxiety disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder and specific phobia. 
Control participants (n = 175) were matched on education. Participants completed the 
COW AT (Benton & Hamsher, 1989) requiring participants to generate as many words 
as possible with one minute each for the letters F, A and S. Other measures included an 
episodic memory test o f 32 neutral words and the Trail Making Test measure o f visual 
scanning, sequencing and motor speed (Reitan & Davidson, 1974). Overall, there were 
no group differences for the total anxiety group compared to the control group on the 
Letter Fluency Task, indicating that anxiety does not affect strategy generation. 
Participants with panic disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder took significantly 
longer on the Trail Making Test section B requiring participants to join circles and 
alternate between numbers and letters. Participants with Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
showed no impairment compared to controls on memory, strategy generation and 
sequencing. The authors noted that participants who volunteered for the study had high 
education levels and income, resulting in other groups not being fully represented. 
Episodic memory is personal memory o f past events (Eysenck & Keane, 2001) and so it 
is questionable whether a memory test o f 32 neutral words is a valid assessment o f 
episodic memory. In addition, the Generalised Anxiety Disorder group had a small 
sample size o f seven participants, possibly underestimating the effects o f anxiety on 
executive function. The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 
1983) assessed anxiety in the current study.
2.5.4 Anxiety
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A study assessing the prevalence o f Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) in 17 year 
olds with the Diagnostic Interview Schedule found 2%  received a present diagnosis o f 
OCD (Maina, Albert, Bogetto & Ravizza, 1999). Alexander, Crutcher and Delong 
(1990) argued that the neural connections between the prefrontal region and superior 
temporal gyrus, thought to underpin social cognition, show abnormal activity in OCD.
Sayin, Oral, Utku, Baysak and Candansayar (2010) reported executive function and 
social cognition data from 30 participants who had previously been inpatients at a 
psychiatric hospital and met the DSM IV criteria for OCD matched according to age (M 
= 34.30, SD = 11.49), gender and education with 30 control participants. Participants 
completed first and second order false belief cartoon tasks and a Hinting Task 
comprising a passage about social interaction between people that ends with a character 
making an obvious hint (Corcoran, Mercer &  Frith, 1995). Participants were required to 
answer a question about what a character really meant by what they said. E.g. Paul has 
to go to an interview and he’s running late. While he is cleaning his shoes, he says to his 
wife, Jane: “I want to wear my blue shirt but it’s very creased.” Participants are asked 
“What does Paul really mean when he says this?” Success on this task requires 
understanding of intentions behind indirect utterances. Double bluff vignettes from 
Happe’s (1994) Strange Stories Task, a third order Theory of Mind Test (e.g. he knows 
they think he will lie), were also administered. Participants with OCD scored 
significantly lower than the control group on the Hinting Task and the Strange Stories 
Task, but not on the first and second order false belief tasks. Sayin et al. (2010) 
concluded that basic social cognition remains intact in OCD, but performance on 
advanced social cognition tasks is impaired. However, the social cognition task battery 
was limited and the authors suggested future research should also assess IQ and 
executive function with the D-KEFS or Hayling and Brixton Tests (Burgess & Shallice,
1997). A self-report item was included on the demographic questionnaire to assess for 
OCD.
2.5.5 Obsessive compulsive disorder
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In conclusion, this chapter has reviewed literature about the effects o f pubertal 
development, mood and the effects of alcohol, cannabis and ecstasy on executive 
function and social cognition. Research into executive function and social cognition in 
HI and ASD has also been reviewed, together with Depression, Anxiety and Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder. The Self-Administered Rating Scale for Pubertal Development 
(Carskadon & Acebo, 1993) was included in the present study to assess pubertal 
development. The Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson, Clark & 
Tellegen, 1988) assessed mood and the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
(Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) assessed Anxiety and Depression. Participants also reported 
alcohol, cannabis and ecstasy use. The research reviewed in this chapter provides a 
rationale for selecting the final task battery, detailed in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3 
Methodology review
3.1 Chapter overview
This chapter reviews a range o f  measures discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 assessing 
executive function, social cognition, IQ and pubertal development. The chosen task  
battery for the current study is outlined w ith rationale underpinning the choice o f  
specific tasks.
3.2 Design: measuring age-related change in neuropsychological research
The present study employed a sequential design that combines cross sectional and 
longitudinal approaches. The majority o f  previous research exam ining social cognition 
(Dumontheil et al., 2010; Tonks et al., 2007) or executive function developm ent in 
adolescence (Delis et al., 2001; Rom ine & Reynolds, 2005) has utilised a cross sectional 
design. Advantages o f  this type o f  design include being faster and easier to conduct 
compared to longitudinal designs (Moriguchi & Hiraki, 2011). D isadvantages o f  cross 
sectional designs include no data on developmental change (Kraemer, Yesavage, Taylor 
& Kupfer, 2000) and cohort effects, although the latter is not an issue in the present 
sample because o f  close age groups.
A  sequential design has been recommended to identify how  abilities improve and 
decline over time (De Luca et al., 2003; Rom ine & Reynolds, 2005; W aber et al., 2007), 
and allows age-related change in social cognition and executive functions to be 
exam ined both cross sectionally and longitudinally. A  time frame o f  12 to 16 months 
between testing sessions enabled any subtle linear and non-linear changes to be 
identified. A  12-month interval between testing sessions conform s to 
neuropsychological assessment procedures (Lezak, Howieson & Loring, 2004). Shores 
and Mears (2006) recommended a m inimum  o f  six to 12 months between assessments 
following m ild head injury. Furthermore, practise effects due to memory are m inim ised 
after an interval o f  a year (Hausknecht, Halpert, Di Pado & Gerrard, 2007). Previous
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research outlined in Chapter 1 has used similar testing intervals. For example, in a 
longitudinal study of self-report empathy, Davis and Franzoi (1991) administered the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980) with a 12-month interval. Bava et al.
(2010) employed a 16-month interval between testing sessions and reported that greater 
increases in longitudinal white matter maturation were associated with higher scores on 
the D-KEFS Letter Fluency Test (Delis et al., 2001) in participants with a mean age of 
17.8 years at Time 1. A longer interval between testing might not detect non-linear 
development given the rapid morphological changes occurring in late adolescence, 
including white matter development and grey matter decreases particularly in frontal 
networks (Lebel et al., 2008; Paus, 2005; Sowell et al., 2003).
Previous studies have included broad age groups in adulthood e.g. 22-62 years (Dziobek 
et al., 2006), 22-45 years (Heavey et al., 2000), 19-27 years (Dumontheil et al., 2010) 
and 19-32 years (Hallerback et al., 2009). A smaller age range o f 17 to 19 years at Time 
1 in the present study corresponds better to rapid morphological brain changes occurring 
in late adolescence and early adulthood. Whether executive function and social 
cognition follow linear or non-linear trajectories corresponding to morphological 
change at specific ages in late adolescence and early adulthood remains to be 
established (Gogtay et al., 2004). The current study may establish whether linear and 
non-linear morphological brain changes correspond to linear and non-linear functional 
development across narrow age ranges.
3.3 Selected executive function tasks
The meta-analysis by Romine and Reynolds (2005), detailed in Chapter 1, has informed
the selection o f suitable executive function tasks for participants in late adolescence and
early adulthood in the present study. Romine and Reynolds (2005) concluded that
verbal fluency and planning continue to develop between 17 years and 22 years, and
consequently tasks that measure these executive functions were selected for the task
battery. Verbal Fluency Tasks are appropriate for use with typically developing
participants because they do not produce ceiling effects (Strauss, Sherman & Spreen,
2006). Previous research has reported the attainment o f adult levels by age 14 to 15 on
Semantic Fluency Tasks, but not on phonemic Letter Fluency Tasks, suggesting that
phonemic letter fluency has a more protracted maturation (Matute, Rosselli, Ardilla &
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Morales, 2004); therefore, the (phonemic) Letter Fluency Task from the D-KEFS was 
selected.
Tower o f Hanoi and Tower o f London Tasks were not selected as planning measures 
because ceiling effects are problematic in research with adults (Humes, Welsh, Retzlaff 
& Cookson, 1997). Huizinga, Dolan and van der Molen (2006) reported that 15 year 
olds attained adult performance on the 4, 5 and 6 move Tower o f London Task 
measures o f first move planning time and number o f additional moves required to 
complete the tower, indicating this task is not appropriate for participants in late 
adolescence or early adulthood. Instead, the D-KEFS Tower Test was utilised because 
this avoids ceiling performance in typically developing samples by including 
progressively more challenging items, culminating in a tower that can be completed in a 
minimum of 26 moves (Delis et al., 2001).
Previous executive function studies have often included the Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Test (WCST; Heaton, 1981; Heaton, Chelune, Talley, Kay & Curtiss, 1993) to assess 
concept formation. For example, Huizinga, Dolan and Van der Molan (2006) reported 
that performance on the WCST improved up to age 21. The WCST consists o f four 
reference cards and 128 stimulus cards that differ by colour, design and number o f 
items. Participants are required to match the stimulus cards with the reference cards and 
receive feedback from the examiner about whether the match was correct. The 
classification rule changes after ten correct sorts requiring participants to flexibly shift 
to a different sorting rule. Indices o f task performance include number o f categories 
completed (set maintenance) and perseverative errors, when a participant sorts 
according to a previous sorting rule despite a change in sorting rule. The findings o f 
Huizinga et al. (2006) are not consistent with the findings of Romine and Reynolds
(2005) who reported that improvement in set maintenance and inhibition o f 
perseveration, assessed with the WCST, improved between ages 5 and 14, followed by 
no change at ages 17 and 22 in typically developing participants. However, Romine and 
Reynolds (2005) noted that the tasks included in their review might not completely 
assess the target executive function, therefore an alternative assessment o f concept 
formation was included in the present task battery. In the present study the D-KEFS 
Sorting Test was selected instead of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task because there are
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16 conceptual sorting rules in the D-KEFS version, compared to only 3 sorting rules in 
the WCST, increasing processing demands, minimizing ceiling effects and increasing 
task sensitivity (Delis et al., 2001a).
The development o f prepotent response inhibition is not fully understood in adolescence 
and lack of inhibition has been attributed to increased risk taking (Luna & Sweeney,
2004) at these age ranges. Examples o f adolescent risk taking include drug and alcohol 
use, dangerous driving and violent behaviour (Steinberg, 2008). Data from The 
Department for Education (2011) showed that 18 and 19 year olds reported the highest 
rates of ever using cannabis and alcohol relative to younger age groups. Romine and 
Reynolds (2005) recommended that future research should include additional tasks; in 
the present study the Hayling Test assessed inhibition of prepotent responses in the 
vocal domain and first move time from the Tower task provides a measure o f motor 
inhibition. The Brixton Test (Burgess & Shallice, 1997) was included to assess rule 
detection using a spatial format, to explore further how this executive function develops 
during late adolescence and early adulthood.
A diagram o f the selected task battery is presented in Figure 3.1. The selected tasks are 
described in more detail later in the chapter.
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3.3.1 Description of executive function tasks
In this section, the Hayling and Brixton Tests (Burgess & Shallice, 1997) and D-KEFS 
(Delis et al., 2001) will be described because literature reviewed in Chapter 1 employed 
these tasks (e.g. Kalkut et al., 2009; Waber et al., 2007) and they were utilised in the 
present study.
3.3.1.1 Haying and Brixton Tests (Burgess & Shallice, 1997)
The Hayling Test has previously been employed in adolescent research with atypically 
developing participants. For example, comparing participants with ASD and control 
groups in seven to 13 year olds (Ames & White, 2011) and eight to 17 year olds 
(Robinson et al., 2009). Some studies of executive function in adulthood have employed 
both the Hayling and Brixton Tests. For instance, Bielak, Mansueti, Strauss and Dixon
(2006) examined performance in older adults aged 53 to 90 years and Barker et al.
(2010) compared performance between participants who had sustained a head injury 
before the age o f 25 with those injured after the age o f 25. Considering previous 
research in either early adolescence or late adulthood using both the Hayling and 
Brixton tests, this highlights a gap in the literature, with a need for studies focusing on 
typically developing participants in late adolescence and early adulthood.
The Hayling Test is a sentence completion task, yielding a measure o f response
initiation speed and inhibition of prepotent responses. In section one, the participant
listens to sentences with the last word missing and is required to produce a word to
correctly complete the sentence. Section two requires the participant to generate a word
which is completely unconnected to the sentence, e.g. for "Most cats see very well at
 ." The participant must first inhibit the expected response of "night" and then
produce an unconnected word. A possible strategy is to name objects from the room.
There are 30 items in total, with 15 different sentences in each section. When scoring
the Hayling Test, Burgess and Shallice (1997) recommended response times for each
section are rounded down. A scaled score is calculated based on response times and the
number o f errors in section two. The scaled score, instead of the raw score, is used most
extensively for reporting test results (e.g. Barker et al., 2010; Frangou, Donaldson,
Hadjulis, Landau & Goldstein, 2005; Joshua, Gogos & Rossell, 2009; Wood & Liossi,
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2005). Burgess & Shallice (1997) reported an overall test-retest reliability o f 0.76 when 
31 typically developing participants completed the test between two days and four 
weeks apart.
The Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test assesses rule detection using a visuospatial array 
and requires the ability to detect rules from a sequence of stimuli. The stimulus for the 
Brixton Test is a booklet showing ten numbered circles arranged in two lines, with one 
circle coloured blue. The pattern followed by the coloured circle changes several times; 
participants are required to identify the pattern and indicate where they consider the 
blue circle will appear on the subsequent page. The outcome measure is the total 
number o f errors in the 55 trials. The raw score is then converted to a scaled score. Test 
re-test reliability for 31 typically developing participants tested between two days and 
four weeks apart was 0.71 (Burgess & Shallice, 1997). The Hayling and Brixton Tests 
are quick to administer, taking approximately 20 minutes in total.
3.3.1.2 Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System
The D-KEFS (Delis, Kaplan & Kramer, 2001a) includes Trail Making, Verbal Fluency, 
Design Fluency, Colour-Word Inference, Sorting, Twenty Questions, Word Context, 
Tower and Proverb Tests. Table 3.1 presents a description o f each test.
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Table 3.1. Descriptions of D-KEFS Tests and the executive functions assessed
D-KEFS Tests
Trail Making 
Verbal Fluency
Design Fluency 
Colour-word Interference
Sorting
Twenty Questions 
Word Context
Tower
Proverb
Description
Certain stimuli from an 
array o f circles are marked 
in a particular order 
Produce words beginning 
with a specific letter (Letter 
Fluency), category 
(Category Fluency) or 
alternate categories 
(Category switching) 
Connect dots by drawing 
lines whilst following set 
rules
Colours are named 
(condition 1), colour words 
are named (condition 2), ink 
colour o f incongruent 
stimuli named (condition 3) 
and switching between 
naming incongruent ink 
colour and word (condition 
4)
Sort 6 cards into 2 groups 
based on a similarity and 
identify sorts created by the 
examiner
Generate "yes/no" questions 
whilst viewing 30 pictures 
to identify the target picture 
Generate meaning o f novel 
words using information 
from 5 clue sentences
Move disks across pegs to 
create towers in as few 
moves possible 
Generate meaning of 
proverbs in a free and 
multiple choice format
Executive functions and 
non executive functions 
Sequencing (ef), visual 
scanning and motor speed 
(non efs)
Strategy generation (ef), 
memory, language and 
processing speed (non efs)
Nonverbal fluency, 
cognitive flexibility (efs) 
and motor ability (non ef) 
Inhibition, flexibility (efs) 
and visual processing (non 
ef)
Verbal and non-verbal 
concept formation (ef), 
memory and language 
(non-efs)
Concept formation (ef) and 
language (non ef)
Deductive reasoning, 
verbal abstract thinking 
(efs) and language (non ef)
Planning, rule learning and 
inhibition (efs) and 
processing speed (non ef) 
Verbal abstract thinking
Administration o f the entire D-KEFS Task battery takes approximately 90 minutes. The 
D-KEFS is an improvement on existing measures. Kaplan (1988) criticised the use o f a 
single score to index neuropsychological test performance; a strength of the D-KEFS
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Sorting and Tower Tests in particular is that several scores are calculated giving a more 
accurate assessment o f executive functions than a single score. On the Sorting Test, the 
calculation of several components o f concept formation provides data on verbal and 
non-verbal concept formation, abstract expression of concepts and flexibility of 
behavioural response. The addition of easier and more difficult items in the D-KEFS 
Tower Test provides a larger range of scores, resulting in improved psychometric 
properties (internal reliability and lower likelihood of floor/ceiling effects) compared to 
the Tower o f Hanoi or Tower of London (Delis et al., 2001).
The Colour-word Interference Test was not included because participants with colour 
blindness, estimated at about 10% of the population (Tate et al., 2005) would not be 
able to complete this task. D-KEFS normative data showed that performance on the 
Twenty Questions Test, assessing ability to formulate questions and identify categories, 
peaked in 16-19 year olds followed by little developmental change (Delis et al., 2001b). 
The Twenty Questions Test was not included because these data indicate performance 
does not greatly change in late adolescence and early adulthood.
In the test descriptions, references are made to normative data reported by Delis et al. 
(2001b) from 1750 participants aged between eight to 89 years. The use o f broad age 
categories in the D-KEFS normative data (Delis et al., 2001) e.g. 16 to 19 years and 20 
to 29 years results in a nebulous picture o f executive functions in late adolescence and 
early adulthood (Taylor, Barker, Heavey & McHale, 2013). Consequently, more fine­
grained age groups in the present study will further elucidate development o f executive 
function in these age ranges. Test-retest reliabilities with 9 to 74 days between 
administration are reported from the manual (Delis et al., 2001) in the following test 
descriptions.
The following section reviews the Verbal Fluency, Sorting and Tower Tests as these 
executive function tests are frequently reported in the literature and were employed in 
the present study. Furthermore, the development o f strategy generation, concept 
formation and planning is considered important during adolescence (e.g. Romine & 
Reynolds, 2005) and previous research has found that ability on these executive
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function tasks continues to develop into late adolescence and early adulthood (Delis et 
al., 2001; Waber et al., 2007; Reynolds & Horton. 2008).
3.3.1.2.1 Verbal Fluency Test
Verbal fluency provides a measure o f strategy generation (Barker at al., 2006; Luo, Luk 
& Bialystock, 2010; Phillips, Bull, Adams & Fraser, 2002) because successful 
performance requires participants to generate an effective strategy to retrieve words that 
follow the specified rule. The Verbal Fluency Test comprises three sections: Letter 
Fluency, Category Fluency and Category Switching. The Letter Fluency Test assesses 
phonemic fluency and involves a participant speaking as many words as possible in 60 
seconds beginning with the letter “F”, “A” and then “S” excluding numbers or names o f 
people or places and expletives. Additionally, the same words with different endings are 
not allowed, e.g. if  a participant said “take” they should not then say “takes” or 
“taking”. To score highly on this task a successful strategy must be employed with a 
systematic search through the mental lexicon, e.g. the generation of words beginning 
with “Fa” followed by “Fe” for the letter “F”. Inhibition is also required to avoid 
generating words that do not adhere to task instructions (Anderson, Levin & Jacobs, 
2002). D-KEFS normative data for Letter Fluency show a rapid improvement in eight to 
19 year olds, with performance peaking in the 30 to 39 year old group (Delis et al., 
2001b). For the 16 to 19 year old age group, an internal consistency value o f 0.80 and 
test-retest reliability o f 0.67 was reported (Delis et al., 2001b).
3.3.1.2.2 Sorting Test
The D-KEFS Sorting Test, previously called the California Card Sorting Test (Delis,
Squire, Bihrle & Massman, 1992), and adapted from the WCST (Heaton, 1981),
consists o f free sorting and sort recognition conditions, providing measures o f problem
solving, abstract concept formation and perseveration (Delis et al., 2001a). The test
authors noted four stages necessary in the completion o f concept formation tasks: “a)
initiation of effortful and novel thinking, b) isolation of a common feature or attribute
from the array o f stimuli, c) formation of a higher level concept that captures the
defining properties o f those common features, d) flexibility o f thinking in order to
abandon one conceptual relationship in order to apprehend new ones" (Delis et al.,
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2001a, p. 4). The number o f  correct sorts assesses the first two stages, description scores 
assess stage c and d is evident w ith a low  number o f  repeated sorts. The inclusion o f 
more difficult target sorts, e.g. concave and convex shapes, m inim ises ceiling effects 
(Delis et al., 2001a).
The Sorting Test comprises two sets o f  cards and takes approximately 20 m inutes to 
administer. Card set one is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2. D-KEFS Sorting Test
In the free sort condition, participants sort six cards, w ith one word printed on them , 
into two groups and describe the characteristics o f  each group. The sort recognition 
condition requires participants to identify how  the exam iner has sorted the six cards into 
two groups. There are eight possible sorts; three sorts use semantic inform ation o f  the 
words (e.g. one syllable vs. two syllables) and five sorts use visuospatial features o f  the 
cards (e.g. straight edges vs. curved edges). Each description is scored out o f  two points. 
The Sorting Test is unique because it assesses description scores for verbal and non ­
verbal sorts separately.
I l l
Table 3.2 shows the scoring criteria for the one syllable (bus, car, duck) and two 
syllables (airplane, eagle, tiger) target sorts with 0, 1 or 2 points awarded depending on 
the detail of the participants’ response.
Table 3.2. Example o f scoring criteria for the D-KEFS Sorting Test
Target sort 2 point answers 1 point answers 0 points answers
One syllable Single syllable Short words Easy to say
One part per word
Two syllables Double syllable Long words Hard to say
Two parts per word
For example, if  a participant described the one syllable card group as ‘easy to say’ they 
would be awarded 0 points. It is possible to calculate several scores to assess 
performance on the Sorting Test and the following scores were used in analysis. 
Number of correct free sorts and free sort description score were calculated from the 
free sorting section, with the number o f repeated free sorts providing an indication of 
perseveration. Sort recognition description score was calculated from the sort 
recognition section and description scores for verbal and perceptual sorts were totalled 
across both sections.
Delis et al. (2001b) reported internal consistency values o f 0.72, 0.73 and 0.74 for free 
sorting, free sorting description and sort recognition scores in 16 to 19 year olds. For the 
same tasks, Delis et al. calculated test-retest coefficients o f 0.49, 0.67 and 0.56. 
However, in the second testing session, the same cards were administered to the 
participants; in the present study the use o f alternative cards in longitudinal testing 
minimised the influence o f practise effects. The normative data from the D-KEFS 
showed the number o f attempted sorts peaked in the 16 to 19 age group, whilst accuracy 
of sorts and descriptions peaked in the group aged 20 to 29 years across the whole 
sample (Delis et al., 2001b).
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3.3.1.2.3 Tower Test
The Tower Test provides a measure o f  rule learning, planning, problem  solving, 
inhibition o f  prepotent responses and maintenance o f  instructional sets (Shunk, Davis & 
Dean, 2006). Participants are shown a diagram  o f the tower they should aim  to build on 
one o f  the three pegs, using up to five disks, in as few moves as possible. Only one disk 
can be moved at a time and a larger disk cannot be placed on a smaller disk. There are 
nine trials in total becom ing progressively more complex to solve. Participants have a 
specific amount o f  time to complete each tower (e.g. 30 seconds for the first tow er and 
240 seconds for the last tower). The test is discontinued if  a participant fails to complete 
three consecutive towers. The total number o f  moves taken to complete a tower, 
whether the participant correctly built the tower and the time taken are recorded. Ceiling 
performance in typically developing samples is avoided by including progressively 
more challenging items, culm inating in a tower which can be completed in a m inimum  
o f  26 moves (see Figure 3.3).
Figure 3.3. Tower nine from the D-KEFS Tower Test (starting position on the left 
and completed position in the right)
The Tower Test can be scored in several ways: number o f  items completed (total out o f  
9 trials), achievement score (takes into account i f  items are completed and also the 
number o f  moves), m ean first move time (total first move time / items adm inistered), 
time per move (total completion time / total number o f  moves) and move accuracy (total 
number o f  moves / total m inimum  number o f  moves required). Delis et al. (2001b)
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reported an internal consistency value o f 0.60 and test-retest reliability coefficient of 
0.51 for the Tower Test. D-KEFS normative data shows the shortest mean first move 
time was for 13 to 15 year olds, possibly indicating a degree o f impulsivity (Delis et al., 
2001b). Achievement score peaked in the 16 to 19 year old group, whilst 13 to 19 year 
olds achieved the lowest rule violations compared to 20 to 29 year olds and beyond.
3.4 Social cognition tasks
Social cognition incorporates a range o f abilities including Theory of Mind (Carrington 
& Bailey, 2009; Frith, 2007; Kalbe et al., 2010), emotion recognition, empathy and 
perspective taking (Frith, 2007; Vollm et al., 2006). An array o f tasks exists for 
assessing social cognitive development in a range o f formats including written format 
(Strange Stories Task; Happe, 1994), visual static stimuli (Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
test; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001) and auditory stimuli 
(Reading the Mind in the Voice test; Golan, Baron-Cohen, Hill & Rutherford, 2007). 
Tasks utilising a dynamic visual paradigm include the Social Attribution Task (Klin,
2000), Awkward Moments Test (Heavey, Phillips, Baron-Cohen & Rutter, 2000), 
Empathic Accuracy Paradigm (Roeyers, Buysse, Ponnet & Pichal, 2001), Reading the 
Mind in Films Test (Golan, Baron-Cohen, Hill & Golan, 2006) and the Movie for the 
Assessment of Social Cognition (Dziobek et al., 2006).
Research reviewed in Chapter 1 shows that aspects of social cognition continue to 
develop into adolescence, for example emotion recognition from facial and vocal 
information (Tonks et al., 2007), perspective taking (Choudhury et al., 2006; 
Dumontheil et al., 2010) and self-report empathy (Davis & Franzoi, 1991).
3.5 Selected social cognition tasks
The social cognition tasks were selected to encompass a variety o f aspects o f social 
cognition using different formats, e.g. static (Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task) and 
dynamic (Movie for the Assessment o f Social Cognition; MASC). The task battery also 
assessed visual (Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task) and auditory social cognition 
(Reading the Mind in the Voice Task). The tasks show acceptable levels o f internal
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reliability and are appropriate for participants in late adolescence / early adulthood by 
avoiding ceiling effects.
Tager-Flusberg (2001) identified a conceptual framework, consisting of social- 
perceptual and social-cognitive components o f Theory of Mind. The social-perceptual 
component refers to understanding and interpreting information from faces, voices and 
body posture and attributing mental states, whilst the social-cognitive component refers 
to the use o f information over time and events in the attribution o f mental states. The 
adult version o f the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997) is 
considered to be a test o f the social-perceptual aspect o f Theory o f Mind (Tager- 
Flusberg, 2001). It is suggested that the Reading the Mind in the Voice Test assesses 
social-perceptual skills because this test requires the interpretation of vocal information. 
Mental state understanding in everyday life consists o f both social-perceptual and 
social-cognitive processes (Tager-Flusberg, 2001). The MASC, a measure 
approximating ecologically valid social situations, provided a measure o f both social- 
perceptual and social-cognitive processes. Social-perceptual processes are required to 
interpret facial expressions, speech and body language, whereas social-cognitive skills 
are utilised in remembering what has happened previously in the film.
Beer and Ochsner (2006) noted that social cognition is composed of processes involved 
in understanding other people and understanding the self. The component o f 
understanding others was assessed through the inclusion o f Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes, Reading the Mind in the Voice and the MASC. The Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index (IRI), a self-report measure of empathy, provides an assessment o f the self- 
understanding aspect of social cognition proposed by Beer and Ochsner (2006).
A further comparison can be made between objective assessments (the Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes Test, Reading the Mind in the Voice Test and MASC), whilst the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index is subjective, and includes a perspective taking scale. 
The selected task battery provides a comprehensive assessment o f social cognition 
compared to other studies assessing social cognition in late adolescence and early 
adulthood that have administered only one task. For instance, Thomas et al. (2007) 
administered Ekman faces (Ekman & Friesen, 1976), Davis and Franzoi (1991) utilised
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the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980) and Dumontheil et al. (2010) assessed 
social cognition with the Director Perspective Taking Task.
3.5.1 Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test
In this task a participant views photographs of a person’s eye region and chooses one of 
four mental state terms to best describe what they think that person is thinking or feeling 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). An example from the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test is 
presented in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4. An example from the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test 
Arrogant grateful
Note. Correct answer: Tentative
Improvements have been made to the original version of the Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). In the revised version, there is a forced choice 
format o f four mental states, instead o f two mental states in the original version, thus 
reducing the likelihood of a participant guessing the correct answer. In the original 
version, the target answer and foil were semantically opposite, e.g. sympathetic and 
unsympathetic. The emotional valence of the target answer and foils are the same in the 
revised version to make the task more challenging. Furthermore, only complex mental 
states are included in the revised version, with basic emotions omitted to make the test
sarcastic tentative
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more sensitive. The revised version consists o f 36 items, whereas the original version 
had 25 items. These improvements reduce the likelihood of ceiling effects and increase 
power to detect individual differences (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Total test scores 
range from zero to 36. The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al.,
2001) has been used extensively in studies with adolescents and adults involving 
participants with autism and a typically developing control group. However, there is a 
gap of data in late adolescence / early adulthood (e.g. 11 to 17 year olds in Demurie, De 
Corel & Roeyers, 2011; mean age 14 years in Grossman & Tager-Flusberg, 2008; mean 
age 31 years in Kirchner, Hatri, Heekeren & Dziobek, 2011).
Typically developing adults with a mean age o f 46.5 years (SD = 16.9) achieved a mean 
score o f 26.2 (SD = 3.6) out o f a possible 36 on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), indicating that ceiling effects are not likely to be 
problematic. No significant correlation was found between performance on the Eyes 
Test and the WAIS -  R (Wechsler, 1939), suggesting that task performance is not 
related to IQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). However, the authors only reported 
correlations with Full Scale IQ and it is unclear whether Verbal or Performance IQ 
correlated with performance on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, which is 
possible given the verbal component o f task. There were no significant gender 
differences on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). 
DeSoto et al. (2007) administered the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test to female 
participants four weeks apart and reported a test re-test reliability o f r=0.67 with no 
significant difference in scores between time 1 and time 2 in a typically developing 
group. Matyassy, Kelemen, Sarkozi, Janka and Kere (2006) reported a Cronbach’s 
alpha o f 0.81 for abstinent alcoholics and healthy controls (mean age 36 years; 38 
males, 22 females), above the acceptable value o f 0.7 recommended by Nunnally 
(1978).
A limitation of the Eyes test is the use of static stimuli, because they are less demanding 
than real life social situations (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The static nature o f the 
stimuli restricts the emotions which can be presented, as some require movement e.g. 
relief (Golan, Baron-Cohen & Hill, 2006). Despite these criticisms, the Eyes Test is one 
of the most widely used assessments of visual emotion recognition tasks, being
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appropriate for use in late adolescence / early adulthood due to the inclusion of complex 
mental state terms. Moreover, the task is considered a pure assessment of social 
cognition because executive function is not heavily required (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). 
The pen and paper format makes it quick and easy to administer taking about 15 
minutes to complete.
3.5.2 Reading the Mind in the Voice Test
The revised version of the Reading the Mind in the Voice Test (Golan, Baron-Cohen, 
Hill & Rutherford, 2007) comprises 25 sound clips from BBC dramas. The participant 
is required to select one o f four mental states that best describe how the speaker is 
feeling and requires consideration of both the verbal content and intonation. Total test 
scores range from zero to 25. Limitations o f the original version of the Reading the 
Mind in the Voice Test (Rutherford, Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2002), comprising 
of 40 items, were ceiling effects and limited sensitivity. Golan et al. (2007) improved 
the revised version by increasing the number o f possible answer options from two to 
four for each item using an emotion taxonomy of 412 mental states (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill & Golan, 2004) divided into six developmental levels to generate 
foils that were either in the same developmental level, one above or below the target 
answer. The proposed developmental levels in the emotion taxonomy and 
corresponding ages are: level one (understood by typically developing 4 to 7 year olds), 
level two (8 to 10 year olds), level three (11 to 13 year olds), level four (15 to 16 year 
olds), level five (17 to 18 year olds) and level six (understood by less than 75% o f 
typically developing 1 7 - 1 8  year olds). Baron-Cohen et al. (2004) established these 
levels by talking to children and adolescents aged between 4 and 18 to ascertain their 
understanding o f mental states. However, information about sample size and the exact 
method used is omitted. The removal o f easier items from the Reading the Mind in the 
Voice Test and selection of foils matching the target answer for content but not for 
intonation make the revised task more challenging.
The typically developing control group in the Golan et al. (2007) study, who were aged
17-51 years with a mean age of 24.3 years (SD = 7.71), attained a mean score o f 18.77
(SD  = 2.41) from a possible 25 on the Reading the Mind in the Voice Test, showing no
evidence of ceiling effects. Golan et al. (2007) reported a significant positive correlation
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between the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and Reading 
the Mind in the Voice Test (Golan et al., 2007), providing concurrent validity for the 
Voices Test. Verbal IQ and scores on the Voices Test were positively correlated, 
whereas no significant correlation was reported between the Voices Test and 
Performance IQ or age. Golan et al. (2007) reported a test-retest reliability for 24 
participants with Asperger’s Syndrome over a 10 week interval o f r = 0.8.
3.5.3 Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition
The Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (Dziobek et al., 2006) is a 15-minute 
film showing social interaction between two male and two female adults aged between 
30 and 40 years. The film is paused on 45 occasions and participants answer questions 
relating to a particular character’s emotions, thoughts and intentions. The test authors 
used a multi-dimensional approach, including first and second order false belief, 
deception, faux pas, persuasion and sarcasm. To answer questions correctly, verbal 
content must be considered, including literal and non-literal instances (i.e. containing 
figurative speech and other pragmatics). The participant must also consider non-verbal 
content, for example facial emotion recognition and interpretation of body language. 
The MASC includes positive, negative and neutral emotional valences and scores range 
from zero to 45, with each question having a four item forced choice answer format. 
The four answers include the target answer, responses in which the mental state 
inference is excessive or insufficient and an answer lacking mental state inference, 
instead referring to physical causation. Administration o f the MASC takes 
approximately 40 minutes.
Roeyers and Demurie (2010) suggested film clips overcome the limitations o f static or
uni-modal tasks (e.g. Reading the Mind in the Eyes or Voice Tests). Moore (2001)
considered the use o f static stimuli underestimated participants’ abilities to recognise
emotion. Wehrle et al. (2000) provided evidence for this and found participants
performed more successfully on an emotion recognition task using dynamic faces
compared to static faces. The MASC is a closer approximation to real life social
situations because there are up to four adults in each scene, whereas the Eyes Test only
includes one person per item. The MASC, a dynamic social cognition task, was selected
to capture a holistic assessment, following Johnston, Miles and McKinlay (2008) who
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suggested information from the face and body are necessary for social cognition. The 
MASC requires consideration o f verbal content and non-verbal content (e.g. 
interpretation of face expressions and body language). Other social cognition tasks, for 
example the Reading the Mind in the Eyes (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) or Reading the 
Mind in the Voice Tasks (Golan et al., 2007) do not involve interpretation of full facial 
or body language. Erickson (1995) criticised traditional neuropsychological assessments 
for not considering error responses. A strength o f the MASC is that it enables the 
classification of errors into excessive or insufficient mental state inference errors, or an 
answer that lacks mental state understanding and instead refers to physical causation. 
Therefore, error analysis can provide insight into where a participant shows a weakness 
in this aspect o f social cognition. The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test was included 
in the task battery to allow for comparison with other groups because this measure has 
been more widely used than the MASC which is relatively new and the psychometric 
properties are less well documented than the Eyes Test.
In the Dziobek et al. (2006) study, a group with Asperger’s Syndrome and a typically 
developing control group completed the MASC, Strange Stories Task (Happe, 1994), 24 
items from the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al, 2001) and 28 
photographs of faces showing basic emotions (happiness, sadness, fear, disgust, anger 
and surprise). In addition, executive function was assessed with the Stroop Test (Stroop, 
1935), a Verbal Fluency Task (Horn, 1962) and Trail Making Test (Reitan & Wolfson,
1993). No significant correlations were found between the MASC and IQ measures 
from the WAIS (Wechsler, 1955), or between social cognition and executive function. 
The finding o f no significant correlations between the Strange Stories Task (Happe,
1994), the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test and a basic emotion recognition task 
indicates “social cognition is a multifaceted construct” (Dziobek et al., 2006, p. 633). 
The authors found the MASC was the superior social cognition task in discriminating 
between participants with Asperger’s Syndrome and the control group. Dziobek et al. 
(2006) reported a test-retest reliability o f r = 0.86, with the second administration of the 
MASC being one to 12 months after the first completion, with an average o f 4.6 months 
for the group with Asperger’s Syndrome and 3.6 months for the control group. A 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.84 shows the MASC has good reliability (Dziobek et al., 2006).
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3.5.4 Interpersonal Reactivity Index
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983) is a 28 item self-report measure 
tapping four aspects o f empathy: empathic concern, personal distress, perspective taking 
and fantasy (see appendix section 1). The IRI adopts a multidimensional approach by 
including both affective empathy (Empathic Concern and Personal Distress scales) and 
cognitive empathy (Perspective Taking and Fantasy scales). The four sub-scales assess 
different components o f empathy, defined as “the reactions o f one individual to the 
observed experiences o f another” (Davis, 1983, p. 113). Participants rate statements on 
a five point scale for how well they describe themselves, ranging from “does not 
describe me well” to “does describe me well”. The Perspective Taking scale relates to 
the tendency of a person to consider other peoples’ viewpoint, whereas the Fantasy 
scale assesses whether the participant relates to characters in books and films. The 
Empathic Concern scale explores sympathetic feelings towards other people’s 
misfortune and the Personal Distress scale measures personal feelings o f apprehension 
in stressful situations. Examples from each scale o f the IRI are: “I try to look at 
everybody’s side o f a disagreement before I make a decision” (Perspective Taking), “I 
really get involved with the feelings of the characters in novels” (Fantasy), “When I see 
someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind o f protective towards them” (Empathic 
Concern) and “I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle o f a very emotional 
situation” (Personal Distress). Internal reliability statistics for the sub-scales are 
acceptable and range between 0.71 to 0.77 with test-retest reliabilities between 0.62 and 
0.71 (Davis, 1980).
3.6 Review of other measures
In addition to the executive function and social cognition tasks, the following measures 
were also included in the task battery to assess IQ, anxiety, depression, affect, pubertal 
development and demographics.
3.6.1 Wechsler Abbreviated Scale o f Intelligence
Previous research reviewed in Chapter 1 has found a relationship between IQ and 
executive functions (e.g. Garcia-Molina et al., 2010) and social cognition (e.g. Charlton 
et al., 2009). Consequently, an IQ measure was included in the task battery. The
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Wechsler Abbreviated Scale o f Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999) was selected due 
to its shorter administration time compared to the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
(Wechsler, 1997).
The WASI is comprised of Vocabulary and Similarities sections, assessing Verbal IQ, 
and Block Design and Matrix Reasoning, assessing Performance IQ. Examples from the 
Vocabulary section are "Tell me what transform means" and "Tell me what formidable 
means." In the Similarities section, participants explain how two words are similar, e.g. 
"In what way are photograph and song alike?" and "In what way are peace and war 
alike?" The Block Design section requires participants to create specific patterns out of 
blocks in a set time-limit, with difficulty ranging from easier patterns comprised of four 
blocks to more complex nine block patterns. Participants are presented with patterns 
that have one piece missing and decide from a choice of four answers which piece 
completes the pattern in the Matrix Reasoning section. The WASI takes approximately 
30 minutes to administer. Wechsler (1999) reported test-retest reliability coefficients 
ranging from 0.79 to 0.90 for an adult sample, who completed the WASI with two to 12 
weeks between testing sessions (Wechsler, 1999). The average internal consistency 
reliability coefficients for each subtest o f the WASI range from 0.92 to 0.94 indicating 
that this measure has good internal consistency.
3.6.2 Pubertal Development Scale
An assessment of pubertal development was included because the possible influence of 
puberty on functioning is often overlooked in developmental research (Kalkut et al., 
2009; Blakemore, 2008). Findings about the effect of pubertal development on 
executive function and social cognition are inconsistent. Pubertal development has been 
found to affect inhibition (Olaguni-Jones, Luna & Asato, 2007) and emotion 
understanding assessed with a visual analogue scale (Burnett et al., 2011), whilst other 
studies reported pubertal development did not relate to executive functions (Magar et 
al., 2010) or emotion recognition (Thomas et al., 2007). The Self-Administered Rating 
Scale for Pubertal Development (Carskadon & Acebo, 1983) was selected because it is 
more ethically acceptable than picture-based measures when working with adolescents 
(Bond et al., 2006).
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Petersen, Crockett, Richards and Boxer (1988) developed the Pubertal Development 
Scale, an interview based continuous measure. Both males and females rate on a 4-point 
scale (1 = not yet started to 4 = seems complete) their stage of development with regard 
to growth spurt, body hair growth and skin changes. Males complete questions about 
facial hair growth and voice changes, whilst females answer questions about breast 
development and the age they started their periods. Instead of interviewing participants, 
some researchers (e.g. Carskadon & Acebo, 1993) use a self-report version o f this 
measure. This adopts the same questions and rating scale as the interview measures, but 
allows participants to complete the questions themselves privately.
3.6.3 The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale
Literature reviewed in Chapter 2 demonstrated that depression has an equivocal effect 
on executive functions and social cognition (Favre et al., 2009; Harkness et al., 2005; 
Uekermann et al., 2008). Therefore, the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; 
Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) was included to explore the relationship between task 
performance with anxiety and depression and assess for age group differences. The 
HADS is a state measure of anxiety and depression, with seven items scored between 
zero and three on each subscale. “I feel tense or wound up” is an example from the 
anxiety subscale and “I feel cheerful” is from the depression subscale. Crawford, Henry, 
Crombie and Taylor (2001) reported Cronbach’s alpha o f 0.82 for the anxiety scale and 
0.77 for the depression scale indicating the HADS is a reliable measure.
3.6.4 Positive and Negative Affect Scale
Chapter 2 reviewed evidence that positive mood can impair executive function (Phillips, 
Smith & Gilhooly, 2002) and social cognition (Converse et al., 2008). An assessment o f 
mood is rarely included in executive function or social cognition research despite 
findings that mood can affect cognitive function. Consequently, the Positive Affect and 
Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988) enabled age group 
comparisons of mood state and its relationship to task performance to be examined. The 
PANAS consists o f 20 emotion words: ten positive affect (e.g. enthusiastic) and ten 
negative affect (e.g. scared), which the participants rated on a likert scale indicating to 
what extent they feel a specific emotion at the present moment. Crawford and Henry
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(2004) reported Cronbach’s alpha of 0.89 for the Positive Affect scale and 0.85 for the 
Negative Affect scale indicating good reliability.
3.6.5 Demographics
It has been suggested that young peoples’ changing social environment (Blakemore, 
2008) and education (Romine & Reynolds, 2005) may affect social and executive 
development. Other studies of cognitive function in late adolescence and early 
adulthood (e.g. Dumontheil et al., 2010a; Dumontheil et al., 2010b; Magar, Phillips & 
Hosie, 2010) provide no data on education, drug and alcohol use or changes to living 
arrangements and friendship groups. A demography measure (see appendix section 2) 
was developed to account for the effect o f environment on functional change. 
Participants stated how their living arrangements and friendship groups had changed 
over the last year. Participants noted whether they drank alcohol and whether they 
consumed over the weekly limit. Data on cannabis and ecstasy use, including age at first 
use, frequency and last use was also collected because studies reviewed in Chapter 2 
showed impaired executive functions for cannabis users (McHale & Hunt, 2008) and 
ecstasy users (de Sola Llopis et al., 2008) relative to controls. Data about mental illness 
was collected because literature reviewed in Chapter 2 indicated inconsistent findings in 
relation to the effects o f mental illness on executive function and social cognition. 
Participants were asked to report current mental illness by selecting whether they had 
experienced a Head Injury with 30 minutes unconscious, Autism or Asperger’s 
Syndrome, Depression, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder and Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder.
In summary, the present study utilised a sequential design with participants aged 17
years 0 months -  17 years 8 months, 18 years 0 months -  18 years 8 months and 19
years 0 months -  19 years 8 months at Time 1. A time interval o f 12 to 16 months
between testing allowed for the identification o f any subtle linear or non-linear
development o f executive functions and social cognition and practise effects were
minimised (Hausknecht et al., 2007). Executive function and social cognition tasks
appropriate for use with participants in late adolescence and early adulthood were
selected. The executive function battery comprised o f the Hayling and Brixton Tests
(Burgess & Shallice, 1997), measures o f response inhibition and rule detection, and D-
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KEFS Letter Fluency, Card Sorting and Tower Tests (Delis et al., 2001a), assessing 
strategy generation, concept formation and planning. The social cognition battery 
included the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and the 
Reading the Mind in the Voices Test (Golan et al., 2007) assessing emotion recognition 
in visual and auditory domains. The MASC (Dziobek et al., 2006) provided a measure 
o f social cognition combining visual dynamic and auditory stimuli showing social 
interaction and the IRI (Davis, 1983) assessed self-report empathy. Additional measures 
in the task battery assessed factors that may influence task performance including IQ, 
pubertal development, mood and demographic information.
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Chapter 4 
Recruitment, IQ and mood state data
4.1 Chapter overview
This chapter outlines recruitment o f  participants and then discusses retention in 
longitudinal studies, exam ining whether the Time 2 sample is representative o f  the Time 
1 sample. Follow ing this, age group comparisons o f  IQ and mood state data are reported 
at Time 1 and Time 2. M ood data include positive affect, negative affect, anxiety and 
depression scores. Self-report data on employment, education, living arrangements, 
friendship groups, drug use and pubertal development are reported.
4.2 Partic ipant recruitm ent
Participants were recruited from a variety o f  establishments including local schools, 
colleges, youth organisations and Sheffield Hallam  University. Participants received a 
£10 voucher for taking part at Time 1 and another £10 voucher for participating at Time 
2, w ith Sheffield Hallam  University students receiving either a voucher or course credit. 
It was more difficult to recruit 17 year olds compared to 18 and 19 year olds. Therefore, 
ethical approval was gained for snowball sampling to increase recruitm ent o f  17 year 
olds; participants told friends who m ight be interested in the study and received £10 for 
each friend who participated.
4.3 Procedure
Testing sessions took place in a quiet room  at Sheffield Hallam  University  and lasted 
approximately 3 hours each. Rest breaks were participant-determ ined. Participants first 
completed the questionnaire measures: Positive and Negative A ffect Scale (PANAS; 
W atson et al., 1988), Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Z igmond & 
Snaith, 1983), D rug use and Self-Adm inistered Rating Scale for Pubertal Developm ent 
(Carskadon & Acebo, 1993). Follow ing these, the W echsler Abbreviated Scale o f  
Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999) was adm inistered before the social cognition and 
executive function battery, which were counterbalanced across testing sessions. The
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individual tasks within the executive function and social cognition task batteries were 
also counterbalanced.
4.4 Retention in longitudinal studies
An inherent limitation of longitudinal designs is participant attrition. Participants gave a 
phone number, email address and postal address at Time 1 to enable contact about 
participating at Time 2. Participants were contacted twice by email, twice by phone and 
a voice message recorded to arrange Time 2 testing. Letters were sent to participants 
who had changed their phone numbers. To increase the number o f participants taking 
part at Time 2 the testing period was extended, participants received £20 for taking part 
and the researcher offered to travel to test participants. The Time 1 sample consisted of 
98 participants and 58 participants took part at Time 2, a 60% retention rate. Of 
participants who did not take part at Time 2, three did not want to participate again, 17 
did not reply, eight were not in Sheffield and six participants were too busy due to 
academic or work commitments. Six participants did not attend their booked testing 
session at Time 2 and were not available again.
Other longitudinal studies have reported similar retention rates. Novack, Bergquist, 
Bennett and Gouvier (1991) reported a retention rate o f 60% in a 6-month longitudinal 
study assessing anxiety and depression in caregivers o f Head Injury patients. In another 
study, Zipparo et al. (2008) conducted neuropsychological assessments including IQ 
and executive functions tests with 52 participants at Time 1 and 32 participants at Time 
2, a retention rate of 60%. As retention in the present study is similar to Zipparo et al. 
(2008) it is possible some participants did not want to take part because o f the testing 
sessions lasting approximately 3 hours. Davis and Franzoi (1991) reported a 
longitudinal study with 100% retention rate assessing 205 15 and 16 year olds on two 
short questionnaires, the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983) and Self 
Conscious Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975), every year over three consecutive years. In 
the Davis and Franzoi study, it is likely that the shorter testing time and availability of 
participants who were still at school at follow up testing resulted in a higher retention 
rate than in the present study. Intervention studies reported lower retention rates; for 
example, Cabiya et al., (2008) achieved a retention rate o f 54% in a Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy Intervention 6 months following Time 1. A study investigating
127
parent-child interaction therapy with 120 dyads at Time 1 retained 31% o f participants 
over the 2-year intervention (Lanier et al., 2011).
T-tests were conducted to compare Time 1 data (PANAS Positive Affect and Negative 
Affect scores, HADS Depression and Anxiety scores and WASI Verbal IQ, 
Performance IQ and Full IQ) o f participants who took part only at Time 1 with 
participants who took part at both time points. There was a significant difference for 
Verbal IQ scores (t (96) = 2.27, p  = 0.03) with participants who took part at Time 2 (M  
= 105.60, SD  = 8.73) attaining a higher IQ compared to participants who only took part 
at Time 1 (M =  101.20, SD  = 10.43). However, mean scores for both groups fell within 
the average IQ range indicating that the two groups were not categorically different 
based on IQ scores. Other t-tests with mood variables were not significant (all p ’s > 
0.30) indicating that the Time 2 sample is representative of the Time 1 sample on mood, 
depression, anxiety and Full Scale IQ.
Chi square tests were conducted on self-report drug use and changes in living 
arrangements to ascertain whether the Time 2 sample was representative o f the Time 1 
sample. Yates’s continuity corrections are reported because the contingency tables are 
2x2 (Field, 2005). There were no associations between whether participants took part at 
Time 1 or both time points and whether they reported drinking or not drinking alcohol 
(X (1) = 0.01, p  = 0.91, phi = 0.04, p  = 0.67) and whether they reported drinking under 
or over the weekly guidelines (x2 (1) = 1.19,p = 0.28, phi = 0.13, p  = 0.19). There were 
also no associations between whether participants took part at Time 1 or both time 
points and whether or not they reported ever using cannabis (x2 (1) = 0.01, p  = 0.91, phi 
= 0.03, p  = 0.74) or ecstasy (x2 (1) = 1.72,p = 0.19, phi = 0.17, p  = 0.09). Furthermore, 
there was no association between whether participants took part at Time 1 or both 
testing sessions and whether or not they reported changes in living arrangements over 
the previous 12 months (x2<0.01,p  = 0.28, phi = 0.13, p  = 0.19). These variables were 
o f particular interest because studies reviewed in Chapter 2 showed that alcohol, 
cannabis and ecstasy use can affect executive function and social cognition (Parada et 
al., 2012; Uekermann et al., 2005; McHale & Hunt, 2008; De Sola Llopis et al., 2008; 
Yip and Lee, 2006).
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4.5 IQ and mood data at Time 1
The Time 1 sample consisted of 98 participants in total from three age groups: 17 years 
0 months -  17 years 8 months (n = 3 1 ,M  = 17 years 4 months, SD  = 2.47 months, 23 
females: 8 males), 18 years 0 months -  18 years 8 months (n = 31, M =  18 years 4 
months, SD  = 2.44 months, 26 females: 5 males) and 19 years 0 months -  19 years 8 
months (n = 36, 19 years 2 months, SD  = 1.75 months, 28 females: 8 males). The 
sample consisted of more females (n = 77) than males (n = 21) because females more 
readily volunteered for the study.
Descriptive statistics for PANAS and HADS scores are presented in Table 4.1. 
Inferential statistics examining group differences follow the table.
Table 4.1. Means and Standard Deviations for Wechsler Abbreviated Scale o f  
Intelligence, Positive and Negative Affect Scale, Hospital Anxiety and Depression 
Scale and Pubertal Development Scale for age groups at Time 1
17 year olds (n = 31) 18 year olds (n = 31) 19 year olds (n = 36)
Verbal IQ 105.35 (7.51) 103.55 (11.78) 102.69 (9.36)
Performance
IQ*
105.39(10.62) 99.97 (9.39) 104.83 (7.93)
Full IQ 106.03 (7.43) 102.13 (10.98) 104.33 (7.65)
Positive affect 30.00 (4.32) 30.87 (7.43) 32.56 (4.75)
Negative
affect**
14.68 (5.22) 13.87 (3.31) 11.86 (2.38)
Depression 3.14(1.64) 2.58(3.13) 3.21 (2.41)
Anxiety* 8.38 (2.90) 8.38 (3.38) 6.65 (2.80)
Pubertal
Development
Scale**
3.57 (0.32) 3.77 (0.27) 3.84 (0.21)
* p  < 0.05, ** p  < 0.01 Depression and anxiety scores for n = 89
Groups differed on Performance IQ (F  (2, 95) = 3.24, p  = 0.04), with 18 year olds 
scoring significantly lower than 17 year olds (1 (60) = 21.3 p  = 0.04) and 19 year olds (t 
(65) = 2.30 p  = 0.03). However, mean IQ scores for each age group fell within the 
average range and there were no group differences for Verbal IQ (F(2, 95) = 0.64, p  = 
0.53, rj2 = 0.01) or Full Scale IQ (F(2, 95) = 1.54, p  = 0.22, r f  = 0.03).
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No significant group differences were found between 17 year olds, 18 year olds and 19 
year olds on the Positive Affect scale of the PANAS (Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988) 
(F  (2, 95) = 1.80,/? = 0.17, g2 = 0.04). There were group differences on the Negative 
Affect scale o f the PANAS (F  (2, 95) = 5.04, /?<0.01, g2 = 0.10), with 17 year olds (t 
(65) = 2.91, /?<0.01) and 18 year olds (t (65) = 2.88, /?<0.01) scoring significantly 
higher, indicating greater negative affect, than 19 year olds. No significant differences 
were evident between 17 year olds and 18 year olds (t (60) = 0.73, p  = 0.47) for 
Negative Affect scores. The PANAS scores are similar to normative data by Crawford 
and Henry (2004) indicating that group differences did not reflect pathological changes 
to mood state. Depression scores from the HADS (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) fell within 
the normal range with no significant group differences (F  (2, 86) = 0.56, p  = 0.57, g2 = 
0.01). Group differences were found on the Anxiety scale of the HADS (F  (2, 86) = 
3.49,/? = 0.04, g2 = 0.08), with scores for 17 year olds and 18 year olds within the mild 
range and significantly higher, indicating greater anxiety, than 19 year olds whose 
scores were in the normal range. No significant differences were found between 17 year 
olds and 18 year olds whose scores fell within the mild range on the Anxiety scale o f 
the HADS (t (53) <0.01,/? = 1.00).
Extent o f pubertal development differed between groups (F  (2, 95) = 9.10,/?<0.001, g2 
= 0.16). Seventeen year olds scored lower than 18 year olds (t (95) = 3.03,/?<0.01) and 
19 year olds (/ (95) = 3.06, p  < 0.001) indicating that the youngest age group showed 
less pubertal development than the other groups as might be expected. There were no 
other group differences for pubertal development.
Data about employment, education, living arrangements and friendship groups per age 
group is presented in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2. D ata on employment, education, living a rrangem en ts  and  friendship
groups fo r 17 ,18 and  19 year olds a t T ime 1
17 year olds (n=31) 18 year olds («=31) 19 year olds (rc=36)
Job 35% 55% 39%
Education AS levels 45% A2 levels 13% AS levels 3%
A2 levels 52% Degree 81% Degree 97%
BTEC 3% BTEC 6%
Living changed 16% 68% 75%
Live w ith Parents 97% Parents 35% Parents 25%
Grandparents 3% Friends 62% 
Partner 3%
Friends 75%
New  friends 42% 45% 67%
Changed groups 19% 19% 19%
Further apart 10% 13% 6%
Back in contact 3% 0% 0%
No change 26% 23% 8%
Note.  Education refers to participants’ current course o f  study. Participants stated 
whether their living arrangements and friendship groups had changed in the previous 12 
months. Friendship changes were categorised into one o f  five categories: m aking new  
friends, changing friendship groups, grow ing further apart from  friends, com ing back 
into contact w ith friends or no change.
Table 4.2 shows a higher percentage o f  18 year olds (55%) reported having a job , in 
comparison to 39% o f  19 year olds and 35% o f 17 year olds. Seventeen year olds were 
studying for AS levels (45%), A2 levels (52%) and BTEC (3% ), w hilst a higher 
percentage o f  18 and 19 year olds were university students (81%  and 97%). The 19- 
year-old group had greater independence away from  fam ily, w ith 75%  reporting living 
w ith friends instead o f  parents compared to 0% o f  17 and 62%  o f  18 year olds. Seventy 
five per cent o f  19 year olds reported their living arrangements had changed in the last 
year compared to 16% o f 17 and 68% o f  18 year olds. The percentage o f  participants 
living w ith their parents decreased w ith age from  97% o f  17 year olds, 35%  o f  18 year 
olds and 25%  o f  19 year olds. A sim ilar percentage o f  participants reported making new  
friends across 17-year-old (42%) and 18-year-old (45%) age groups; this was greatest in
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19 year olds (67%) presumably because of changed living arrangements. These 
demographic data show the 18 and 19-year-old groups had undergone greater change to 
their social and living environment than 17 year olds.
4.6 Self-report drug use at Time 1
There was no association between age and self-report cannabis use (%2 (2) = 4.62, p  = 
0.10, phi = 0.22, p  = 0.10), ecstasy use (%2 (2) = 0.46,/? = 0.80, phi = 0.07,/? = 0.80) or 
alcohol use (%2 (2) = 3.73, p  = 0.28, phi = 0.20, p  = 0.16) indicating that drug use was 
similar across age groups.
4.6.1 Self-report cannabis use at Time 1
Forty-five per cent o f 17 year olds, 26% of 18 year olds and 22% of 19 year olds 
reported using cannabis. From those, 100% of 17 year olds recruited to the current study 
and 88% of both 18 and 19 year olds reported they had started using cannabis by age 16 
or younger. The youngest age o f first reported cannabis use was found in the 17-year- 
old group; one participant began at age 13. Twenty-one per cent o f 17 year olds, 13% of 
18 year olds and 0% of 19 year olds in the current study reported using cannabis weekly 
or more often. Three participants in the youngest age group reported using the drug the 
day before testing, whereas for 18 year olds the most recent (n = 1) was a week prior to 
testing and 19 year olds was 2 months before ( n=  1). Box plots showed that participants 
with recent cannabis use were not outliers on executive function and social cognition 
task scores.
4.6.2 Self-report ecstasy use at Time 1
Ecstasy use was similar across all age groups: 17 year olds (10%), 18 year olds (6%) 
and 19 year olds (6%) reported using ecstasy. O f these, 67% of 17 year old, 50% o f 18 
year old and 0% of 19-year-old ecstasy users had begun using ecstasy by age 16 or 
younger. One of the 17 year olds reported starting using this drug at age 14, which was 
earlier than first use in the other age groups. Last ecstasy use prior to participating in the 
study was a month or less for 33% of 17-year-old and 50% of 19-year-old ecstasy users 
and more than a month for 18-year-old users. There was no reported ecstasy use in the 
previous 24 hours prior to participating in the study.
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4.6.3 Self-report alcohol use at Time 1
Seventy-seven per cent of 17 year olds, 94% of 18 year olds and 89% o f 19 year olds 
reported drinking alcohol. O f these, 13% of 17 year olds, 34% of 18 year olds and 44% 
of 19 year olds reported that they consumed over the weekly limit. A higher percentage 
of 18 and 19 year olds reported alcohol use than 17 year olds, with the greatest amount 
o f alcohol consumed by 19 year olds. These data indicate a shift from drug use to 
alcohol use as students commence university.
4.7 Self-report mental illness at Time 1
Reported mental illness was depression (3%) and OCD (6%) for 17 year olds, 
depression (3%), depression and ADHD (3%) and OCD (6%) for 18 year olds and 
depression (2%) and OCD (2%) for 19 year olds, indicating similar frequencies of 
mental health problems across groups.
4.8 IQ and mood data at Time 2
The sample at Time 2 consisted o f 58 participants: 18 year olds (n = 15, 12 females: 3 
males), 19 year olds (n = 17, 14 females: 3 males) and 20 year olds (n  = 26, 21 females: 
5 males). Descriptive statistics for age data in 18, 19 and 20 year old age groups are 
presented in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3. Descriptive statistics for age data in 18, 19 and 20 year olds age groups 
at Time 2
18 year olds (n = 19 year olds (n = 20 year olds (n =
15) 17) 26)
Mean 18 years 5 months 19 years 4 months 20 years 4 months
Standard deviation 2.74 2.46 2.40
Range 18 years 1 month - 19 years 0 months - 20 years 0 months -
18 years 10 months 19 years 8 months 20 years 9 months
Data for IQ, positive and negative affect, anxiety, depression and pubertal development 
at Time 2 are reported in Table 4.4.
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Table 4.4. Means and S tandard Deviations for Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence, Positive and Negative Affect Scale, Hospital Anxiety and Depression 
Scale and Pubertal Development Scale for age groups at Time Two
18 year olds (n  =
15)
19 year olds (n = 
17)
20 year olds (n  = 
26)
Verbal IQ 108.47(10.99) 110.94 (8.58) 105.27 (8.83)
Performance IQ 111.40(12.11) 109.00 (7.54) 112.31 (10.82)
Full IQ 111.07(11.44) 111.53 (8.22) 109.65 (6.99)
Positive affect 30.13 (7.75) 32.06 (6.87) 32.54 (5.29)
Negative affect 15.07 (5.18) 12.47 (2.81) 12.54 (2.85)
HADS Depression* 4.47 (2.67) 1.76 (1.68) 2.62 (2.56)
HADS Anxiety 8.73 (3.54) 6 .12 (2 .71 ) 7.00 (3.05)
Pubertal
Development Scale
3.73 (0.22) 3.81 (0.21) 3.90 (0.15)
* p <  0.05
There were no group differences on Verbal IQ (F  (2, 55) = 1.95 , p  = 0.153 q2 = 0.07), 
Performance IQ ( F  (2, 55) = 0.53, p  = 0.590, rj2 = 0.02) or Full Scale IQ (2, 55) = 
0.27, p  = 0.761, r)2 = 0.01) across groups at Time 2. Groups did not d iffer on Positive 
Affect ( F  (2, 55) =  0.68, p  = 0.510, r)2 = 0.02) or Negative A ffect (2, 55) = 2.84, p  = 
0.067, q = 0.09). There were group differences on the HADS Depression score (F  (2, 
55) = 5.40, p  = 0.007, q = 0 .1 6 )  w ith 18 year olds scoring significantly higher, 
indicating greater depression, than 19 year olds ( t  (30) = 3.47, p  = 0.002) and 20 year 
olds (t  (39) = 2.20, p  = 0.034). No difference on the HADS Depression score was 
evident between 19 and 20 year olds (t  (41) = 1.21, p  = 0.234). There were no group 
differences on HADS Anxiety score (F  (2, 55) = 2.95, p  = 0.061, q2 = 0.10). Anxiety 
and Depression scores between 8 and 10 are classed as m ild (Z igmond & Snaith, 1983) 
indicating participants were lower than mild.
Data about employment, education and living and friendship changes are reported in 
Table 4.5.
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Table 4.5. D ata on employment, education and  living and  friendsh ip  changes at
Time 2
18 year olds («=15) 19 year olds («=17) 20 year olds (n=26)
Job 60% 59% 62%
Student 93% 94% 100%
Education A2 levels 64% A2 levels 6% Degree 100%
Degree 36% Degree 94%
Living changed 20% 71% 54%
Live w ith Parents 87% Parents 35% Parents 23%
Grandparents 13% Friends 59% Friends 61%
On own 6% Partner 12%
Parents & partner 4%
New  friends 40% 53% 15%
Changed groups 0% 6% 15%
Closer 0% 0% 8%
Further apart 20% 6% 0%
Back in contact 0% 0% 0%
No change 40% 35% 62%
Note.  Education refers to participants’ current course o f  study. Participants stated 
whether their living arrangements and friendship groups had changed in the previous 12 
months. Friendship changes were categorised into one o f  five categories: making new  
friends, changing friendship groups, grow ing further apart from  friends, com ing back 
into contact w ith friends or no change.
A sim ilar proportion o f  18, 19 and 20 year olds reported having a job  (approximately 
60%). A  higher percentage o f  participants in the 19-year-old group (71%) reported their 
living arrangements had changed in the previous 12 months compared to 20%  o f  18 
year olds and 54% o f 20 year olds. E ighteen year olds predom inantly lived w ith their 
parents (87%) and the remainder lived w ith grandparents (13%). N ineteen year olds 
reported living w ith parents (35%), friends (59%) and on their own (6%). A  higher 
percentage o f  20 year olds lived w ith friends (61%) compared to 18 and 19 year olds. 
Twenty three per cent o f  20 year olds lived w ith their parents, 12% w ith their partner 
and 4%  w ith their parents and partner. A higher percentage o f  19 year olds (53%) 
reported making new  friends in the previous 12 months, compared to 40%  o f  18 year
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olds and 15% o f 20 year olds. Twenty per cent of 18 year olds reported becoming 
further apart from friends compared to 6%  o f 19 year olds and 0% o f 20 year olds.
4.9 Self-report drug use at Time 2
There was no association between age and self-report cannabis use (%2 (2) = 3.86, p  = 
0.15, phi = 0.26,p  = 0.15), ecstasy use (%2 (2) = 1.51 ,/? = 0.47, phi = 0 .16 ,p  = 0.47) or 
alcohol use (%2 (2) = 0.55,/? = 0.76, phi = 0.10,/? = 0.76), indicating that drug use was 
similar across age groups at Time 2.
4.9.1 Self-report cannabis use at Time 2
The highest percentage o f cannabis use was in 18 year olds (53%) compared to 35% o f 
19 year olds and 23% of 20 year olds. Age at first use in the 18-year-old group ranged 
from 14 years old to 17 years old, 13 to 16 years for the 19-year-old group and 15 to 19 
years for the 20-year-old group. Self-reported cannabis use was most frequent in the 20- 
year-old group with one participant reporting they used cannabis once a week and 
another two or three times a month. In the 18-year-old group, previous cannabis use 
ranged from 4 days for one participant and one week for another to over a year before 
testing. In the 19-year-old group, one participant reported 3 days before testing, another 
2 weeks and the remainder last used cannabis over a year prior to testing. In the 20- 
year-old group, two participants reported using the drug a week before testing, one two 
weeks before and the remainder over a year before testing.
4.9.2 Self-report ecstasy use at Time 2
Twenty per cent o f 18 year olds, 6% o f 19 year olds and 12% of 20 year olds reported 
using ecstasy. In the 18-year-old group, age at first use was reported at age 15, 17 and 
18 with last use o f the drug reported two weeks, 5 months and 3 years ago. The only 
participant in the 19-year-old group who reported using ecstasy started at age 18 and 
had used the drug once two weeks prior to testing. O f the three 20 year old participants 
who reported ecstasy use, two first used it at age 17 and one at age 18. Previous ecstasy 
use was reported as 3 months, 6 months and 3 years ago.
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4.9.3 Self-report alcohol use at Time 2
A slightly higher percentage o f 19 year olds reported consuming alcohol (94%) 
compared to 87% of 18 year olds and 89% of 20 year olds. O f these participants who 
consumed alcohol, 23% of 18 year olds, 29% of 19 year olds and 30% of 20 year olds 
reported consuming over the weekly alcohol limit.
4.10 Self-report mental illness at Time 2
Frequency of mental illness was similar across 18, 19 and 20 year old groups with no 
participants reporting mental illness in 18 and 19 year olds, whilst one 20 year old 
reported depression.
To summarise, the age groups at Time 1 and Time 2 were broadly comparable on mood 
state, anxiety and depression scores, which were not at clinically significant levels 
according to guidelines by Zigmond and Snaith (1983). Whilst there were some group 
differences, they did not reflect severe mental illness and fluctuated between 
moderate/mild to normal. At both time points cannabis, ecstasy and alcohol use were 
similar across age groups. Chi squared tests found no association between whether 
participants took part at Time 1 or both time points and self-report alcohol, cannabis and 
ecstasy use and changes in living arrangements. Data was further explored by 
comparing Time 1 IQ and mood data for participants who took part at Time 1 or both 
time points. No group differences were found on the HADS Depression and Anxiety 
scores, Positive Affect and Negative Affect, Performance or Full Scale IQ. Participants 
who took part at Time 2 had a significantly higher Time 1 Verbal IQ relative to 
participants who did not participate at Time 2, although IQ scores are within the normal 
range. Overall, the Time 2 sample was representative o f the Time 1 sample.
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Chapter 5 
Time 1 cross section analyses
5.1 Chapter overview
This chapter presents Time 1 cross sectional data from 17, 18 and 19 year olds on a 
battery o f executive function and social cognition tasks. The present late adolescent and 
early adulthood executive function and social cognition data is compared to existing 
adulthood data from published studies in section 5.6. Gender comparisons are reported 
in section 5.7. Following this, the effects o f IQ, drug and alcohol use, living 
arrangement and pubertal development on task performance are reported. Findings are 
discussed in relation to previous research.
5.2 Distribution of data
To assess the distribution o f the data, histograms, skewness statistics and box plots per 
age group were examined (see appendix section 3 for examples o f box plots). Clark- 
Carter (2004) recommended that skewness statistics ranging between ±2.85 are 
parametric. Using these guidelines, the data are parametric with the exception of 
combined repeated sorts on the D-KEFS Sorting Test for 18 and 19 year olds (skewness 
= 3.73 and 6.00 respectively). Chi square, a non-parametric test, was used to analyse the 
repeated sorts data.
The following box plots had no outliers: IRI Fantasy, IRI Perspective Taking, IRI 
Personal Distress, D-KEFS Letter Fluency, D-KEFS number o f correct free sorts, 
description score for sort recognition and description score for verbal sorts, D-KEFS 
Tower achievement score and Tower time per move. The histograms for the Eyes Test 
were slightly negatively skewed and a low outlier was present on the 17 and 18 year old 
group box plots, whereas no outliers were evident in the 19 year old group. The 
histograms for the Voices Test were generally normally distributed. The MASC Total 
score box plots showed one low outlier for 17 year olds, a low and high outlier for 18 
year olds and no outliers for 19 year olds. For IRI Empathic Concern there was a high
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outlying score in the 19 year old group with no outliers for the 17 and 18 year old 
groups. The Hayling Scaled boxplots had outliers for the 17 and 18 year old groups 
whereas the 19 year old group had no outliers. The Brixton scaled box plots had a low 
outlier for the 17 year old group, no outliers for the 18 year old group with a high outlier 
and two low outliers present in the 19 year old group. For free sort description score the 
17 and 19 year old groups had no outliers whereas there were two low outlying scores in 
the 18 year old group. There was a low outlying score in the 17 year old group, three 
low and high outliers in the 18 year old group and no outlying scores in the 19 year old 
group for D-KEFS perceptual scores descriptive score The box plots for towers 
completed showed a low outlying score for 17 year olds, two for 18 year olds and one 
for the 19 year old group. Outliers were retained for the analyses because these are true 
neuropsychological task scores (Finch, 2012).
5.3 Task scores reported
Inferential statistics are reported in raw scores, with the exception of Hayling and 
Brixton Tests, for ease o f comparison across tests because some measures do not have 
standardised score equivalents. Standardised scores indicate participants’ performance 
relative to peers the same age. Scaled scores, instead of raw scores, are reported for the 
Hayling and Brixton Tests because these are reported extensively in the literature (e.g. 
Barker et al., 2010; Frangou, Donaldson, Hadjulis, Landau & Goldstein, 2005; Joshua, 
Gogos & Rossell, 2009; Wood & Liossi, 2005). Higher scaled scores on the Hayling 
Test indicate more accurate response inhibition and higher scaled scores on the Brixton 
Test relate to greater rule detection compared to lower scores.
Waber et al. (2007) noted that standardised scores capture individual differences, but are
not sensitive to developmental differences and recommended the analysis o f raw scores.
Raw scores are reported for the D-KEFS Letter Fluency, Sorting and Tower Tests with
higher Letter Fluency Task scores indicating greater strategy generation. Several indices
are reported on the Sorting Test: number o f free sorts correct, description score for free
sorts, description score for sort recognition and description score for verbal and
perceptual sorts with a higher score indicating better concept formation. Number of
Towers completed, Achievement score, mean first move time, move accuracy and time
per move are reported for the D-KEFS Tower Test. Primary measures for the D-KEFS
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tests are provided in this chapter; Delis, Kaplan and Kramer (2001) described these as a 
global achievement score or process scores for key task components. As there is only 
one primary measure for the Tower Test, optional measures are reported in addition, 
consistent with previous research (e.g. Larochette, Benn & Harrison, 2009), to provide a 
more comprehensive assessment.
5.4 Executive function group differences
One way between group ANOVAs were conducted with task scores to identify group 
differences in 17, 18 and 19 year olds on executive function and social cognition task 
scores. Considerations when reporting inferential statistics are discussed first. ANOVAs 
are reported in preference to MANOVA because in MANOVA moderately correlated 
dependent variables decrease power (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). As correlations 
between dependent variables increase, power o f MANOVA decreases (Ramsey, 1982, 
cited in Field, 2005). Executive function correlations at Time 1 range from r = 0.20 to r 
= 0.85 for executive function tasks and r = 0.20 to r  = 0.83 for social cognition tasks. 
The high r values are for variables from the same task rather than variables across tasks. 
Post-hoc Tukey HSD tests are reported, because these are conservative when 
conducting a large number o f comparisons (Dancey & Reidy, 2004).
While some statisticians recommend a more stringent p  value is needed with multiple 
tests (e.g. Shaffer, 1995), the p  value is not adjusted for multiple testing because this 
increases Type II errors, the probability o f accepting the null hypothesis when it is false 
(Pemeger, 1998) and there is the possibility o f loss o f power (Field, 2005). Rothman 
(1990) argued that not adjusting p  values is more preferable to adjusting them because 
this results in fewer errors o f interpretation and adjusting for multiple comparisons 
could lead to important findings being missed. Pemeger (1998) argued that adjustments 
are applicable to Statistical Test Theory (Neyman & Pearson, 1928) and are useful in 
repetitive decision making, but are not suitable when analysing data. Furthermore, 
Pemeger (1998) commented that multiple adjustments are interpreted differently 
depending on the number o f other tests conducted. The approach o f not adjusting the p  
value applies to all subsequent analyses in this thesis.
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Descriptive statistics for executive function tasks are presented in Table 5.1. All p  
values are reported as two tailed unless otherwise stated.
Table 5.1. Means and standard deviations for age groups at Time 1 on executive 
function tasks (Hayling & Brixton Tests, D-KEFS Letter Fluency, Card Sorting 
and Tower Task)
17 year olds (n = 31) 18 year olds (n = 31) 19 year olds (n = 36)
M easures o f  response inhibition (Hayling Test) and rule detection (Brixton Test)
Hayling scaled 5 .97 (1 .25 ) 5 .74 (1 .37 ) 5 .22 (1 .76 )
Brixton scaled 7.39 (2.00) 7.23 (1.77) 7 .17 (1 .60 )
M easure o f  strategy generation (D -KEFS Letter Fluency)
Letter fluency * 39.35 (7.56) 34.00 (8.60) 36.06 (7.36)
M easures o f  concept formation (D -KEFS Sorting Test)
Free sorts correct * 12.00(1 .97) 10 .74(1 .53) 10.83 (1.98)
Free sort description 
score *
45.23 (7.66) 39.97 (7.78) 41.75 (7.34)
Sort recognition 
description score *
48.97 (6.44) 44.42 (7.89) 45.08 (6.81)
Verbal sorts 
description score
31.84 (7.96) 28.71 (7.10) 30 .17 (8 .11 )
Perceptual sorts 
description score *
62.35 (8.92) 56.94 (9.99) 56.31 (8.17)
M easures o f  plannin g (D -KEFS Tower Test)
Number o f  Tower 
items completed
8.42 (0.85) 8.13 (0.96) 8.33 (0.72)
Tower achievement 
score
18.26 (2.85) 18 .32(2 .70) 17.64 (2.95)
Mean first move 
time
3 .08 (1 .10 ) 3.89 (1.83) 3 .9 6 (1 .8 4 )
Time per move 2.60 (0.62) 2.80 (0.78) 2.74 (0.52)
Move accuracy 1.66 (0.44) 1 .57(0 .46) 1.65 (0.37)
* / ?< 0.05
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5.4.1 Response inhibition and rule detection (Hayling & Brixton Tests)
No significant age group differences were found on the Hayling Test, a measure o f
response inhibition (F  (2, 95) = 2.23, p  = 0.113, r)2p = 0.05) or Brixton Test, a measure 
of rule detection ( F (  2, 95) = 0.13 ,/? = 0.875, q2 < 0.01).
5.4.2 Strategy generation (D-KEFS Letter Fluency Test)
There were significant age group differences for scores on the Letter Fluency Test, a 
measure o f strategy generation (F  (2, 95) = 3.70, p  = 0.028, r|2p = 0.07). Results o f post 
hoc Tukey tests showed that 17 year olds scored higher, indicating better performance, 
than 18 year olds on the Letter Fluency Test (t (95) = 2.69, p  = 0.023). There were no 
significant differences between 17 year olds and 19 year olds (t (95) = 1.72,/? = 0.203) 
or 18 and 19 year olds (t (95) = 1.07,/? = 0.534).
5.4.3 Concept formation (D-KEFS Sorting Test)
There were a number o f significant age group differences on the D-KEFS Sorting Test, 
a measure o f concept formation. For number o f correct free sorts (F  (2, 95) = 4.58, p  = 
0.013, r |2p = 0.09), 17 year olds scored significantly higher than 18 year olds (t (95) = 
2.69,/? = 0.023) and 19 year olds (t (95) = 2.59,/? = 0.030). Number o f correct free sorts 
were not significantly different for 18 year olds and 19 year olds (t (95) = 0.20, p  = 
0.978). On free sort description score (F  (2, 95) = 3.87,/? = 0.024, rj2p = 0.08), 17 year 
olds scored significantly higher than 18 year olds (t (95) = 2.73,/? = 0.020). There were 
no significant differences between 17 year olds and 19 year olds (t (95) = 1.87, p  = 
0.153) or 18 and 19 year olds (t (95) = 0.96, p  = 0.604). On sort recognition description 
score (F  (2, 95) = 3.81, p  = 0.026, r|2p = 0.07), 17 year olds scored significantly higher 
than 18 year olds (t (95) = 2.54, p  = 0.034). There were no significant age group 
differences for description score for verbal sorts (F  (2, 95) = 1.26, p  = 0.278, r |2p = 
0.03). On description score for perceptual sorts (F  (2, 95) = 4.37, p  = 0.02, q2 = 0.08), 
17 year olds scored higher than 18 (t (95) = 2.37, p  = 0.050) and 19 year olds (/ (95) = 
2.74,/? = 0.020).
To summarise, 17 year olds scored significantly higher, indicating more accurate 
concept formation, than 18 year olds on four components o f concept formation (number
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o f  correct free sorts, free sort description score, sort recognition description score and 
description score for perceptual sorts). Seventeen year olds also scored significantly 
higher, indicating more accurate concept formation, than 19 year olds on number o f  
correct free sorts and description score for perceptual sorts.
Raw  data were transformed into standardised z scores to graphically illustrate peaks and 
troughs in task perform ance where group differences were evident for concept 
formation and strategy generation (D-KEFS Sorting and Letter Fluency Tests).
Figure 5.1. Z score graph for 17, 18 and 19 year old age groups on the D-KEFS 
Sorting Test, a measure of concept formation, and D-KEFS Letter Fluency Test, a 
measure of strategy generation
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Graphed data in Figure 5.1 follow  a U  shape suggesting non-linear developm ent o f  
concept formation and strategy generation w ith a peak at age 17, dip in perform ance at 
age 18 and slight upturn in ability on these measures in the 19 year old group, although 
the difference between 18 and 19 year olds is not significant.
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5.4.3.1 Perseveration on the D-KEFS Sorting Test
A Chi square test was conducted to explore age group and number of repeated sorts on 
the Sorting Test because these variables are categorical. A significant association was 
found between age and repeated sorts on the D-KEFS Sorting Test (%2 (2, N  = 98) = 
14.75, p  < 0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.41) with repeated sorts decreasing with age. The 
highest per cent o f repeated sorts was evident in the 17 year old group (35.5%), 
followed by 6.5% of 18 year olds and 2.8% of 19 year olds repeated sorts. Fisher’s 
Exact Test is reported because more than 25% o f cells have an expected frequency o f 
less than 5 (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). Seventeen percent of variation in frequency counts 
o f repeated sorts can be accounted for by age. Table 5.2 demonstrates that 17 year olds 
made more repeated sorts, with repeated sorts (perseveration) decreasing with age 
indicating better performance.
Table 5.2. Number of repeated sorts by age group on the D-KEFS Sorting Test
Zero One Two Three Four
17 year olds 20 9 1 0 1
18 year olds 29 2 0 0 0
19 year olds 35 0 1 0 0
5.4.4 Measures o f planning (D-KEFS Tower Test)
Several indices were calculated for the Tower Test according to the D-KEFS examiner's 
manual: number o f items completed, achievement score (takes into account if  items are 
passed and also the number of moves), mean first move time (total first move time / 
items administered), time per move (total completion time / total number o f moves) and 
move accuracy (total number o f moves /  total minimum number o f moves required). 
There were no age group differences for number o f Tower items completed (F  (2,95) = 
0.98, p  = 0.378, q2 = 0.02), Tower achievement score (F  (2,95) = 0.60,/? = 0.549, r |2p = 
0.01), Tower mean first move time (F  (2,95) = 2.87,/? = 0.062, rj2p = 0.06), Tower time 
per move (F  (2, 95) = 0.81,/? = 0.447, r)2p = 0.02) and Tower move accuracy (F  (2,95) = 
0.44,/? = 0.643, r| p < 0 .01). These results indicate that ability on these measures did not 
differ significantly as an effect of age in late adolescence in the present cohort.
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5.5 Social Cognition group differences
Raw scores on social cognition tasks were analysed with one way between group 
ANOVAs across age groups. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3. Means and standard deviations for age groups at Time 1 on social 
cognition tasks with range of possible scores (Reading the Mind in the Eyes, 
Reading the Mind in the Voices, Movie for the Assessment o f Social Cognition and 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index)
17 year olds (n = 31) 18 year olds (n = 31) 19 year olds (n = 36)
Static visual stimuli (Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test)
Eyes
Range 0 - 3 6
27.26 (4.83) 27.61 (3.55) 28.23 (3.26)
Auditory stimuli (Reading the Mind in Voices Test)
Voices 
Range 0 - 2 5
17.06 (2.25) 16.97(2.66) 16.86 (2.26)
Dynamic visual and auditory stimuli with social interaction (MASC)
MASC correct 35.48 (3.79) 35.19(3.25) 35.83 (3.32)
MASC excessive 
mental state 
inference errors
5.48 (2.78) 6.16(2.25) 5.19(2.73)
MASC insufficient 
mental state 
inference errors
2.48 (1.81) 2.39(1.26) 2.69(1.51)
MASC no ToM 
errors
Range 0 - 4 5
1.55 (0.93) 1.26 (1.00) 1.28 (1.06)
Self report (Interpersonal Reactivity Index)
IRI Fantasy 18.35 (5.35) 16.65 (6.06) 17.18(4.37)
IRI perspective 17.03 (3.85) 16.90(4.00) 17.03 (4.04)
IRI empathic 21.29 (3.45) 20.26 (3.66) 20.60 (3.08)
IRI personal 
distress 
Range 0 - 2 8
12.61 (4.67) 14.52 (5.28) 14.06 (4.21)
All p >  0.05
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5.5.1 Reading the Mind in the Eyes and Voices Tests
One way between group ANOVAs showed no significant age group differences in total 
scores on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes (F  (2, 94) = 0.52,/? = 0.594, r |2p = 0.01) or 
Reading the Mind in the Voice tasks F  (2, 95) = 0.06,/? = 0.941, rj2p < 0.01).
5.5.2 Movie for the Assessment o f Social Cognition
Groups were not different on the total score o f the Movie for the Assessment o f Social 
Cognition (F  (2, 95) = 0.29, p  = 0.750, r]2p < 0.01), MASC excessive mental state 
inference errors (i.e. over-attribution o f mental state content) (F  (2, 95) = 1.19, p  =
9 •0.310, r| p = 0.02), MASC insufficient mental state errors (i.e. under-attribution of 
mental state content) (F  (2, 95) = 0.35, p  = 0.703, r|2p <0.01) and MASC no Theory o f 
Mind errors (i.e. physical causation, no mental state attribution) (F  (2, 95) = 0.83, p  = 
0.438, t |2p = 0.02).
5.5.3 Interpersonal Reactivity Index
For self-report empathy, there were no group differences on the four factors o f the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index: Fantasy (F  (2, 94) = 0.87, p  = 0.424, rj2p = 0.02), 
Perspective Taking (F  (2, 94) = 0.01, p  = 0.989, r|2p < 0.01), Empathic Concern (F  (2, 
94) = 0.75,/? = 0.476, r\2p = 0.02) and Personal Distress (F  (2, 94) = 1.38,/? = 0.256, r |2p 
= 0.03).
5.6 Comparison with existing adult data
The present late adolescence / early adulthood data is compared to existing adulthood 
data to contextualise the present data and provide a broader comparison. A summary of 
how executive function and social cognition change between late adolescence and 
adulthood based on published data is presented in Tables 5.4 and 5.5. The ▲  symbol in 
the table indicates whether the highest task performance is at age 17, 18, 19 years or 
adulthood. The existing adulthood papers were chosen because they specified the age of 
the adult group and gave descriptive statistics for task performance on identical tasks to 
the present study. Some studies (e.g. Greve, Farrell, Besson & Crouch, 1995) had 
typically developing participants. Where the study involved atypically developing
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participants the control data was used for comparison (e.g. Kirchner, Hatri, Heekeren & 
Dziobek, 2011).
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Table 5.4. Comparison between late adolescent data (17, 18, 19 year olds) and
existing adult data on executive function tasks
17 year olds 
(n = 31)
18 year olds 
(n = 31)
19 year olds 
(n = 36)
Existing adult data
Measures o f response inhibition and rule detection
Hayling scaled
Brixton raw 
errors
5.97(1.25)
12.10(6.76)
5.74(1.37)
11.94(4.56)
5.22(1.76) 
12.47 (5.50)
5.60(0.76) A  
M=28.2 years 
Henry, Mazur & 
Rendell (2009) 
10.7 (35.00) A  
M =  22.8 years 
Andres & Van der 
Linden (2000)
Measure o f Strategy generation
Letter fluency 39.35 (7.56) 34.00 (8.60) 36.06 (7.36) 48.3 (17.57) A  
M=28.2 years 
Henry, Mazur & 
Rendell (2009)
Measures o f concept formation
Free sorts correct 75.00% 67.13% 67.69% 80.22% A  
M — 22 years
Free sort 
description score
70.67% ▲ 62.45% 65.23% 71.89% A
Sort recognition 
description score
76.52% A 69.41% 70.44% 76.72% A
Greve, Farrell, 
Besson & Crouch 
(1995)
Measures o f planning
Number o f Tower 
items completed 
Tower 
achievement 
score
Mean first move 
time
Time per move 
Move accuracy
8.42 (0.85) 
18.26 (2.85)
3.08 (1.10) A
2.60 (0.62) A  
1.66 (0.44)
8.13 (0.96)
18.32 A  
(2.70)
3.89 (1.83)
2.80 (0.78) 
1.57 (0.46) A
8.33 (0.72)
17.64
(2.95)
3.96(1.84)
2.74 (0.52) 
1.65 (0.37)
17.88 (3.83)
M — 23.03 years
34.21 (27.81)
3.30(1.08)
1.68 (0.37) 
Larochette, Benn & 
Harrison (2009)
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Table 5.5. Comparison between late adolescent data (17, 18 and 19 year olds) and
existing normative adult data on social cognition tasks
17 year olds 
(n = 31)
18 year olds 
(n = 31)
19 year olds 
(n = 36)
Existing adult data
Static visual stimuli
Eyes 27.26 (4.83) 27.61 (3.55) 28.23 
(3.26) A
25.1 (3.8)
M =  31.8 years
Kirchner, Hatri, 
Heekeren & 
Dziobek (2011)
Auditory stimuli
Voices 17.06(2.25) 16.97(2.66) 16.86 (2.26) 18.77(2.41) A
M =  24.3 years
Golan, Baron- 
Cohen, Hill & 
Rutherford (2007)
Dynamic visual and auditory stimuli with social interaction
MASC correct 35.48 (3.79) 35.19(3.25) 35.83(3.32)
A
33.34(5.26) M =  
33.2 years
MASC excessive 
mental state 
inference errors
5.48 (2.78) 6.16(2.25) 5.19(2.73) Ritter et al. (2011)
MASC 
insufficient 
mental state 
inference errors
2.48(1.81) 2.39(1.26) 2.69 (1.51)
MASC no ToM 
errors
1.55 (0.93) 1.26(1.00) 1.28(1.06)
Self-report empathy
IRI Fantasy 18.35 
(5.35) A
16.65 (6.06) 17.86 (4.37) 16.30 (5.40)
IRI Perspective 17.03 (3.85) 16.90 (4.00) 17.03 (4.04) 20.40 (4.20) A
IRI Empathic 21.29 (3.45) 20.26 (3.66) 20.60 (3.08) 21.60 (4.30)
IRI Personal 
distress
12.61 (4.67) 14.52 (5.28) 14.06 (4.21) 10.10(3.90) A 
Hassenstab et al. 
(2007)
▲  best performance on tasks
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Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show a combination o f changes, with some studies demonstrating 
functions peaking in late adolescence (achievement score, mean first move time, time 
per move and move accuracy on the D-KEFS Tower Test) while other functions peak in 
adulthood (Brixton Test: rule detection, D-KEFS Letter Fluency: response generation 
and D-KEFS free sorts correct: concept formation). Seventeen year olds scored 
similarly to adults on concept formation (free sorts description score and sort 
recognition description score), with poorer performance in 18 and 19 year old groups, 
consistent with the notion o f non-linear development.
Table 5.5 shows that the 19 year old group showed better performance on the Reading 
the Mind in the Eyes Test (emotion recognition with static stimuli) and the total score o f 
the Movie for the Assessment o f Social Cognition (a dynamic measure) relative to 
adults, 17 and 18 year olds. Adults attained the highest score on the Reading the Mind 
in the Voice Test, indicating that emotion recognition from auditory stimuli continues to 
develop between late adolescence and adulthood. Seventeen year olds rated themselves 
highest relative to 18 year olds, 19 year olds and adults on the Fantasy scale o f the IRI 
suggesting that 17 year olds have a higher tendency to associate with characters in 
books and films. The data show that Perspective Taking, the tendency o f a person to 
consider other peoples’ viewpoints, continues to develop following late adolescence, 
whereas Empathic Concern, sympathetic feelings towards other people’s misfortune, is 
relatively stable across late adolescence and adulthood. Changing living arrangements 
and friendship groups in late adolescence may lead to higher Personal Distress ratings, 
feelings o f apprehension in stressful situations, in late adolescence relative to adults. 
Evidence for changing living arrangements and friendship groups in the present sample 
is reported in Chapter 4. Sixteen per cent o f 17 year olds, 68% of 18 year olds and 75% 
of 19 year olds reported a change in living arrangements in the previous 12 months. 
Forty two % of 17 year olds, 45% of 18 year olds and 67% of 19 year olds reported 
making new friendships;
5.7 Correlations between social cognition and executive function task scores
Appendix Section 4 presents correlations between executive function and social 
cognition task scores to explore the relationship between these variables. However, it
must be noted that correlation does not imply causation (Dancey & Reidy, 2004).
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Scores on the Eyes Test (r = 0.39,/? < 0.001), Voices Test (r = 0.33,/? = 0.001), MASC 
correct (r = 0.23,/? = 0.023) and IRI Perspective Taking (r = 0.21,/? = 0.037) positively 
correlated with the Brixton Test, a measure o f rule detection. MASC insufficient mental 
state errors negatively correlated with scores on the Brixton Test (r = -0.22, p  = 0.034). 
It is possible that scores on the Eyes, MASC and Brixton Tests correlated due to the 
visual nature of tasks. For example, the Eyes Test requires participants to identify 
mental states shown in photographs of eye regions, the MASC requires attribution of 
mental states to characters in dynamic film clips and the Brixton Test requires 
participants to identify a rule in visual stimuli. Scores on the Brixton Test and Voices 
Test could correlate due to good pattern identification resulting in successful rule 
detection on the Brixton Test and informing emotion recognition in auditory stimuli on 
the Voices Test.
Letter fluency scores, a measure of strategy generation, positively correlated with 
MASC correct scores (r = 0.28, p  = 0.005) assessing emotion recognition in dynamic, 
visual and auditory stimuli and negatively correlated with MASC insufficient errors (r = 
-0.24, p  = 0.020). Strategy generation may require flexible behaviour allowing 
participants to generate words beginning with a particular letter in a methodical way. 
Flexible behaviour is utilised in social situations when generalising concepts to different 
situations (Ahmed & Miller, 2011).
Scores on the Voices Test, an assessment o f emotion recognition in the auditory 
domain, significantly correlated with several indices of the Sorting Test, a measure o f 
concept formation: free sorts correct (r = 0.22, p  = 0.031), free sort description score (r 
= 0.20,/? < 0.050), sort recognition description score (r = 0.25,/? = 0.014), description 
score for verbal sorts (r = 0.23, p  = 0.025) and description score for verbal perceptual 
sorts (r = 0.21, p  = 0.041). It is possible that Voices Test scores correlated with indices 
on the Sorting Test due to a verbal component o f the tasks. Voices Test scores also 
correlated with number o f towers completed, a measure of planning {r = 0.27, p  = 
0.008). Planning may be utilised in social situations to decide how to act in response to 
another person’s behaviour.
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5.8 Gender differences
Gender differences in executive function and social cognition were examined as 
previous research has indicated gender may affect task performance with females 
scoring significantly higher than males on social cognition tasks (e.g. Kalkut et al., 
2009; Demtl et al., 2010; Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore & Robertson, 1997). Group 
data were collapsed to provide two subgroups: females (n = 77) and males (n = 21). Due 
to uneven sample sizes, Mann Whitney U tests were conducted to compare task 
performance across males and females. Descriptive statistics (median and range) are 
presented in Table 5.6.
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Table 5.6. Medians and ranges of executive function task scores for females and
males
Females (n = 11) Males (n = 21)
Measures o f response inhibition (Hayling Test) and rule detection (Brixton Test)
Hayling scaled 6.00(1.00-9.00) 6.00 (4.00 - 7.00)
Brixton scaled 7 .00(1.00- 10.00) 7.00 (4.00 - 10.00)
Measure of strategy generation (D-KEFS Letter Fluency)
Letter fluency 37.00(17.00-56.00) 36.00(19.00-57.00)
Measures o f concept formation (D-KEFS Sorting Test)
Free sorts correct 11.00 (7.00- 15.00) 11.00 (9.00- 15.00)
Free sort description score 41.00(13.00-59.00) 44.00 (36.00 - 54.00)
Sort recognition description 
score
45.00 (23.00 - 60.00) 48.00 (35.00 - 57.00)
Verbal sorts description score 31.00(12.00-47.00) 32.00 (19.00-48.00)
Perceptual sorts description 
score *
58.00 (34.00 - 80.00) 61.00(47.00-72.00)
Measures o f planning (D-KEFS Tower Test)
Number of Tower items 
completed
8.00 (6.00 - 9.00) 9.00 (6.00 - 9.00)
Tower achievement score 18.00(13.00-24.00) 17.00(14.00-24.00)
Mean first move time 3.40(1 .40-9.70) 3 .10(1 .40-7 .70)
Time per move 2.70 (1 .80-4.40) 2.40 (1 .60-4.00)
Move accuracy 1.50 (1.00-3.40) 1.70(1.10-3.30)
* p <  0.05
There was a significant difference for description score o f perceptual sorts, a measure o f 
concept formation ( U  = 576.50, Z = 2.01, p  = 0.04, r  = 0.20) with males scoring higher 
than females. This is in line with Greve, Farrell, Besson and Crouch (1995) who 
reported that males scored significantly higher than females on number o f correct free 
sorts and free sort description score on the California Card Sorting Test, a measure o f 
concept formation (Delis, Squire, Bihrle & Massman, 1992). There were no other 
significant gender differences on executive function task scores. Other research supports
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this finding showing no gender differences in behavioural results on letter fluency 
(Harrison, Buxton, Husain & Wise, 2000), planning assessed with the Tower o f London 
(Boghi et al., 2006; Luciana, Collins, Olson & Schissel, 2009) and inhibition (Magar, 
Phillips & Hosie, 2010).
More male participants were recruited in a second testing phase between January 2011 
to December 2011 to account for the gender imbalance resulting in a sample size o f 119 
participants, with 77 females (M age = 220.26, SD = 9.07) and 42 males (M  age = 
222.43, SD  = 8.39). Additional males completed the following measures: Positive 
Affect and Negative Affect Scale (Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988), Hospital Anxiety 
and Depression Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), Self-Administered Rating Scale for 
Pubertal Development (Carskadon & Acebo, 1993) and the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale 
o f Intelligence (Wechsler, 1999). Participants completed the Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), Reading the Mind in the Voice Test (Golan et al., 
2007), Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (Dziobek et al., 2006) and the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Scale (Davis, 1983). Participants only completed social 
cognition tasks because present and existing findings indicate no or few gender 
differences on executive function tasks (Boghi et al., 2006; De Luca et al., 2003; 
Harrison, Buxton, Husain & Wise, 2000; Luciana, Collins, Olson & Schissel, 2009; 
Magar, Phillips & Hosie, 2010). Descriptive statistics (median and range) are presented 
in Table 5.7.
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Table 5.7. M edians and  ranges of mood, IQ  and social cognition ta sk  scores for
males and  females
Females (n  =  77) Males (n  = 42)
Demographics
Positive Affect 3 2 .0 0 (1 7 .0 0 -4 2 .0 0 ) 30.00 (2 1 .0 0 -4 7 .0 0 )
Negative A ffect 1 2 .0 0 (1 0 .0 0 -34 .00 ) 12 .50(10 .00  -21 .00 )
Anxiety * 8.00 (0 -  16.00) 7.00 (2.00 - 14.00)
Depression 3.00 (0 -  16.00) 2.00 (0 - 8.00)
WASI Verbal IQ 103.00 (85.00 - 138.00) 106.00 (8 5 .00 - 122.00)
WASI Performance IQ 104.00 (77 .00 - 119.00) 105.00 (8 9 .00 - 127.00)
WASI Full IQ 105.00 (85.00 - 133.00) 107.00 (8 7 .0 0 - 117.00)
Static visual stimuli
Eyes 28.50 (11.00 - 34.00) 2 8 .0 0 (1 6 .0 0 -3 2 .0 0 )
Auditory stimuli
Voices 1 7 .0 0 (10 .0 0 -22 .0 0 ) 1 7 .0 0 (1 3 .0 0 -2 0 .0 0 )
Dynamic visual and auditory stimuli with social interaction
MASC correct 36.00 (2 4 .0 0 -4 3 .0 0 ) 36.00 (28.00 - 39.00)
MASC excessive mental 
state inference errors *
5.00 (0 - 12.00) 6.00 (3 .0 0 - 12.00)
MASC insufficient mental 
state inference
3.00 (0 - 9.00) 2.00 (0 - 5.00)
MASC no ToM  errors 1.00 (0 -  5.00) 1.00 (0 - 3.00)
Self-report empathy
IRI Fantasy 17.00 (4 .0 0 -2 8 .0 0 ) 17.00 (8 .0 0 -2 7 .0 0 )
IRI perspective 1 7 .5 0 (8 .0 0 -2 5 .0 0 ) 16.00 (8 .0 0 -2 4 .0 0 )
IRI empathic * 21.00 (1 5 .0 0 -2 8 .0 0 ) 1 9 .0 0 (1 3 .0 0 -2 4 .0 0 )
IRI personal distress * 14.50 (2 .0 0 -2 6 .0 0 ) 11.00 (4 .0 0 -2 0 .0 0 )
* p  < 0.05
There was a significant group difference on HADS Anxiety ( U  =  1076.50, Z  = 2 .10 , p  = 
0.04, r  = 0.19) w ith females scoring significantly higher than males. For social 
cognition measures, there were significant gender differences on the MASC , a social
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cognition task using dynamic stimuli. Males made significantly more excessive mental 
state inference errors (i.e. over-attribution of mental state content) compared to females 
(U=  1264.50, Z =  1.98 ,/? < 0.05, r = 0.18). Results of Mann Whitney tests also showed 
gender differences on two indices of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index, a self-report 
measure of empathy: Empathic Concern (U=  1013.00, Z =  3.13,/? < 0.01, r  = 0.29) and 
Personal Distress (U  = 930.50, Z = 3.60, p  < 0.01, r = 0.33). Empathic Concern, 
assessing sympathetic feelings to others, was significantly higher in females than males. 
Females also rated themselves significantly higher in Personal Distress than males, 
indicating that females experienced more anxiety than males in tense social situations.
To summarise, findings indicate that males outperformed females on description score 
for perceptual sorts, a measure o f executive function indexing concept formation, and 
females outperformed males on excessive mental state inference errors o f the Movie for 
the Assessment of Social Cognition, a measure of social cognition with dynamic 
stimuli. Females were higher than males on self-report empathy measures o f Empathic 
Concern, an assessment o f sympathetic feelings towards others, and Personal Distress, 
anxiety in tense social situations. Results indicate that gender differences were evident 
on only one subscale of executive function, one measure o f social cognition and two 
self-report empathy subscales.
5.9 Contribution of IQ
To explore a possible contribution of IQ to executive function performance, Full Scale 
IQ scores were entered as a covariate for tasks showing significant group differences. 
With Full Scale IQ partialled out, number o f correct free sorts (F  (2, 94) = 3.49, p  = 
0.03) and description score for perceptual sorts (F  (2, 94) = 3.56,/? = 0.03) from the D- 
KEFS Sorting Test remained significant. Letter fluency (F  (2, 94) = 2.52, p  = 0.09), 
description score for free sorts (F  (2, 94) = 2.76, p  = 0.07) and sort recognition 
description score (F  (2, 94) = 2.68, p  = 0.07) were not significant. Results indicate a 
contribution o f IQ to strategy generation performance on the Letter Fluency Task but 
not to correct free sorts and description score for perceptual sorts on the Sorting Test. It 
is important to note that Full Scale IQ was not different across groups (see Chapter 4).
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To explore a possible contribution of Performance IQ to executive function task 
performance, Performance IQ was entered as a covariate for Letter Fluency and Sorting 
Tasks because these showed age group differences. With Performance IQ partialled out, 
number o f correct free sorts (F  (2, 94) = 3.78, p  = 0.026) and description score for 
perceptual sorts (F  (2, 94) = 3.91, p  = 0.023) remained significant. Letter fluency (F  (2, 
94) = 2.89, p  = 0.062), description score for free sorts (F  (2, 94) = 2.98, p  = 0.056) and 
sort recognition description score (F  (2, 94) = 3.00, p  = 0.055) were not significant. 
Similar to the analysis with Full Scale IQ as a covariate, these results indicate that 
Performance IQ contributes to strategy generation assessed with the Letter Fluency 
Task but not to free sorts correct and description score for perceptual sorts on the 
Sorting Test, a measure o f concept formation.
5.10 Demographic effects on executive function and social cognition
5.10.1 Drug use
Research reported in Chapter 2 indicated that cannabis use (McHale & Hunt, 2008), 
ecstasy use (Yip & Lee, 2006), alcohol use (Parada et al., 2012) and pubertal 
development (Burnett et al., 2011) affect executive function and social cognition task 
performance. The effects o f these variables on task performance were analysed and are 
reported below.
Independent samples t-tests were conducted on executive function and social cognition 
task scores with whether participants had used cannabis (n = 30) or not (n = 68) as the 
independent variable. There were no significant group differences, indicating that in the 
present sample cannabis use had no effect on social cognition (all p ' s  > 0.23) and 
executive function (all p ' s  > 0.14). Descriptive statistics for participants who reported 
using cannabis previously and participants who did not are presented in appendix 
sections 4 and 5.
5.10.2 Alcohol use
Independent samples t-tests were conducted for social cognition and executive function 
scores with whether participants drink alcohol or not as the independent variable. Whilst 
this is a brief assessment o f alcohol use, it was useful to have an indication o f alcohol
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use as previous research has often neglected this variable and research in Chapter 2 
show that alcohol use can affect executive function and social cognition. Descriptive 
statistics for executive function and social cognition task scores o f participants who 
reported alcohol use and participants who reported no alcohol use are presented in 
appendix section 6 and 7. Four indices of the D-KEFS Sorting Test showed significant 
group differences. For number o f free sorts correct, the group who reported drinking 
alcohol (M =  10.99, SD  = 1.83) scored lower than the group who reported not drinking 
alcohol (M  = 12.38, SD  = 2.06, t (96) = 2.52, p  = 0.013). Similarly, for free sort 
description score participants who reported drinking alcohol (M = 41.49, SD = 7.55) 
scored lower than those who did not (M  = 47.46, SD  = 7.76, t (96) = 2.65, p  = 0.01). 
Drinkers also scored lower (M = 45.41, SD  = 7.15) on sort recognition description score 
than non-drinkers (M =  50.62, SD  = 6.58, t (96) = 2.47, p  = 0.015). The same pattern 
was found for description score for verbal sorts: participants who consumed alcohol (M  
= 29.53, SD  = 7.47) scored lower than participants who did not drink alcohol (M  = 
34.85, SD  = 8.44, t (96) = 2.35, p  = 0.021). There were no group differences for social 
cognition task scores.
Participants also reported whether they consumed below or above the recommended 
weekly limit of alcohol consumption (see appendix sections 7 and 8 for descriptive 
statistics). Independent samples t-tests were conducted between weekly alcohol 
consumption and social cognition and executive function scores. Participants who 
consumed above the weekly limit (M =  43.59, SD  = 7.52) scored lower than the group 
who drank less (M =  46.82, SD  = 6.85) on the sort recognition description score (t (95) 
= 2.06,/? < 0.01). Similarly, participants who consumed over the weekly limit group (M 
= 54.37, SD  = 9.5) scored lower on the description score for perceptual sorts compared 
to the under the weekly limit group (M=  59.8, SD  = 8.79, t (95) = 2.67,/? < 0.01). There 
were no group differences for social cognition task scores. These results suggest that 
alcohol use over the weekly limit is associated with a lower ability to describe concept 
formation.
5.10.3 Changes in living arrangements
Two separate hierarchical multiple regressions were conducted to explore the
contribution o f age, living changes and anxiety to strategy generation and concept
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formation using scores on the Letter Fluency and Card Sorting Tests (number o f free 
sorts correct) as criterion variables, with age entered in block one, changes in living 
arrangements in block two and anxiety in block three (see Tables 5.8 and 5.9). Strategy 
generation and concept formation were selected as criterion variables because group 
differences were found for these variables.
Table 5.8. Hierarchical regression analyses with age, living changes and HADS 
Anxiety as predictor variables and D-KEFS Letter Fluency score as the dependent 
variable.
AR2 AF d f 3
Step 1: Age 0.04* 3.31 1,87 -0.19*
Step 2: Age 0.01 0.52 1,86 -0.15
Living change -0.09
Step 3: Age 0.01 0.47 1,85 -0.16
Living -0.10
Anxiety -0.08
* /?<0.05 one tailed
Results in Table 5.8 show that in block one, age was a significant predictor (/? = -0.19, t 
= 1.82, p  = 0.036) and accounted for 19% of variance in response generation with 
greater age associated with better strategy generation. The addition of changes to living 
arrangements in block two showed age accounted for 15% of variance, whilst living 
arrangements accounted for 9% of variance on the Letter Fluency Task. In block three, 
age accounted for 16% of variance, with changes in living arrangements and anxiety 
accounting for 8% and 6% of variance on the Letter Fluency Task.
The hierarchical regression for the D-KEFS Sorting test is presented in Table 5.9.
Table 5.9. Hierarchical regression analyses with age, living changes and HADS  
Anxiety as predictor variables and number o f correct free sorts on the D-KEFS  
Sorting Test as the dependent variable.
AR2 AF df 3
Step 1: Age 0.06 5.68** 1,87 -0.25**
Step 2: Age <0.01 0.67 1,86 - 0.20*
Living change -0.10
Step 3: Age <0.01 0.53 1,85 -0.19
Living -0.08
Anxiety 0.08
*/?<0.05 one tailed **/?<0.01 one tailed
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Age was a significant predictor of number o f free sorts correct and accounted for 25% 
of variance (fl = -0.25, t = 2.38, p  <0.01). The addition of changes to living 
arrangements in block two showed that age accounted for 20% of variance and living 
arrangements accounted for 10% of variance in number of free sorts correct. In block 
three, age accounted for 19% of variance and changes to living arrangements and 
anxiety accounted for 8% of variance to concept formation. These findings indicate that 
age contributes more to strategy generation (D-KEFS Letter Fluency Task) and concept 
formation (D-KEFS Sorting Test) than changes in living arrangements and anxiety. 
Increasing age was associated with poorer performance on the D-KEFS Sorting Test 
number of correct free sorts.
5.10.4 Pubertal Development
Participants’ pubertal development was scored according to the criteria for the Pubertal 
Development Scale by Carskadon and Acebo (1993), with each item scored either 1 = 
not yet begun, 2 = barely started, 3 = definitely underway or 4 = seems complete. An 
average was calculated, with 4 indicating that puberty had been completed. Table 5.10 
shows the number o f participants who reported completing puberty or not completing 
puberty in each age group.
Table 5.10. Frequency of pubertal development for each age group
Puberty not complete Puberty complete
17 year olds (n = 31) 28 3
18 year olds (n = 31) 17 14
19 year olds (n = 36) 18 18
Table 5.10 shows that as age increases more participants had completed puberty 
according to the self-report measure. A new variable was created that coded participants 
who had finished puberty (average of 4 on the PDS) and those who had not finished 
puberty (less than an average of 4 on the PDS). T-tests were conducted to compare 
participants who reported completing puberty and those who reported they had not 
completed puberty on social cognition and executive function task scores for the whole
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sample and each age group. There were no significant group differences between 
participants who had completed puberty (n = 35) and participants who had not (n = 63) 
for the whole sample on social cognition (all p ' s  > 0.168) or executive function tasks 
(allp ' s  > 0.273). The equal variances assumed values are reported when Levene’s test is 
significant (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). Descriptive statistics are in appendix sections 9 
and 10.
Mann Whitney U tests were conducted to compare participants who reported 
completing puberty with those who did not in 17, 18 and 19 year old groups separately. 
There were no differences on social cognition task scores between participants who 
reported they had completed puberty compared to those still progressing in the 17 year 
old group (all p ' s  > 0.122) and 18 year old groups (all p ' s  > 0.128). In the 19 year old 
group, participants who had finished puberty scored lower on the MASC Total score, 
indicating poorer performance, (median = 24.50, range = 13.00, n -  18) than those who 
were still progressing (median = 37.50, range = 9.00, U = 93.50, Z = 2.18, T = 254.50, p  
= 0.029, n = 18). There were no differences in 17, 18 and 19 year old groups based on 
pubertal development for executive function task performance (allp ' s  > 0.084).
5.11 Discussion
The present findings show evidence of developmental change suggesting a non-linear 
trajectory for strategy generation and concept formation specifically when comparing 17 
and 18 year olds and no developmental change for other variables (inhibition, rule 
detection, planning, self-report empathy and emotion recognition from visual static, 
auditory and dynamic stimuli). Full Scale IQ scores were similar across age groups 
indicating that differences in intelligence did not account for observed group differences 
on executive function measures, although IQ mediated some aspects o f Letter Fluency 
Task performance, a measure o f strategy generation. Different levels o f pubertal 
development between age groups did not account for performance on executive function 
and social cognition tasks. Self-report alcohol use, particularly above the weekly limit, 
was associated with poorer concept formation, assessed with the Sorting Test. Data 
reported in Chapter 4 showed that drug and alcohol use was similar across groups, 
whilst Negative Affect and Anxiety were higher in the two younger age groups.
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The executive functions of strategy generation and concept formation measured by the 
D-KEFS Letter Fluency and Sorting Test respectively followed a non-linear 
developmental trajectory in the three age groups with functional peaks shown in the 17 
year old group compared to 18 and 19 year olds on Letter Fluency and better 
performance in 17 year olds compared to 18 year olds on most indices o f concept 
formation. The D-KEFS Letter Fluency Task requires participants to generate as many 
words as possible beginning with a specific letter in a given time. Successful 
performance requires participants to generate an effective strategy to retrieve words 
beginning with the specified letter. The result o f IQ contributing to response generation 
performance on the Letter Fluency Task in Section 5.8 is consistent with previous 
research (Diaz-Asper, Schretlen & Pearlson, 2004; Harrison, Buxton, Husain & Wise, 
2000; Porter, Collins, Muetzel, Lim & Luciana, 2011), but IQ differences are unlikely to 
be responsible for age group differences on executive tasks because analysis in Chapter 
4 shows that groups did not differ in Full IQ.
There were significant group differences on several indices o f the Sorting Test, 
including number o f correct free sorts (functional peak in 17 year olds), free sort 
description score (17 year old group scores were higher than 18 year olds), sort 
recognition description score (17 year old group scores were higher than 18 year olds) 
and description score for perceptual sorts (functional peak at 17 years). Eighteen year 
olds showed a significant dip in performance across all indices o f the Sorting Test 
compared to their younger counterparts but were not significantly different from 19 year 
olds. The 17 year old group showed a significant peak in functional ability in matching 
to criterion (free sorts) and description of category identified (description score for 
perceptual sorts) compared to 18 and 19 year olds. There were no group differences on 
description score for verbal sorts index of the Sorting Test suggesting that the separate 
indices o f the task are functionally dissociable. Groups may have performed similarly 
on this index because performance is associated with verbal aptitude and groups were 
not different on Verbal IQ scores.
Comparing the present late adolescent data with existing adult data reveals different 
developmental trajectories. Performance peaks in late adolescence for emotion 
recognition with static visual stimuli (19 year olds), emotion recognition with dynamic
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stimuli (19 year olds), response inhibition (17 year olds) and several indices o f planning 
(Tower achievement score and Tower move accuracy; 18 year olds, mean first move 
time and time per move; 17 year olds). Faster mean first move times and time per move 
at age 17 on the Tower Test possibly indicate some degree of impulsivity in this age 
group relative to adults. Emotion recognition from auditory stimuli, self-report 
perspective taking, rule detection, strategy generation and one index o f concept 
formation (number o f correct free sorts) continue to develop into adulthood. Non-linear 
development is evident for two indices o f concept formation (description score for free 
sorts and sort recognition) with functions peaking at age 17, followed by a dip at age 18 
and then peaking again in adulthood.
It is possible that the dip in performance at age 18 reflects dynamic brain changes to 
regions underpinning specific executive functions and corresponds to synaptic pruning 
occurring in prefrontal networks following age 17 as shown in imaging data (Gogtay et 
al., 2004). Non-linear development may reflect several dynamic maturational processes 
including synaptic pruning, increased white matter connectivity (Lebel et al., 2008; 
Paus, 2005; Sowell et al., 2003) and functional synchronisation (Uhlhaas et al., 2009).
Recent longitudinal data showed evidence of non-linear IQ development in late 
adolescence possibly reflecting underlying neuronal re-organisation, supporting the 
present non-linear findings. Ramsden et al. (2011) reported a longitudinal study 
assessing IQ in adolescents aged 12-16 at Time 1 and 15-20 at Time 2. Participants 
showed variation in IQ scores between time points, with increases or decreases evident 
across adolescence (Verbal IQ -20 to +23, Performance IQ -18 to +17 and Full Scale IQ 
-18 to +21). Following a Hebbian model o f neural plasticity, it is possible that focal 
maturation to regions supporting foundational functions is essential for the emergence 
o f more complex cognitive functions (Hebbs, 1949).
Environmental changes may also play a role in executive function development in late 
adolescence possibly because independent living develops autonomy. Eighteen and 19 
year olds had undergone greater changes in living arrangements relative to 17 year olds. 
Regression analyses indicated that changes to living arrangements accounted for 
approximately 10% of variance in strategy generation and concept formation although
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the contribution of this variable to executive function was not significant and age was 
the greatest predictor. Whilst the contribution o f environmental factors to executive 
function is speculative in the present study, previous research supports this. For 
example, Tuvblad et al. (2013) assessed environmental and genetic factors o f decision 
making in a longitudinal twin study. Participants completed the Iowa Gambling Task 
(Bechara, Damasio, Damasio & Anderson, 1994) at age 11-13, 14-15 and 16-18 years. 
Non shared environmental factors, not shared by all children in the same family (Plomin 
et al., 2001), contributed to 65% of variance in task performance at age 11-13, 80% at 
age 14-15 and 54% at age 16-18. Tuvblad et al. (2013) concluded that environmental 
factors influence individual differences in decision making.
Age groups were not different on the Tower Test, a measure o f planning. Other data 
similarly show little behavioural differences on this measure across broad age ranges, 
although EEG data indicated age effects in neural networks underpinning task 
performance. Guevera, Martinez, Aguirre and Gonzalez (2011) reported no significant 
differences for first move time and number of moves on the Tower o f Hanoi in 11-13 
year olds, 18-20 year olds and 26-30 year olds. The older groups completed 
significantly more towers in the time limit relative to 11-13 year olds. EEG of prefrontal 
and parietal areas during task performance showed differences in functional 
synchronisation between age groups. The 18-20 year olds required increased 
interhemispheric and intrahemispheric coupling in nearly all frequency bands relative to 
baseline, whereas 26-30 year olds showed an increase only in selected bands in the right 
hemisphere. Therefore, it is possible that group differences on the Tower Test in late 
adolescence are only evident with EEG. Other findings show that performance on a 
computerised version of the Tower of London Task is associated with activation in 
frontal, parietal and premotor networks suggesting diverse neural substrates mediate 
performance on this measure (Wagner, Koch, Reichenbach, Sauer & Schlosser, 2006). 
Burgess, Veitch, de Lacy Costello and Shallice (2000) proposed that planning 
comprises multiple stages mediated by different brain networks. These stages include 
initial planning, remembering the task rules, following a plan and recounting how 
performance matches the original plan. Thus, it is likely that performance on the Tower 
Test recruits functions mediated by diverse neural substrates and that might account for 
the absence of significant group differences on the task.
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No effect o f age was found for social cognition measures, although gender mediated 
three aspects o f social cognition. Other research has reported non-linear development o f 
emotional processing for faces or words in early adolescence with a significantly longer 
reaction time evident in 11-12 year old females and 12-13 year old males relative to 
participants one year younger (McGivem et al., 2002). Although speculative it is 
possible that the social cognitive functions measured in the current study are well 
established by late adolescence. Another plausible explanation for no developmental 
change in social cognition and non-linear executive function development is that these 
functions are likely to recruit some shared and some disparate neural substrates. 
Findings indicate diverse neural substrates, including occipito parietotemporal, temporal 
and prefrontal networks, contribute to performance on the MASC (Wolf et al., 2010). 
There is also extensive evidence from imaging data that myelination follows a specific 
template across development occurring in a posterior to anterior direction (Kinney, 
Karthigasan, Borenshteyn, Flax, & Kirschner, 1994; Lebel et al., 2008; Sowell et al., 
2003; Yakovlev & Lecours, 1967) so that occipital networks and posterior frontal 
networks mature earlier than anterior networks. Consequently current data indicate that 
socio-cognitive functions measured here show no developmental change and are 
relatively stable across late adolescence.
Imaging data suggest that social cognition tasks may be less process pure than executive 
function measures with more functionally diverse abilities recruited during completion 
o f social cognition compared to executive function tasks. For instance, the MASC 
(Dziobek et al., 2006) requires attribution of mental state content in addition to 
remembering the scene previously viewed and episodic content from previous 
scenarios. The task also includes a significant verbal component and groups were not 
different in this capacity based on Verbal IQ scores, which may have mediated similar 
scores on this measure. However, another possibility is that different neural substrates 
mediate similar functional abilities at different age ranges due to dynamic neuronal 
morphology (Moor, Op de Macks, Giiroglu, Van der Molen & Crone, 2011) and future 
studies might map behavioural data to imaging data to further establish how 
maturational change impacts cognitive functions.
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Gender accounted for differences on one executive function scale, description score for 
perceptual sorts, where males performed better than females, and one index of the 
MASC (Dziobek et al., 2006). Females made fewer errors involving over-attribution of 
mental state content compared to males, which may be explained as gender differences 
in interpreting expression intensity. Previous research has shown that females were 
more accurate than males on an emotion recognition task; however the gender 
difference was only apparent with subtle expressions at 50% intensity compared to 
100% intensity (Hoffmann, Kessler, Eppel, Rukavina & Traue, 2010). Thus, gender 
differences may be evident on the MASC because this task approximates real life social 
situations where emotions are portrayed at low to mid intensity (Motley & Camden, 
1988). Females also rated themselves significantly higher than males on two sub-scales 
o f the Interpersonal Reactivity Index: Empathic Concern assessing sympathetic feelings 
towards others, and the Personal Distress scale measure o f anxiety levels in tense social 
situations. Females rated themselves significantly higher on the Empathic Concern scale 
of the IRI in line with other research (Davis, 1983; Demtl et al., 2010; Kramer, 
Mohammadi, Donamayor, Samii & Miinte, 2010) possibly due to participants 
conforming to gender stereotypes (Demtl et al., 2010). Females may assume they are 
more empathic compared to males because empathy is a larger part o f the traditional 
female stereotype. Social desirability may also affect self-report empathic measures; 
Laurent and Hodges (2009) assessed social desirability with the Marlowe-Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) and empathy with the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983) in 194 university students (mean age =
19.8 years). Laurent and Hodges (2009) reported a positive correlation between social 
desirability and IRI Empathic Concern whereas IRI Personal Distress and social 
desirability were negatively correlated.
Similar to the present findings, Banissy, Kanai, Walsh and Rees (2012) found females 
scored significantly higher than males on IRI Empathic Concern and Personal Distress 
scales in a study with 118 participants (mean age = 22.9 years). Banissy et al. (2012) 
reported that IRI Empathic Concern scores were negatively related to grey matter 
volume in the inferior frontal gyrus, precuneus and anterior cingulate. Thus smaller grey 
matter volume in the inferior frontal gyrus was associated with higher Empathic 
Concern scores. This relates to the notion o f synaptic pruning occurring into early
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adulthood resulting in a more efficient neural network that is evidenced behaviourally in 
better empathic concern. A possible explanation for females scoring higher than males 
on Empathic Concern is due to gender differences in grey matter volume. In an MRI 
study with young adults (mean age = 26 years) females were found to have significantly 
smaller grey matter volume in the left inferior frontal gyrus relative to males (Witte, 
Savli, Holik, Kasper & Lanzenberger, 2010).
To summarise, Time 1 cross sectional analyses showed that 17 year olds scored 
significantly higher than 18 year olds on the Letter Fluency and Sorting Tests, measures 
o f strategy generation and concept formation. No age group differences were evident on 
social cognition task scores. Converging evidence suggests that adolescence represents 
an important phase o f neural reorganisation with associated behavioural changes 
(Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006; Giedd, 2004; Giedd et al, 1999; Paus, Keshevan, 
Giedd, 2008; Sowell et al; 2003; Steinberg, 2008). Importantly late adolescence and 
early adulthood is also often associated with changes to friendship groups and living 
arrangements. The 18 and 19-year-old groups in the present study had undergone 
greater change to their social and living environment than 17 year olds over the 
preceding twelve months. Therefore, present findings likely reflect the complex 
interplay between maturational, social and environmental changes that take place in late 
adolescence and early adulthood and provide evidence of linear social cognitive and 
non-linear executive function development.
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Chapter 6 
Time 2 cross sectional and longitudinal 
data analyses
6.1 Chapter overview
Chapter 6 includes Time 2 cross sectional data analyses of executive function and social 
cognition task scores. Section 6.2 discusses the time interval between Time 1 and Time 
2 testing. As the time interval was not similar for age groups, Time 2 data was analysed 
by (1) comparing groups at Time 2 in their original groups from Time 1 not taking 
account of time interval variability between participants, as outlined in section 6.3 
below, and (2) taking into account time interval variability by re-categorising 
participants on the basis o f actual chronological age at Time 2 (18, 19 and 20 years) in 
section 6.5. Section 6.4 compares Time 1 and Time 2 cross sectional findings. 
Justification and discussion for conducting Time 2 analyses this way is given below. 
Gender comparisons are reported in section 6.6. Following this, section 6.7 presents 
longitudinal data analyses. Various longitudinal analyses are considered with 
justification for the selected analyses. Correlations between time interval and task 
change score are reported and show that time interval does not correlate with the 
majority o f executive function and social cognition task change scores. Therefore, in 
subsequent analyses time interval is not used as a covariate. Mixed ANOVAs with age 
group at Time 1 as the between group factor, Time 1 and Time 2 task score as the 
within subjects factor and interactions are reported. Section 6.8 discusses the findings in 
relation to previous research.
In this section, groups are categorised as Younger, Middle and Older referring to 
participants who were originally in 17, 18 and 19 year old groups at Time 1 (i.e. 17 year 
olds are re-named the Younger age group, 18 year olds are re-named the Middle age 
group and 19 year olds are re-named the Older age group). Age groups are renamed 
because o f some participants changing age groups due to different time intervals 
between testing (see section 6.2) at Time 2. Figure 6.1 shows the Younger, Middle and 
Older age groups at Time 1 and Time 2.
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Figure 6.1. Ages of Younger, Middle and Older groups at Time 1 and Time 2
Time 1 Younger T1 
M  age = 
17 years 4 
months
Range:
17 years 0 
months -17  
years 8 
months
(* = 31)
Middle T1 
M  age =
18 years 4 
months
Range:
18 years 0 
months - 18 
years 8 
months
(n = 31)
Older T1 
M age = 
19 years 2 
months
Range:
19 years 0 
months - 19 
years 8 
months
in = 36)
I I I
Younger T2 Middle T2 Older T2
M  age = M  age = M age =
18 years 7 19 years 7 20 years 3
months months months
Range: Range: Range:
18 years 1 19 years 1 20 years 0
month - 19 month -  20 months - 20
years 4 months years 6 years 9 months
months
(n = 19) (" = 21)
(>2=18)
Figure 6.1 shows retention of 61% for the Younger group (n = 19), 58% for the Middle 
group {n = 18) and 58% for the Older group (n = 21) indicating that retention was 
similar across age groups at Time 2. Chapter 4 included other studies with similar 
retention rates (Novack et al., 1991; Zipparo et al., 2008) and explored whether the 
Time 1 demographic data o f participants who only took part at Time 1 differed to 
participants who took part at both time points. Analyses in Chapter 4 showed that 
participants who took part at both time points had a higher Time 1 Verbal IQ compared 
to participants who only took part at Time 1. There were no differences for Performance 
IQ, Full IQ, affect or HADS comparing Time 1 data for participants who took part at
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both time points relative to participants who took part only at Time 1 indicating that the 
Time 2 sample is representative of the Time 1 sample.
The age ranges in Figure 6.1 show there is overlap in age groups at Time 2 e.g. the 
Younger group ranges from 18 years 1 month to 19 years 4 months overlapping with the 
Middle age group that spans from 19 years 1 month to 20 years 6 months. The Middle 
group overlaps with the Older group that ranges from 20 years 0 months to 20 years 9 
months. The overlap in age groups is the rationale for conducting alternative cross 
sectional analyses in section 6.5 based on actual chronological age.
6.2 Time interval
Table 6.1 shows data about time interval between Time 1 and Time 2 testing for 
Younger, Middle and Older groups.
Table 6.1. Descriptive statistics for time interval between Time 1 and Time 2 
testing for Younger, Middle and Older age groups
Younger Middle Older
Mean (sd) 15.32 (4.03) months 16.33 (5.37) months 13.14(1.24) months
Range 12 to 27 months 12 to 26 months 12 to 16 months
Table 6.1 shows that time interval between Time 1 and Time 2 testing was different 
across age groups in the present study. The Younger age group (t  (21) = 2.26, p  = 0.035) 
and Middle age group {t (19) = 2.47, p  = 0.024) had a longer time interval between 
testing than the Older age group, whilst there was no significant difference in time 
interval between Younger and Middle groups (t (31) = 0.65, p  = 0.521). The time 
interval was different across age groups because Younger participants were away at 
university at Time 2 so testing was delayed until they returned to Sheffield in the 
holidays. Some participants in the Middle group were unavailable when first contacted 
at Time 2. As attrition was high in this age group, Time 2 testing was extended resulting 
in a longer mean time interval between testing than the other groups. The Older group 
had a shorter mean time interval compared to the other age groups because they were 
from Sheffield Hallam University and were available for testing at Time 2 when 
contacted.
170
As the time interval between testing varied across age groups, this resulted in some 
participants moving groups. Four 17 year olds were 19 years old at Time 2 and five 18 
year olds were 20 years old at the second time point. Figure 6.2 shows the number o f 
participants in each age group at Time 1 and participant groups at Time 2.
Figure 6.2. Figure showing number of participants in each age group at Time 1, 
number changing age groups and number in each age group at Time 2
T im e 1 Younger T1 Middle T1 Older T1
17 year olds 18 year olds 19 year olds
(w =  31) (/i =  31) in = 36)
- 0 -
T im e 2 18 year olds 
(77=15)
19 year olds 
(77=17)
20 year olds 
(77 =  26)
Key: Black = participants who are in the Younger age group at Time 2 (n = 19)
Grey = participants who are in the Middle age group at Time 2 (n = 18)
White = participants who are in the Older age group at Time 2 (n =21)
6.3 Time 2 cross sectional data analyses by Time 1 age group
Cross sectional analyses were conducted to explore group differences between original
Time 1 age groups at Time 2 on executive function and social cognition task scores. 
These analyses were conducted to compare group differences at Time 1 and Time 2 and 
explore the stability of the group differences. If  the pattern of findings was present at 
Time 1 and Time 2 this may indicate that group differences are due to characteristics 
specific to the current sample. However, if  different cross sectional findings are present 
at Time 1 and Time 2 this could indicate age related change. If  functions show age 
related change, it would not be expected for cross sectional findings to be the same at 
Time 1, when participants were 17, 18 and 19 years old, and Time 2 because 
participants were older at Time 2.
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For example, Time 1 cross sectional analyses showed the Younger group (17 year olds) 
scored significantly higher than the Middle age group (18 year olds) on strategy 
generation, assessed with the D-KEFS Letter Fluency Task, and some indices of 
concept formation, measured with the Sorting Test. If the Younger group continued to 
score significantly higher than the Middle age group at Time 2 this could indicate group 
differences due to sample characteristics, such as the Younger group finding the study 
an unusual and novel experience or being more motivated compared to the other groups, 
possibly resulting in better executive function (Ritter et al., 2012; Pessoa, 2009). If  the 
group differences were not evident at Time 2 this could indicate age related change 
specific to age 17 and 18 years.
Raw scores are presented for the D-KEFS Letter Fluency, Card Sorting and Tower Tests 
(Delis et al., 2001) and scaled scores are reported for Hayling and Brixton Tests 
(Burgess & Shallice, 1997) to be consistent with Time 1 data. While multiple tests are 
reported on a range of executive function scores, p  values were not adjusted (see 
Chapter 5.3).
ANOVAs were conducted because variables had a skewness statistic o f ±2.85, with the 
exception o f MASC no ToM errors in the Younger group (skewness statistic = 3.01) 
indicating generally parametric data (Clark-Carter, 2004). Means, standard deviations 
and ANOVA inferential statistics comparing Younger, Middle and Older groups on 
executive function task scores at Time 2 are presented in Table 6.2. Means and standard 
deviations are reported because the data is considered to be parametric.
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Table 6.2. Means, standard deviations and ANOVA F  and p  values for Younger, 
Middle and Older participants on executive function tasks at Time 2
Younger 
group T2 
(n =  19)
Middle 
group T2 
( « =  18)
Older group
T2
(« = 21)
F ( 2, 55) P
Measures o f  response inhibition and rule detection
Hayling scaled 6 .58 (1 .26 ) 6.50 (0.92) 6 .67 (1 .49 ) 0.09 0.919
Brixton scaled 8 .47 (1 .54 ) 7 .94 (1 .55 ) 8.38 (1.43) 0.65 0.525
M easure o f  strategy generation
Letter Fluency 43 .16 (9 .00 ) 35.00 (9.40) 39.05 (9.67) 3.51 0.037*
M easures o f  concept; formation
Free sorts correct 11 .00(1 .89) 9.83 (2.09) 11 .10(2 .10) 2.24 0.116
Free sort % 
accuracy
84 .32(11 .29) 86.72 (12.09) 93.62 (9.19) 3.99 0.024*
Free sort 
description score
38.68 (7.34) 36.11 (7.48) 39.05 (8.88) 0.76 0.474
Sort recognition 
description score
41.79 (6.31) 41.00 (8.34) 40.05 (8.93) 0.24 0.788
Verbal sorts 
description score
31.79 (8.53) 31.00 (7.61) 31.52 (8.88) 0.24 0.788
Perceptual sorts 
description score
48.68 (8.89) 46.11 (9.61) 47 .57 (11 .50 ) 0.30 0.742
M easures o f  planning
Number o f  Tower 
items completed
8.63 (0.76) 8.72 (0.58) 8.71 (0.56) 0.12 0.889
Tower
achievement score
19 .16(3 .39) 19.33 (3.52) 20.24 (3.59) 0.55 0.579
Mean first move 
time
2.40 (0.45) 3 .20 (1 .46 ) 3.25 (1.38) 3.10 0.053
Time per move 1.98 (0.27) 2.31 (0.56) 2.35 (0.41) 4.32 0.018*
Move accuracy 1.62 (0.34) 1 .56(0 .28) 1.59 (0.31) 0.17 0.841
* p  <  0.05
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There were significant group differences on the D-KEFS Letter Fluency measure of 
strategy generation (F  (2, 55) = 3 .51 ,p  = 0.037, r\ p = 0.11). The Younger group scored 
significantly higher on Letter Fluency scores, indicating better strategy generation, than 
the Middle group (t (35) = 2.70, p  = 0.011) but there were no group differences between 
Younger and Older {t (38) = 1.39, p  = 0.173) or Middle and Older groups (/ (38) = 1.32, 
p  = 0.195). Free sort %  accuracy was calculated by number o f correct sorts / attempted 
sorts x 100. Groups differed significantly on free sort %  accuracy on the D-KEFS 
Sorting Test (F  (2, 55) = 3.99, p  = 0.024, r)2p = 0.13) with the Younger group scoring 
significantly lower, indicating poorer concept formation, than the Older group (t  (38) = 
2.87, p  = 0.007). No other group differences were found for free sort %  accuracy 
between Younger and Middle groups (t (35) = 0.63, p  = 0.535) or Middle and Older 
groups (t (37) = 2.02, p  = 0.051) whilst the latter group difference is approaching 
significance. Groups differed significantly on time per move on the D-KEFS Tower 
Test (F  (2, 55) = 4.32, p  = 0.018, ri2p = 0.14) with the Younger group scoring 
significantly lower than the Middle group (t (24) = 2.26, p  = 0.033) and Older group (t 
(38) = 3.29, p  = 0.002). A lower, faster time per move time in the Younger group 
relative to the Middle and Older group indicates faster processing speed in the Younger 
group. No significant differences were evident between the Middle and Older groups on 
Tower time per move (t  (37) = 0.23, p  = 0.817).
Inferential statistics reported in Table 6.2 show there were no significant group 
differences on the Hayling Test, a measure of inhibition, or on the Brixton Test, an 
assessment o f rule detection. Scores on the D-KEFS Sorting Test, a measure o f concept 
formation, showed no significant group differences on the following indices: number o f 
correct free sorts, free sorts description score, sort recognition description score, 
description score for verbal sorts or perceptual sorts. No group differences were found 
on the number o f towers completed, Tower achievement score, mean first move time or 
move accuracy.
To summarise, Time 2 cross sectional executive function analyses by original Time 1 
age group showed group differences on the D-KEFS Letter Fluency, Sorting and Tower 
Tests. The Younger group scored significantly higher than the Middle group on the 
Letter Fluency Task, a measure o f strategy generation. The Younger group scored
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significantly lower on free sort %  accuracy, indicating poorer concept formation, 
compared to the Older group. The Younger group attained a faster time per move on the 
Tower Test compared to Middle and Older groups.
Means and standard deviations for Younger, Middle and Older age groups on social 
cognition tasks at Time 2 are reported in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3. Means and standard deviations for social cognition tasks in Younger, 
Middle and Older groups at Time 2 with ANOVA F  and p  values
Younger T2 
( « = 1 9 )
Middle T2 
(w =  18)
Older T2 
(n = 21)
F {  2,55) P
Static visual stimuli
Eyes 26.84 (4.65) 27.00 (3.45) 28.71 (2.94) 1.57 0.218
Auditory stimuli
Voice 16 .58(2 .87) 17.33 (2.50) 17.62 (2.54) 0.80 0.449
Dynam ic visual and auditory stimuli w ith  social interaction
MASC correct 35.53 (6.29) 36.56 (3.29) 38.38 (2.31) 2.30 0.110
MASC excessive 5.26 (3.11) 5.00 (2.54) 3 .86 (1 .68 ) 1.82 0.172
MASC insufficient 2.63 (2.41) 2 .50 (1 .62 ) 1 .76(1 .09) 1.41 0.253
MASC no ToM errors 1.58 (2.57) 0 .94 (1 .11 ) 1.00 (0.84) 0.84 0.437
Self-report empathy
IRI Fantasy 19.42 (3.92) 14 .56(5 .72) 19.48 (4.42) 6.68 0.003*
IRI Perspective 17.21 (3.79) 16.06 (4.71) 17.81 (3.50) 0.95 0.394
Taking
IRI Empathic Concern 21 .37 (2 .61 ) 19.39 (4.98) 21.52 (2.71) 2.11 0.131
IRI Personal Distress 10.84 (4.40) 12.89 (5.93) 14.52 (5.25) 2.49 0.093
*p < 0.05
Groups differed significantly on IRI Fantasy score (F  (2, 55) = 6.68, p  = 0.003, r\2p = 
0.20) with the Younger (t (35) = 3.03, p  = 0.005) and Older age groups (t (37) = 3.03,/? 
= 0.004) scoring significantly higher than the Middle age group. This indicated that 
Younger and Older groups were more likely to report relating to characters in books and 
films compared to the Middle age group. The Younger and Older groups did not differ 
significantly on Fantasy score (t (38) = 0.04,/? = 0.967).
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There were no significant group differences the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, a 
visual static emotion recognition measure and Reading the Mind in the Voice Test, an 
assessment with auditory stimuli. No group differences were evident on the MASC, a 
dynamic social cognition measure. There were no significant differences on the 
Perspective Taking, Empathic Concern or Personal Distress scales o f the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index, a self-report measure o f empathy.
To summarise, Time 2 cross sectional social cognition analyses by original Time 1 age 
groups showed group differences on the IRI Fantasy scale with Younger and Older 
groups scoring significantly higher than the Middle age group. No group differences 
were evident on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, a visual static emotion 
recognition measure, or the Reading the Mind in the Voices Test, an auditory 
assessment o f emotion recognition. Descriptive statistics presented in Table 6.3 indicate 
the Older group attained a total score of 3 higher than the Younger group on the MASC, 
a dynamic measure. However, the ANOVA was not significant and power was 0.45, 
below the recommended level of 0.7 (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). IRI Personal Distress 
scores showed a significant trend with the Older group reporting higher personal 
distress relative to the Younger group. Overall the Time 2 social cognition data suggest 
that social cognition measured by the tasks in the present study is relatively well 
developed by early adulthood because there are relatively few age group differences on 
these tasks at Time 1 and Time 2.
6.4 Comparison with Time 1 cross sectional data
Time 1 cross sectional analyses reported in Chapter 5 showed significant differences on 
the D-KEFS Letter Fluency and Card Sorting Tests. The Younger age group (17 year 
olds) scored significantly higher than the Middle age group (18 year olds) on the Letter 
Fluency Test and the following indices on the Sorting Test: number o f correct free sorts, 
free sort description score, sort recognition description score and description score for 
perceptual sorts. The Younger age group (17 year olds) scored significantly higher than 
the Older group (19 year olds) on number o f correct free sorts and description score for 
perceptual sorts. No group differences were evident on the Hayling and Brixton Tests, 
D-KEFS Tower Test or social cognition task scores at Time 1.
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Table 6.7 summarises Time 1 and Time 2 findings. The Time 1 findings o f the Younger 
age group scoring significantly higher compared to the Middle age group on the Letter 
Fluency Test is evident at Time 2 by the Younger group scoring significantly higher 
than the Middle age group. This indicates that the group differences on Letter Fluency 
scores may be due to the sample with the Younger group having better strategy 
generation than the Middle group, regardless o f age.
The Younger group scored significantly lower than the Older age group on free sort %  
accuracy in the Sorting Test only at Time 2. Whilst no other significant group 
differences were found on the Sorting Test at Time 2, the means show a similar pattern 
to Time 1, with a higher mean in the Younger and Older groups relative to the Middle 
age group for number o f free sorts correct, free sorts description score and description 
score for perceptual sorts. It is possible that significant group differences were not found 
due to participant attrition resulting in lower power at Time 2 e.g. power for free sorts 
correct is 0.44. Time 1 findings o f group differences on sort recognition description 
score (Younger group higher than Middle age group) were not evident at Time 2, 
possibly indicating age related change specific to age 18. Figure 6.3 shows a z score 
graph of sort recognition description score for Younger, Middle and Older groups at 
Time 1 and Time 2.
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Figure 6.3. Z  score g raph  fo r so rt recognition description score on Younger,
M iddle and  O lder groups a t Time 1 and  Time 2
Figure 6.3 supports the notion that non-linear development on sort recognition 
description score, an index o f  concept formation, is specific to Time 1 and not evident at 
Time 2.
6.5 Time 2 cross sectional data analyses of re-categorised groups by 
chronological age at Time 2
These analyses take into account time interval variability  by re-categorising participants 
into groups based on chronological age at Time 2. The original age groups no longer 
applied because o f  some participants changing age groups. Therefore another set o f  
group comparisons were conducted to take account o f  participants who had changed 
groups. N ew  groups were defined according to chronological age at Time 2 (18, 19 and 
20 year olds) regardless o f  group membership at Time 1. See Table 4.3 for descriptive 
age data.
Cross sectional analyses were conducted comparing executive function and social 
cognition task scores by age at Time 2 w ith 18, 19 and 20 year old age groups. The data 
were considered non-parametric due to uneven age group sizes and histogram s indicated 
data did not follow  a normal distribution curve (see histogram s in appendix section 11). 
M edian and range scores for 18, 19 and 20 year olds on executive function tasks are 
presented in Table 6.4. Due to non-parametric data, K ruskal W allis Tests were
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conducted to examine cross sectional Time 2 group differences on executive function 
and social cognition task scores in 18, 19 and 20 year olds.
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Table 6.4. Median, range scores and Kruskal Wallis Inferential statistics for 18 ,19  
and 20 year olds at Time 2 on executive function tasks (Hayling & Brixton Tests, 
D-KEFS Letter Fluency, Card Sorting and Tower Task)
18 year olds 
(» =15)
19 year olds 
(it =17)
20 year olds 
(77 = 26)
H P
Measures of response inhibition and rule detection
Hayling scaled 
Brixton scaled
6.00
(4.00- 10.00) 
8.00 
(6.00-10.00)
7.00
(6.00 -  8.00)
8.00 
(6.00-10.00)
6.00
(4.00- 10.00) 
8.00
(5.00-10.00)
0.38
<0.01
0.825
0.999
Measure of strategy generation
Letter Fluency 44.00
(26.00-52.00)
36.00
(17.00-65.00)
38.50
(22.00-64.00)
3.00 0.223
Measures of concept formation
Free sorts correct 11.00
(8.00- 13.00)
10.00
(6.00-16.00)
11.00
(6.00-15.00)
1.56 0.458
Free sort % 
accuracy
86.00
(60.00-100.00)
86.00
(59.00-100.00)
93.50
(63.00-100.00)
6.92 0.031*
Free sort 
description score
38.00
(24.00-47.00)
38.00
(21.00-55.00)
49.00
(20.00 -  59.00)
0.35 0.838
Sort recognition 
description score
42.00
(29.00-48.00)
44.00
(23.00-59.00)
43.00
(22.00 -  54.00)
0.80 0.670
Verbal sorts 
description score
31.00
(16.00-44.00)
32.00
(19.00-44.00)
31.00
(17.00-47.00)
0.76 0.686
Perceptual sorts 
description score
48.00
(34.00-60.00)
47.00
(31.00-68.00)
46.00
(24.00-69.00)
0.10 0.953
Measures of planning
Number of Tower 
items completed
9.00
(6.00-9.00)
9.00
(8.00-9.00)
9.00
(7.00-9.00)
2.22 0.330
Tower
achievement
score
19.00
(15.00-27.00)
19.00
(17.00-26.00)
19.50
(12.00-27.00)
0.36 0.833
Mean first move 
time
2.40
(1.60-3.70)
3.00
(1.70-7.50)
3.10
(1.00-6.80)
3.76 0.153
Time per move 2.00
(1.50-2.40)
2.10
(1.60-3.10)
2.30
(1.50-3.70)
5.11 0.078
Move accuracy 1.70
(1.00-2.50)
1.50
(1.20-2.20)
1.50
(1.20-2.40)
1.23 0.540
*  p < 0.05
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Free sort % accuracy on the D-KEFS Sorting Test, a measure o f concept formation, was 
calculated by number o f correct sorts / attempted sorts x 100. Groups differed 
significantly on this variable (H  (2) = 6.92, p  = 0.031). Twenty year olds scored 
significantly higher on free sort %  accuracy compared to 18 year olds (U  = 103.50, z = 
2.53, p  = 0.01) with no other significant group differences. Twenty year olds achieved a 
higher free sort %  accuracy by making more free sorts that matched target sorts with 
fewer errors suggesting that 20 year olds used a better concept formation strategy 
compared to 18 year olds.
There were no significant group differences on executive function tasks assessing 
inhibition on the Hayling Test, rule detection on the Brixton Test and on the D-KEFS 
Letter Fluency measure o f strategy generation. On the D-KEFS Sorting Test there were 
no significant differences for number o f correct free sorts, free sorts description score, 
sort recognition description score, description score for verbal sorts or perceptual sorts. 
No age group differences were evident on any D-KEFS Tower Test indices, although 
time per move showed a significant trend with a faster time per move in 18 year olds 
compared to 19 and 20 year olds.
Table 6.5 shows a summary of Time 1 cross sectional findings comparing 17, 18 and 19 
year olds, Time 2 findings by original Time 1 age group (Younger, Middle and Older) 
and Time 2 findings with groups re-categorised by chronological age (18, 19 and 20 
year olds) on executive function tasks.
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Table 6.5 shows that no group differences were evident on the Hayling and Brixton 
Tests, assessing inhibition and rule detection, at Time 1, in Younger, Middle and Older 
groups at Time 2 or by chronological age at Time 2 (18, 19 and 20 year olds). 
Seventeen year olds scored significantly higher than the 18 year olds on the Letter 
Fluency Test, a measure of strategy generation, at Time 1. This group difference was 
evident at Time 2 with the Younger age group showing better strategy generation than 
the Middle age group indicating the results are possibly due to participant 
characteristics o f this specific sample. It is possible that the Younger group found the 
study an unusual and novel experience or were more motivated, resulting in better 
executive function task performance relative to the other age groups (Ritter et al., 2012; 
Pessoa, 2009).
Time 1 findings o f the 17 year olds scoring significantly higher than 18 year olds on 
number o f correct free sorts, free sort description score, sort recognition description 
score and description score for perceptual sorts were not evident in Time 2 cross 
sectional data analyses. This suggests that Time 1 findings may be due to age related 
change in concept formation specific to age 17 and 18 years. At Time 1 groups did not 
differ on free sort %  accuracy, whilst at Time 2 the Older group scored significantly 
higher than the Younger group and 20 year olds scored significantly higher than 18 year 
olds on this index. It is possible that the Older group at Time 2 developed a more 
efficient strategy than the Younger group and made more free sorts that matched target 
sorts with fewer errors.
Median, range scores and Kruskal Wallis inferential statistics for 18, 19 and 20 year 
olds on social cognition tasks are presented in Table 6.6.
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Table 6.6. Median, range and Kruskal Wallis inferential statistics comparing 18, 
19 and 20 year olds at Time 2 on social cognition tasks (Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes, Reading the Mind in the Voices, Movie for the Assessment o f Social 
Cognition and Interpersonal Reactivity Index)
18 year olds 
(w = 15)
19 year olds 
(n=17)
20 year olds 
(n = 26)
H P
Static visual stimuli
Eyes 28.00 28.00 29.00 1.22 0.543
(13.00-33.00) (21.00-31.00) (17.00-33.00)
Auditory stimuli
Voice 17.00 17.00 17.50 0.06 0.969
(7.00-20.00) (13.00-23.00) (12.00-22.00)
Dynamic visual and auditory stimuli with social interaction
MASC correct 38.00 38.00 38.00 0.51 0.774
(16.00-42.00) (31.00-40.00) (28.00-42.00)
MASC 5.00 5.00 4.00 1.82 0.402
excessive errors (0-10.00) (1.00- 10.00) (2.00- 10.00)
MASC 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.49 0.781
insufficient (0 - 9.00) (0 - 4.00) (0 - 7.00)
errors
MASC no ToM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.85 0.397
errors
(0-11.00) (0 - 2.00) (0 - 4.00)
Self report empathy
IRI Fantasy 20.00 16.00 19.50 2.38 0.304
(14.00-24.00) (8.00 - 28.00) (8.00-26.00)
IRI Perspective 19.00 16.00 17.50 2.56 0.278
Taking (9.00-23.00) (8.00-26.00) (8.00-23.00)
IRI Empathic 22.00 20.00 22.00 5.53 0.063
Concern (15.00-25.00) (11.00-24.00) (15.00-28.00)
IRI Personal 12.00 13.00 14.00 1.00 0.605
Distress (1.00- 16.00) (0-21.00) (5.00-24.00)
All/? >0.05
There were no significant group differences on social cognition tasks assessing emotion
recognition on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, a visual static emotion
recognition measure and Reading the Mind in the Voice Test, an assessment with
auditory stimuli. No group differences were evident on the MASC, a dynamic social
cognition measure. There were no significant differences on any sub-scale o f the
Interpersonal Reactivity Index, a self-report measure o f empathy, although there was a
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significant trend for IRI Empathic Concern with 18 and 20 year olds scoring higher than 
19 year olds.
To summarise, Time 2 cross sectional analyses comparing 18, 19 and 20 year olds on 
executive function tasks showed age group differences on free sort %  accuracy, a 
measure o f concept formation from the D-KEFS Sorting Test. Twenty year olds attained 
a significantly higher free sort % accuracy compared to 18 year olds. Higher free sort % 
accuracy in 20 year olds relative to 18 year olds indicates that the older group made 
fewer incorrect free sorts suggesting a more accurate concept formation strategy. No 
age group differences were evident on social cognition tasks.
Table 6.7 shows a summary of Time 1 cross sectional findings comparing 17, 18 and 19 
year olds, Time 2 findings by original Time 1 age group (Younger, Middle and Older) 
and Time 2 findings of groups re-categorised by chronological age (18, 19 and 20 year 
olds) for social cognition task scores.
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Table 6.7 shows that the only cross sectional group difference evident for social 
cognition task scores was for IRI Fantasy scores, with Younger and Older groups at 
Time 2 scoring significantly higher than the Middle group. Group differences on IRI 
Fantasy were not evident in Time 1 cross sectional analyses or Time 2 analyses when 
groups were re-categorised into 18, 19 and 20 year olds. Comparing the present social 
cognition data with existing adult data in Table 5.5 indicates that social cognitive 
functions assessed in the present study have reached adult levels apart from scores on 
Reading the Mind in the Voices Test and IRI Perspective Taking. This suggests that 
emotion recognition from auditory stimuli continues to develop between early 
adulthood and the mean age o f 24.3 years o f participants in the Golan et al. (2007) 
study. By comparing the present data with Hassenstab et al. (2007), whose sample had a 
mean age of 40.1 years, the tendency of a person to consider other peoples’ viewpoints 
may also develop beyond early adulthood.
6.6 Executive function and social cognition task score correlations at Time 2
The table in Appendix Section 14 presents executive function and social cognition task 
scores at Time 2. Scores on the Eyes Test significantly correlated with Tower 
Achievement scores (r = 0.35, p  = 0.007) and Tower mean first move time (r = 0.27, p  
= 0.043). Tower mean first move time is a prospective temporal measure o f planning 
and this could facilitate rapid emotion recognition. Tower achievement scores were 
positively correlated with Voices Test scores (r = 0.32, p  = 0.015) and MASC Correct (r 
= 0.30, p  = 0.022). The Tower Test requires planning and monitoring to ensure 
adherence to task instructions (Wagner et al., 2006). Planning and monitoring may be 
relevant in social cognition allowing people to monitor their behaviour and ensure their 
intentions are fulfilled (Amodio & Frith, 2006).
Brixton Test scores, a measure o f rule detection, significantly correlated with MASC 
correct {r = 0.36, p  = 0.006), MASC insufficient errors (r = -0.36, p  = 0.005) and 
MASC no ToM errors (r = -0.26, p  = 0.050) indicating that rule detection is beneficial 
for mental state attribution in dynamic stimuli.
Letter fluency scores significantly correlated with IRI Fantasy scores (r = 0.32, p  =
0.014). Participants who score highly on the IRI Fantasy are likely to frequently engage
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with books and films (Davis, 1983). It is plausible that the consideration of several 
characters simultaneously improves cognitive flexibility and this would be beneficial on 
the Letter Fluency Task when participants must flexibly initiate responses to generate 
words starting with a particular letter (Ahmed & Miller, 2011).
6.7 Stability o f correlations between executive function and social cognition tasks 
scores
At Time 1, Eyes and Voices Test scores correlated with Brixton Test scores, a measure 
o f rule detection, whereas at Time 2 Eyes and Voices scores correlated with planning 
indices on the Tower Test. The different pattern o f correlations at Time 1 and Time 2 
may be due to a more automatic strategy for completing social cognition tasks 
developing during late adolescence / early adulthood (Burnett & Blakemore, 2009) that 
relies less on pattern identification or rule detection. At both time points Brixton Test 
scores correlated with MASC correct scores, with a stronger correlation evident at Time 
2 relative to the first time point. The finding o f different correlations between time 
points on the Eyes and Voices Test scores and stability between time points on the 
MASC may be due to the Eyes and Voices assessing social perceptual and the MASC 
assessing social perceptual and social cognitive components of Theory o f Mind (Tager- 
Flusberg, 2001).
At both time points, the correlations are around 0.2 to 0.3 and classed as weak 
relationships (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). These r  values are similar to those Ahmed and 
Miller (2011) reported for correlations between scores on the Eyes Test, Strange 
Stories, Faux Pas Test and D-KEFS subtests in a sample o f 18 to 27 year olds. Carlson 
and Moses (2001) reported a correlation o f r = 0.66 between inhibition and ToM task 
scores in 3 and 4 year olds. The stronger correlations between executive function and 
social cognition task scores in childhood compared to early adulthood may arise due to 
executive functions being necessary for children to learn concepts e.g. beliefs (Apperly, 
Samson & Humphreys, 2009; Carlson & Moses, 2001). The presence o f correlations in 
adulthood indicates that executive functions continue to be important to social cognition 
when functions are more mature (Apperly et al., 2009).
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Sequential designs allow the comparison o f cohorts, participants who are the same age 
but bom in different years, to identify whether results are due to age or cohort effects 
(Shaffer & Kipp, 2013). To examine whether group differences are age related or due to 
the sample, Mann Whitney U tests were conducted comparing cohorts o f a similar age
i.e. 18 year olds at Time 1 with 18 year olds at Time 2. If  effects are age related there 
would be no group differences between 18 year olds at Time 1 compared to Time 2. If 
findings are due to the sample then group differences would be evident between the two 
18 year old cohorts. Mann Whitney U tests were conducted due to uneven group sizes. 
Exact p  values are reported because the groups are unevenly balanced (Dancey & 
Reidy, 2004). The descriptive statistics for the groups are presented in Table 6.8.
6.8 Age effect and sampling effect
Table 6.8. Median and range scores for 18 year olds at Time 1 and 18 year olds at 
Time 2 on D-KEFS Letter Fluency and Card Sorting Tasks
18 year olds at T1 
(n = 31)
18 year olds at T2 
(n = 15)
Letter Fluency 40.00 (35.00) 44.00 (26.00)
Free sorts correct 11.00 (5.00) 11.00 (5.00)
Free sort description score 39.00 (26.00) 38.00 (23.00)
Sort recognition description score * 45.00 (35.00) 42.00 (19.00)
Description score for verbal sorts 31.00 (31.00) 31.00(28.00)
Description score for perceptual sorts ** 57.00 (46.00) 48.00 (26.00)
* p  < 0.05, **p < 0.01
Eighteen year olds at Time 1 scored significantly higher than 18 year olds at Time 2 on 
sort recognition description score (U  = 140.50, z = 2.16, p  = 0.030) and description 
score for perceptual sorts (U =  105.00, z  = 2.99, p  = 0.002). These results indicate that 
group differences on sort recognition description score and description score for 
perceptual sorts are not age related and might be due to the sample. Group comparisons 
for Letter Fluency (U =  155.00, z = 1.82,/? = 0.069), free sorts correct (U =  228.00, z = 
0.11, p  = 0.921), free sort description score (U  = 189.00 z = 1.02, p  = 0.313) and 
description score for verbal sorts (U=  224.50, z = 0.19,/? = 0.857) were not significant.
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Analyses in Chapter 5 showed that 17 year olds scored significantly higher, indicating 
better performance, than 18 year olds on Letter Fluency and the Sorting Test (free sorts 
correct, free sort description score, sort recognition description score and description 
score for perceptual sorts). The present analyses found no group differences comparing 
cohorts o f the same age on Letter Fluency, free sorts correct and free sorts description 
score, indicating that the group differences reported in Chapter 5 for these indices are an 
age effect not a cohort effect. Cohort group differences were found on sort recognition 
description score and description score for perceptual sorts indicating that the group 
differences o f 17 year olds scoring higher than 18 year olds on these indices may be due 
to the sample.
6.9 Gender comparisons
Time 2 data were collapsed to form two subgroups o f females (n = 47) and males (n = 
11). Due to uneven sample sizes, Mann Whitney U Tests were conducted to examine 
potential gender differences on IQ, Affect, Anxiety and Depression scores that may 
have influenced task performance. Medians and ranges o f demographic variables are 
reported in Table 6.8.
Table 6.9. Median and range scores for females and males on demographic data at 
Time 2 (Verbal IQ, Performance IQ, Full Scale IQ, Positive Affect, Negative 
Affect, Anxiety and Depression scores)
Females (n = 47) Males (n = 11)
WASI Verbal IQ 108.00 (81.00- 131.00) 109.00 (97.00 - 126.00)
WASI Performance IQ 111.00 (79.00- 127.00) 111.00(102.00- 126.00)
WASI Full IQ 109.00 (84.00- 128.00) 113.00(100.00- 128.00)
Positive Affect 32.00 (14.00 - 45.00) 30.00 (23.00-44.00)
Negative Affect 12.00(10.00-29.00) 13.00(10.00- 19.00)
Anxiety 7 .00(1.00- 16.00) 7.00 (3.00- 11.00)
Depression 2.00 (0 - 9.00) 2 .00(1 .00-6 .00)
all p  > 0.05
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There were no group differences between females and males on the demographic data 
(all p  > 0.311) indicating that groups were similar on IQ, mood and anxiety and 
depression scores. Descriptive statistics for executive function task scores are presented 
in Table 6.9.
Table 6.10. Median and range scores for females and males on executive function  
task scores
Females (n = Al) Males (n=  11)
Measure of response inhibition
Hayling scaled 6 .00(4.00- 10.00) 6.00 (4.00- 10.00)
Measure o f rule detection
Brixton scaled 8.00 (6.00- 10.00) 9.00 (5.00- 10.00)
Measure o f strategy generation
Verbal fluency 41.00 (17.00-65.00) 37.00 (22.00-55.00)
Measures o f concept formation
Free sorts correct 10.00 (6.00- 16.00) 11.00 (8.00- 15.00)
Free sort description score 38.00 (20.00 - 55.00) 42.00 (32.00 - 59.00)
Sort recognition description 
score*
41.00 (22.00-59.00) 46.00 (32.00 - 54.00)
Verbal sorts description score 32.00(16.00-45.00) 34.00 (24.00 - 47.00)
Perceptual sorts description 
score *
46.00 (24.00 - 69.00) 49.00 (39.00 - 66.00)
Measures o f planning
Number of Tower items 
completed
9.00 (7.00 - 9.00) 9.00 (6.00 - 9.00)
Tower achievement score 19.00(12.00-27.00) 19.00(15.00-26.00)
Mean first move time 2.60(1 .00-7 .50) 3 .10(1 .60-5 .00)
Time per move 2.10(1 .60-3 .70) 2 .30(1 .50-3 .00)
Move accuracy 1.50 (1 .20-2.50) 1.50(1 .00-2 .40)
* p <  0.05
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There were group differences on the sort recognition description score (U  = 153.00 , z  =
2.10 , p  = 0.036, r = 0.28) and description score for perceptual sorts ( U  = 159.50, z = 
1.96, p  = 0.049, r  = 0.26) with males scoring higher, indicating better concept 
formation, than females. No group differences were evident on other executive function 
task scores. Median and range scores for males and females on social cognition tasks 
are presented in Table 6.10.
Table 6.11. Median and range scores for females and males on social cognition 
tasks
Females (n = 47) Males (n = 11)
Static visual stimuli
Eyes 28.00 (13.00-33.00) 28.00(17.00-33.00)
Auditory stimuli
Voices 17.00 (7.00-23.00) 17 .00(14.00-19.00)
Dynamic visual and auditory stimuli with social interaction
MASC correct
MASC excessive mental 
state inference errors
38.00(16.00-42.00) 
4.00 (0 - 10.00)
37.00 (28.00 - 42.00)
6.00 (3 .00-7.00)
MASC insufficient mental 
state inference
2.00 (0 - 9.00) 2.00 (0 - 7.00)
MASC no ToM errors 1.00 (0 - 11.00) 1.00 (0 -4 .00 )
Self-report empathy
IRI Fantasy
IRI Perspective Taking
IRI Empathic Concern
IRI Personal Distress*
19.00 (8.00-28.00)
17.00 (8.00 - 26.00)
22.00(11.00-28.00)
14.00 (4.00 - 24.00)
16.00 (8.00-24.00)
17.00 (11.00-23.00)
21.00(12.00-23.00)
10.00 (0 -  15.00)
* p  < 0.05
There was a significant group difference on IRI Personal Distress (U  = 141.50, z = 2.33, 
p  = 0.020, r = 0.31) with females scoring higher, indicating greater feelings o f anxiety 
in tense social situations, than males. There were no other group differences on social 
cognition task scores.
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To summarise, no gender differences were evident on IQ, affect, anxiety and depression 
scores at Time 2. Males scored significantly higher than females, indicating better 
concept formation, on sort recognition description score and description score for 
perceptual sorts. Females scored higher than males on IRI Personal Distress, anxiety in 
tense social situations. The finding of gender differences on description score for 
perceptual sorts and IRI Personal Distress supports gender differences at Time 1. 
Gender differences on MASC excessive mental state inference errors (males higher than 
females) and IRI Empathic concern (females higher than males) were evident at Time 1 
but not at Time 2.
6.10 Longitudinal data analyses
This section considers the various options of longitudinal data analyses and provides a 
rationale for the reported analyses. Confirmatory Factor Analysis is discussed with 
reference to a longitudinal study conducted by Hughes, Ensor, Wilson and Graham 
(2009) that assessed executive function development. Following this, the use o f time 
interval between testing as a covariate was considered. Regressions are then discussed 
before mixed ANOVAs are reported.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) allows the predictors o f individual differences in 
developmental change to be examined. Hughes et al. (2009) conducted CFA in a 
longitudinal study assessing executive function developmental change between ages 4 
and 6 years and reported that inhibition, planning and working memory developed 
significantly across early childhood. The present study did not use CFA because the 
longitudinal sample size o f 58 participants is far below the sample size Kline (2011) 
recommended of 200 participants. Whilst CFA allows the investigation of 
developmental change between time points, it does not allow between group 
comparisons so developmental change in the Younger, Middle and Older groups could 
not be identified.
A strength of longitudinal studies is that they identify how abilities improve or decline
over time (De Luca et al., 2003). However, there are some limitations to this type of
design. Longitudinal studies aim to collect data at specific time points, although
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practicalities of data collection may result in longitudinal studies being subject to creep, 
the widening o f time between testing (Singer & Willett, 2003). Time interval was a 
possible issue in the current study with a significantly longer time interval between 
testing evident in the Younger and Middle age groups compared to the Older group. 
This resulted in some participants moving groups at Time 2. One solution that accounts 
for uneven time intervals is to adjust for time intervals between testing by using this 
variable as a covariate (Locascio & Atri, 2011) when analysing task change scores. In a 
review of longitudinal data analyses in neuropsychological research, Locascio and Atri 
(2011) suggested calculating a task change score (Time 2 task score -  Time 1 task 
score) to give one score for use in longitudinal data analyses. However, a covariate 
should have a linear relationship with the dependent variable (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). 
To assess the suitability o f time interval as a covariate, Pearson’s correlations were 
conducted between time interval and task change score. As participants had a varying 
time interval between testing, the rationale for conducting these correlations was to 
collapse age groups and examine whether time interval correlated with task change 
scores. Together with identifying whether time interval is a suitable covariate, if  time 
interval did not correlate with task change score participants with a longer time interval 
would be retained for further analyses. If time interval and task change score correlated 
for many of the variables then time interval would be a suitable covariate. No executive 
function task change scores significantly correlated with time interval; the correlation 
between sort recognition description change score and time interval showed a 
significant trend (r = -0.25, p  = 0.054) with other correlations not significant ip  > 
0.117). For social cognition, IRI Perspective Taking significantly correlated with time 
interval between testing (r = 0.30, p  = 0.02) indicating that a longer time interval 
between testing sessions is associated with greater improvement in self-report 
Perspective Taking. No other correlations between time interval and social cognition 
task change scores were significant ip > 0.201). The correlations show that time interval 
would not be an appropriate covariate because the variable is not linearly related with 
the majority o f task change scores, the dependent variables.
Results of correlational analyses showed that time interval between testing significantly 
correlated with IRI Perspective Taking change score. Time interval did not correlate 
with other executive function and social cognition task change scores, suggesting that,
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with the exception of IRI Perspective Taking, the varying time interval between testing 
does not contribute to task change scores. Therefore, all participants were retained for 
further analyses to preserve power.
Another option o f longitudinal data analyses were regressions with time interval as a 
predictor variable and task change score as the criterion variable. However, this method 
does not investigate between group comparisons (Locascio & Atri, 2011) and time 
interval and task change score were not linearly related, so the assumption o f linearity is 
not met (Field, 2005). Dimitrov and Rumrill (2003) suggested comparing actual task 
scores instead of task change scores because when variances are similar across time 
points, as in these data, this results in similar task change scores. Therefore the 
following analyses were conducted with actual task scores at Time 1 and Time 2.
Alternative analyses are ANOVAs. Hughes and Ensor (2007) reported repeated 
measures ANOVAs in a longitudinal study assessing executive function and Theory of 
Mind at ages 2, 3 and 4. This allowed developmental change to be assessed across time 
points in a within participants design. The present study employed a mixed design with 
a between participant factor of group and within participant factor o f Time 1 and Time 2 
task score. Mixed ANOVAs were considered more appropriate than repeated measure 
ANOVAs because they allow between group comparisons, within group comparisons 
across time points and interactions. A 9-month longitudinal study by Tyson, Laws, 
Roberts and Mortimer (2004) that assessed executive function in schizophrenics and 
control participants used the same analyses. Tyson et al. reported separate ANOVAs for 
indices on the Intra/Extra dimensional and Stockings o f Cambridge Tests using group 
(schizophrenic and controls) as a between participant factors, time as a within factor and 
interactions.
Mixed ANOVAs were conducted using a between group factor o f age group at Time 1 
(Younger, Middle and Older groups) and a within subjects factor o f Time 1 and Time 2 
IQ, executive function and social cognition task scores. The Younger, Middle and Older 
age groups refer to the age groups described in Figure 6.1. These analyses were 
conducted to explore whether executive function and social cognition task scores for 
Younger, Middle and Older groups changed significantly between Time 1 and Time 2,
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indicating developmental change. The inclusion o f within and between comparisons 
allowed the interaction between groups and time points to be examined. Locascio and 
Atri (2011) recommended ANOVAs for longitudinal data analyses when there are few 
time points and participants have taken part in the same number o f time points. 
Therefore, the Time 1 descriptive statistics only include participants who took part at 
Time 2 to allow comparison across time points with the same participants at each time 
point. Time interval was not included as a covariate because regression lines for the 
groups were not parallel, indicating that ANCOVAs would not be appropriate because 
they use adjusted group means instead of the actual means (Dancey & Reidy, 2004).
6.10.1 IQ
Descriptive statistics for Verbal IQ, Performance IQ and Full Scale IQ are presented in 
Table 6.11 followed by mixed ANOVAs with age group (Younger, Middle and Older) 
as the between group factor, Time 1 and Time 2 as the within group factor and an 
interaction.
Table 6.12. Means and standard deviations for WASI Verbal IQ, Performance IQ  
and Full Scale IQ in Younger, Middle and Older groups at Time 1 and Time 2
Verbal IQ Performance IQ Full Scale IQ
Younger group Time 1 (n = 19) 105.00 (7.74) 103.16(12.24) 104.63 (8.37)
Younger group Time 2 {n = 19) 109.32(10.69) 111.89(11.08) 111.89(10.83)
Middle group Time 1 (n = 18) 103.56(11.16) 99.89 (8.70) 102.00(10.31)
Middle group Time 2 (n = 18) 109.17(8.35) 106.00 (9.66) 108.72 (7.93)
Older group Time 1 (n = 21) 107.90 (6.91) 105.57 (7.06) 107.76 (5.41)
Older group Time 2 (n = 21) 105.14(9.19) 114.76 (8.50) 110.95 (6.70)
Participants varied between Time 1 and Time 2 by -18 to +20 on Verbal IQ, -8 to +25 
on Performance IQ and -8 to +18 on Full IQ supporting variation in IQ during 
adolescence (Ramsden et al., 2011).
There was a significant main effect of time (F  (1, 55) = 5.95,/? = 0.018, r\2p =0 .10) for 
Verbal IQ with the Younger (/ (18) = 2.69, p  = 0.015) and Middle (/ (17) = 2.74, p  =
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0.014) groups scoring significantly higher on Verbal IQ at Time 2 compared to Time 1. 
No developmental change was evident in the O lder group (/ (20) = 1.91, p  =  0.071). 
There was no effect o f  group (F  (2, 55) = 0.05, p  =  0.953) on Verbal IQ. There was a 
significant interaction between time and group {F  (2, 55) = 7.33, p  =  0.002). The 
interaction graph in Figure 6.4 shows that the Younger ( t (18) = 2.69, p  =  0.015) and 
M iddle (t (17) = 2.74, p  =  0.014) age groups scored significantly higher on Verbal IQ at 
Time 2 compared to Time 1. All group means are w ithin the Average range indicating 
that where there are changes across time groups remain in the same IQ category. The 
O lder group scored lower at Time 2 relative to Time 1, although this was not significant 
0t  (2 0 )=  1.91, p  = 0.071).
Figure 6.4. Interaction plot showing Verbal IQ  scores in Younger, M iddle and 
O lder age groups at Time 1 and Time 2.
E s tim a ted  M a rg in a l M ean s  o f  M EA SU RE _1
Tim«
For Performance IQ there was a significant main effect o f  time ( F  (1, 55) = 100.25, p  < 
0.001, r |2p= 0.65) although group ( F ( 2, 55) = 3 .06 , p  = 0.055) and interaction ( F  (2, 55) 
= 1.40, p  = 0.254) were not significant. The Younger group scored significantly h igher 
at Time 2 compared to Time 1 on Performance IQ ( t (18) = 5.80,/? <  0.001). Sim ilarly, 
the M iddle ( t (17) = 3 .71 ,/?  =  0.002) and O lder groups (t (20) = 9 .09 , p  < 0.001) scored
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significantly higher at Time 2 relative to Time 1. The mean Performance IQ scores for 
the Younger and O lder groups changed from an Average IQ group at Time 1 to H igh 
Average at Time 2.
For Full Scale IQ score there was a significant effect o f  time (F  (1, 55) =  61.75, p  < 
0.001, r |2p= 0.53), w ith no effect o f  group ( F ( 2, 55) = l . 2 9 , p  = 0.283) and a significant 
interaction ( F ( 2, 55) = 3.21 , p  =  0.048). The Younger (t  (18) = 5.97 , p  < 0.001), M iddle 
(t  (17) = 4.34, p  < 0.001) and O lder groups ( t  (20) = 3.09, p  = 0.006) attained a 
significantly higher IQ score at Time 2 relative to Time 1. The interaction plot in Figure 
6.5 shows all groups scored higher on Full Scale IQ at Time 2. The mean Full Scale IQ 
scores for the Younger group changed from  an Average IQ group at Time 1 to H igh 
Average at Time 2.
Figure 6.5. Interaction plot for Full Scale IQ  scores in Younger, M iddle and O lder 
groups at Time 1 and Time 2.
E s tim a ted  M a rg in a l M eans  o f  M E A S U R E J I
Time
Descriptive statistics o f  executive function task performance for Younger, M iddle and 
Older groups at Time 1 and Time 2 are presented in Tables 6.13 and 6.14.
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6.10.2 Response inhibition and rule detection (Hayling & Brixton Tests)
The ANOVA showed a significant main effect of time on the Hayling Test (F  (1, 55) = 
20.65, p  < 0.001, r| p = 0.27). Paired samples t-tests showed no developmental change 
in task score for the Younger age group (t (18) = 2.02, p  = 0.059). The Middle age 
group performed significantly better at Time 2 relative to Time 1 (t (17) = 3.22, p  = 
0.005) and the Older group performed better at Time 2, indicating better inhibition, 
compared to Time 1 (t  (20) = 3.01, p  = 0.007). There was no significant main effect of 
age group (F  (2, 55) = 0.08, p  = 0.928) or interaction (F  (2, 55) = 0.24, p  = 0.788) on 
the Hayling Test.
A significant main effect o f time was evident on the Brixton Test (F  (1, 55) = 28.54, p  < 
0.001, r| p = 0.34) indicating developmental change. Paired samples t-tests showed 
scores for the Younger group did not significantly change between Time 1 and Time 2 
(t (18) = 1.88, p  = 0.076). The Middle age group scored significantly higher at Time 2 
compared to Time 1 (t (17) = 3.56,/? = 0.002). Similarly, the Older age group attained a 
higher score, indicating better rule detection, at Time 2 relative to Time 1 (t (20) = 
4.36, p  < 0.001). There was no significant main effect o f age group (F  (2, 55) = 0.85,/? 
= 0.432) or interaction (F  (2, 55) = 0.87,/? = 0.424) on the Brixton Test.
6.10.3 Strategy generation (D-KEFS Letter Fluency Test)
A significant main effect of time was found on the Letter Fluency Test indicating 
developmental change between time points (F  (1, 55) = 9.25, p  = 0.004, r\2p = 0.14). The 
Younger group scored significantly higher at Time 2, indicating better strategy 
generation, compared to Time 1 (t (18) = 2.19, p  = 0.042). No developmental changes 
were found in the Middle age group (t (17) = 1.27,/? = 0.220) or the Older group (t (20) 
= 1.77,/? = 0.092). There was a significant main effect o f age group (F  (2, 55) = 3.75,/? 
= 0.030) but the interaction was not significant (F  (2, 55) = 0.33, p  = 0.718). The 
significant main effect o f age group was explored by conducting t-tests and found the 
Younger group scored significantly higher than the Middle age group (t (35) = 2.50,/? = 
0.017), indicating non-linear development and supporting Chapter 5 findings. No other 
group differences were evident.
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6.10.4 Concept formation (D-KEFS Sorting Test)
There was no main effect o f time (F  (1, 55) = 2.97, p  = 0.090, r \ \  = 0.05), group (F  (2, 
55) = 2.56, p  = 0.087) or interaction (F  (2, 55) = 1.41, p  = 0.253) on number o f free 
sorts correct. There was also no main effect of time (F  (1, 55) = 1.73,/? = 0.194), group 
(F  (2, 55) = 1.17, p  = 0.318) or interaction (F  (2, 55) = 1.35, p  = 0.267) on description 
score for verbal sorts. These findings indicate no developmental change between time 
points, group differences or interaction on number o f free sorts correct and description 
score for verbal sorts.
A significant main effect o f time was found on free sort description score (F  (2, 55) =
9 *9.91 , p  = 0.003, r| p= 0.15) with the Younger group scoring significantly lower at Time 
2, indicating poorer concept formation and non-linear development, relative to Time 1 (t 
(18) = 3.68,/? = 0.002). The Middle (t (17) = 1.01,/? = 0.326) and Older groups (t (20) = 
1.33, p  = 0.200) did not show significant changes between time points. There was no 
effect o f age group (F  (2, 55) = 2.42, p  = 0.098) or interaction (F  (2, 55) = 0.97, p  = 
0.387) on free sort description score.
Developmental change was evident on the sort recognition description score between 
time points (F  (1, 55) = 21.11, p  < 0.001, r |2p = 0.28) with the Younger group scoring 
lower at Time 2, indicating poorer concept formation and non-linear development, 
compared to Time 1 (t (18) = 4.73,/? < 0.001). The Middle group showed no change in 
sort recognition description score over time points (t (17) = 1.00,/? = 0.333). The Older 
group scored significantly lower on sort recognition description score at Time 2 
compared to Time 1 (t (20) = 3.15, p  = 0.005). There was no effect o f age group (F  (2, 
55) = 1.86, p  = 0.165) or interaction (F  (2, 55) = 1.62,/? = 0.207) for sort recognition 
description score.
Description score for perceptual sorts showed developmental change (F ( l ,  55) = 62.96, 
p  < 0.001, r|2p= 0.53). The Younger group (t (15) = 7.51,/? < 0.001), Middle group (t 
(13) = 4.49,/? = 0.001) and Older group (t (20) = 3.71,/? = 0.001) scored significantly 
lower at Time 2 compared to Time 1. There were no significant main effects o f group 
(F  (2, 55) = 1.49,/? = 0.234) or interaction (F  (2, 55) = 0.84,/? = 0.436).
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For free sort %  accuracy there was no main effect o f  time (F  (1, 55) = 1.64, p  = 0.206, 
r |2p = 0.03) or age group (F  (2, 55) = 3.17, p  = 0.05) whilst the interaction was 
significant ( F  (2, 55) = 3.53, p  = 0.036). Figure 6.6 shows an interaction plot for free 
sort % accuracy.
Figure 6.6. Interaction plot for free sort %  accuracy on the D-KEFS Sorting Test 
in Younger, Middle and O lder age groups at Time I and Time 2.
Es tim a ted  M arg in a l M ean s  o f M EASURE_1
Age_group1
 Y o u n g e r
M idd le
O lder
Time
The interaction plot for free sort % accuracy presented in Figure 6.4 shows that the 
Younger and M iddle groups’ scores decreased between Time 1 and Time 2 whereas the 
O lder group showed an increase in free sort % accuracy between tim e points. However, 
t-tests showed that there was only a significant decrease for the M iddle age group 
suggesting a less efficient concept formation strategy at Time 2 compared to Time 1 (t  
(17) = 2.72,/? = 0.015).
Table 6.13 presents the descriptive statistics for Younger, M iddle and O lder groups at 
Time 1 and Time 2 on the D-KEFS Tower Test.
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6.10.5 Planning (D-KEFS Tower Test)
Number o f towers completed showed a significant main effect o f time indicating 
significant developmental changes in planning (F ( l ,  55) = 12.09, p  = 0.001, r |2p= 0.18). 
The Middle age group completed significantly more towers at Time 2, indicating better 
planning, relative to Time 1 (t (17) = 3.34, p  = 0.004). No significant changes were 
found between Time 1 and Time 2 in the Younger group (t (18) = 0.90, p  = 0.380) or 
the Older group (t (20) = 1.78,/? = 0.090). There was no significant main effect o f group 
(F  (2, 55) = 0.28, p  = 0.760) or interaction (F  (2, 55) = 1.49, p  = 0.234) for number of 
towers completed.
Tower achievement score also changed significantly between time points (F  (1, 55) = 
6.28, p  = 0.015, rj p = 0.10). The Older group attained a significantly higher 
achievement score at Time 2 compared to Time 1 (t (20) = 2.16, p  = 0.043). 
Achievement score takes into account whether towers are completed and the number o f 
moves, indicating that the Older group employed a better planning strategy at Time 2 
relative to Time 1. No longitudinal changes were significant between Time 1 and Time 
2 in the Younger (t (18) = 1.39 p  = 0.183) or the Middle age groups (t (17) = 0.79,/? = 
0.439). There was no significant main effect of group (F  (2, 55) = 0.17, p  = 0.847) or 
interaction (F  (2, 55) = 0.81, jo = 0.450).
Mean first move time showed a significant main effect of time (F  (1, 55) = 18.74, p  <
9 • •0.001, rj p = 0.25) with the Younger group having a significantly shorter mean first 
move time at Time 2 relative to Time 1 (t (18) = 2.47,/? = 0.024). A similar pattern was 
found in the Older group with a significantly shorter mean first move time at Time 2 
compared to Time 1 (t (20) = 3.73,/? = 0.001). No developmental change was found in 
the Middle group (t (17) = 1.73, p  = 0.102). There was a significant effect o f group for 
mean first move time (F  (2, 55) = 3.25, p  = 0.046) which was explored with t-tests. The 
Younger group scored significantly lower, showing a faster mean first move time than 
the Older group (t (31.73) = 2.37, p  = 0.024) with no other group differences evident. 
The interaction was not significant ( F (2, 55) = 0.41,/? = 0.667).
For time per move there was a significant effect o f time (F  (1, 55) = 78.06, p  < 0.001, 
rj2p= 0.59). The Younger group (t (18) = 4.74,/? < 0.001), Middle group (/ (17) = 5.32,
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p  < 0.001) and Older groups (t (20) = 5.45, p  < 0.001) showed significantly shorter time 
per move at the second time point, possibly due to participants having completed the 
task before and already having a strategy to complete the towers. There was no 
significant effect o f group (F  (2, 55) = 2.85, p  = 0.066) or interaction (F  (2, 55) = 0.08, 
p  = 0.925). For move accuracy there was no significant effect o f time (F  (1, 55) = 0.48, 
p  = 0.490), group (F  (2, 55) = 0.28, p  = 0.758) or interaction (F  (2, 55) = 0.42, p  = 
0.658).
Table 6.14 presents the descriptive statistics for Younger, Middle and Older group at 
Time 1 and Time 2 on social cognition tasks. |  represents significantly better 
performance at Time 2 relative to Time 1, j  represents significantly poorer performance 
at Time 2 compared to Time 1 and ~ represents no significant change in task scores 
between Time 1 and Time 2
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6.10.6 Reading the Mind in the Eyes and Voices Tests
No significant effects o f time (F  (1, 55) = 0.01,/? = 0.915, r |2p < 0.01), group (F  (2, 55) 
= 1.75, p  = 0.183) or interaction (F  (2, 55) = 0.07, p  = 0.937) were evident on the 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test. Similarly, no effects of time (F  (1, 55) = 0.57, p  = 
0.454, r|2p= 0.01), group (F (2, 55) = 1.03,/? = 0.362) or interaction (F  (2, 55) = 0.34, p  
= 0.712) were found on the Reading the Mind in the Voice Test.
6.10.7 Movie for the Assessment o f Social Cognition
Total MASC score showed a significant effect o f time indicating developmental change 
(F  (1, 55) = 5.29, p  = 0.025, r|2p = 0.09) with the Middle group scoring significantly 
higher at Time 2, indicating better social cognition, relative to Time 1 (t (17) = 2.22, p  = 
0.041) and the Older group scoring significantly higher at Time 2 compared to Time 1 (t 
(20) = 3.20, p  = 0.005). No significant change in MASC total score was found in the 
Younger group (t (18) = 0.04,/? = 0.966) between time points. There were no significant 
effects o f group (F  (2, 55) = 2.08,/? = 0.135) or interaction (F  (2, 55) = 1.69,/? = 0.194) 
on MASC total score.
MASC excessive inference mental state errors showed developmental change (F  (1, 55) 
= 9.73, p  = 0.003, r| p = 0.15) with the Middle group making significantly fewer errors 
at Time 2 compared to Time 1 (t (17) = 2.38, p  = 0.029) and the Older group making 
significantly fewer errors at Time 2 relative to Time 1 (t (20) = 2.36, p  = 0.029). No 
longitudinal changes were evident in the Younger age group (t (18) = 0.98,/? = 0.339). 
No effect o f group {F (2, 55) = 2.14, p  = 0.127) or interaction (F  (2, 55) = 0.36, p  = 
0.701) was found for MASC excessive mental state inference errors.
For MASC insufficient inference errors there were no effects of time (F  (1, 55) = 1.15, 
p  = 0.288, r |2p = 0.02), group (F  (2, 55) = 0.52, p  = 0.595) or interaction (F  (2, 55) =
2.51,/? = 0.090). There were no effects o f time (F  (1, 55) = 0.13,/? = 0.718), group (F  
(2, 55) = 0.60, p  = 0.553) or interaction (F  (2, 55) = 0.77, p  = 0.470) on MASC no 
Theory of Mind errors.
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6.10.8 Interpersonal Reactivity Index
No significant effect o f  time ( F ( l ,  55) = 0.25,/? = 0.618, r f p< 0.01), group ( F (  2, 55) = 
4.58, p  =  0.054) or interaction (F  (2, 55) = 1.99, p  = 0.147) was evident on the IRI 
Fantasy scale. There was no significant effect o f  time {F  (1, 55) = 0.06, p  = 0.810, r |2p < 
0.01), group (F (2 , 55) = 1.03 , p  = 0.363) or interaction (F (2 , 55) =  1.65, p  =  0.201) on 
the Perspective Taking scale. There was no significant effect o f  tim e (F  (1, 55) <0.01, p  
=  0.924, r\2p = 0.01), group (F (2 , 55) = 1.03, p  =  0.364) or interaction (F (2 , 55) = 2.16, 
p  =  0.125) on the Empathic Concern scale. No significant effect o f  tim e (F  (1, 55) =
2.52, p  =  0.118, r |2p = 0.04) or group (F  (2, 55) =  1.40, p  = 0.255) was evident on the 
Personal D istress scale. A  significant interaction between age group at Time 1 and time 
was found for Personal D istress (F  (2, 55) = 3.86, p  = 0.027). T-tests showed that the 
Younger group scored significantly lower at Time 2 compared to Time 1 (t  (15) = 2.21, 
p  = 0.043). Figure 6.7 shows an interaction plot o f  IRI Personal D istress scores in 
Younger, M iddle and O lder groups at Time 1 and Time 2.
Figure 6.7. Interaction plot showing IRI Personal Distress scores for Younger, 
Middle and O lder age groups at Time 1 and Time 2
E s tim a te d  M a rg in a l M e a n s  o f M E A S U R E _ 1
T im e
The interaction plot in Figure 6.4 indicates that the M iddle age group also scored lower 
at Time 2 compared to Time 1, sim ilar to the Younger group. In contrast, the O lder age
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6.11 Discussion
Time 2 cross sectional analyses by Time 1 age group showed that the Middle group 
scored significantly lower, indicating poorer strategy generation, than the Younger 
group on the Letter Fluency Task. The Older group scored significantly higher, 
indicating a more efficient concept formation strategy, than the Younger group on free 
sort %  accuracy. While the Older group scored higher than the Younger group on free 
sort %  accuracy, the number o f correct free sorts was similar, suggesting that the Older 
group made fewer errors. On the Tower Test, the Middle and Older groups scored 
significantly higher than the Younger group on time per move. However, the Younger 
group were faster than the other age groups at Time 1. Younger and Older groups 
scored higher than the Middle group on IRI Fantasy scale, indicating that Younger and 
Older groups were more likely to report relating to characters in books and films 
compared to the Middle age group.
Non-linear development is evident on the Tower Test with the Younger group showing 
a faster time per move compared to the Middle and Older groups. The group difference 
may be due to more efficient planning or processing speed.
The Younger and Older groups scored higher than the Middle group on IRI Fantasy. 
Simulation, thinking how you would feel in a situation (Harris, 1991) may be relevant 
to IRI Fantasy and relating to characters in books and films. However, the Younger and 
Older groups scoring higher than the Middle group on the Fantasy scale does not result 
in group differences on other social cognition tasks. Moreover, it could be questioned 
whether relating to characters in books and films indicates a maladaptive aspect of 
empathy because Lynch, Hill, Nagoshi and Nagoshi (2012) found that shame and poor 
psychological adjustment in university students was mediated by IRI Fantasy scores.
New groupings based on chronological age comparing 18,19 and 20 year olds showed
that 20 year olds scored significantly higher than 18 year olds on free sort %  accuracy
indicating age related linear development. Twenty year olds achieved higher free sort %
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group scored higher at Time 2 relative to Time 1. However, these differences were not
significant.
accuracy by making more free sorts that matched target sorts with fewer errors 
suggesting that the older age group used a better concept formation strategy compared 
to 18 year olds. This finding supports existing adult data reported in Chapter 5 (Greve et 
al., 1995) indicating concept formation improves linearly into early adulthood. Data 
presented in Chapter 4 showed that age groups were similar on IQ, affect and anxiety so 
these did not account for group differences on concept formation. There were no group 
differences on social cognition tasks although IRI Empathic Concern was approaching 
significant with 18 and 20 year olds scoring higher than 19 year olds, indicating non­
linear development. In an MRI study assessing brain regions associated with the IRI in 
early adulthood, Banissy et al. (2012) reported that greater Empathic Concern scores 
were associated with lower grey matter in the left precuneus, left inferior frontal gyrus 
and left anterior cingulate. It is possible that non-linear development o f Empathic 
Concern scores may reflect synaptic pruning of frontal regions, one of the latest regions 
to mature (Gogtay et al., 2004).
Males scoring higher on description score o f perceptual sorts than females supports 
Time 1 gender comparisons and previous research (Greve et al., 1995). This index of 
concept formation requires participants to describe sorts based on perceptual features o f 
the cards e.g. upper case letters and lower case letters or straight edges and curved 
edges. A possible explanation for the gender difference is that males have superior 
visuospatial abilities relative to females (Cazzato, Basso, Cutini & Bisiacchi, 2010). 
Females scored higher than males on IRI Personal Distress, feelings o f anxiety in tense 
social situations, supporting Time 1 gender comparisons and previous research (e.g. 
Mestre et al., 2009).
The present study extends previous executive function and social cognition research by 
employing a sequential design allowing longitudinal developmental changes to be 
identified. The longitudinal analyses provide evidence of some functions improving 
(inhibition, rule detection, strategy generation, planning and emotion recognition in 
dynamic stimuli and feelings of apprehension in stressful situations), whilst concept 
formation was poorer at Time 2 and other functions showed no developmental change 
between time points (emotion recognition with visual static and auditory stimuli, 
sympathetic feelings towards other people’s misfortune, tendency to associate with
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characters in books and films and tendency of a person to consider other peoples’ 
viewpoints). Different developmental trajectories are evident for the age groups on 
some executive functions. For example, Middle and Older groups performed 
significantly better on the Hayling and Brixton Tests at Time 2 compared to Time 1 
although no developmental change was found in the Younger group. All age groups at 
Time 2 scored higher than existing adult data on the Hayling Test (M =  5.60) reported 
by Henry, Mazur & Rendell (2009). It is possible that when completing the Hayling 
Test at Time 2 participants remembered a strategy, e.g. ignoring the content o f the 
sentence and naming objects in the room. In contrast, the Younger group were the only 
group to score significantly higher at Time 2 compared to Time 1 on the Letter Fluency 
Test. A possible explanation is maturation o f the posterior limb of the internal capsule 
leading to more efficient strategy generation in late adolescence (Bava et al., 2010). 
White matter maturation into late adolescence is associated with a decrease in mean 
diffusivity, a DTI measure indexing average magnitude of water diffusion (Schmithorst 
& Yuan, 2010). Mean diffusivity in the posterior limb of the internal capsule reaches 
90% maturation by age 18 (Lebel et al., 2008) a similar age to the Younger group at 
Time 2. Therefore improved strategy generation in the Younger group at Time 2 
compared to Time 1 may reflect white matter maturation in the posterior limb of the 
internal capsule specific to this age.
The finding that only the Younger group scored significantly lower at Time 2 compared 
to Time 1 on free sort description score on the D-KEFS Sorting Test supports the notion 
of non-linear development in concept formation (Kalkut et al., 2009; Taylor et al., 2013) 
reported in Chapter 5. However, all age groups scored significantly lower on description 
score for perceptual sorts at Time 2 relative to Time 1 indicating that the cards at Time 
2 may have been more challenging than the cards at Time 1.
Previous longitudinal studies with adults have found no developmental change over 
time on the Tower Test measure o f planning. For example, Tyson et al. (2004) found no 
main effect o f time for number of towers solved or mean first move time in participants 
with a mean age of 39.4 years and time interval o f 9 months between testing sessions. 
Similarly, Davis and Klebe (2001) reported no developmental change in the number o f 
excess moves in participants with a mean age o f 32.4 years and a mean of 7.8 years
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between testing sessions. In contrast, the current findings show the Middle group 
completed significantly more towers and the Older group attained a higher achievement 
score at Time 2 relative to Time 1. The Younger and Older groups showed a faster
mean first move time at Time 2 and all age groups achieved a faster time per move at
Time 2 compared to Time 1. These data provide evidence for longitudinal 
developmental change in planning specifically during late adolescence / early
adulthood. Brain maturation in late adolescence / early adulthood may explain the 
longitudinal data suggesting planning develops during this age range and previous 
behavioural data showing planning ability develops in late adolescence / early
adulthood (Delis et al., 2001b; Romine & Reynolds, 2005). The faster time per move 
could be explained by ongoing myelination into early adulthood increasing transmission 
speed (Sowell et al., 2001). Myelination leads to an increase in Fractional Anisotropy 
with about half o f brain structures reaching 90% FA by age 19 to 20 (Lebel et al., 2008) 
including the superior longitudinal fasciculus, a fibre tract that extends from parietal to 
occipital and dorsal premotor and dorsolateral prefrontal regions (Makris et al., 2005). 
As performance on the Tower o f London planning task requires widespread neural 
substrates including frontal, parietal and premotor areas (Wagner et al., 2006), it is 
possible that the protracted maturation of the superior longitudinal fasciculus leads to 
development o f planning ability between Time 1 and Time 2. An alternative explanation 
is that greater functional connectivity between these areas results in more efficient, 
accurate and automatic processing (Stevens et al., 2007) evidenced by improved 
planning indices at Time 2.
Performance on the Eyes and Voices Tests showed no developmental change between 
time points supporting findings presented in Chapter 5 that emotion recognition with 
static visual and auditory stimuli is relatively stable across late adolescence and early 
adulthood. At Time 2, the Middle and Older groups scored significantly higher on the 
MASC due to fewer excessive inference mental state errors compared to Time 1 
indicating that social cognition develops longitudinally in late adolescence / early 
adulthood as measured with naturalistic, dynamic and auditory stimuli. The Older group 
at Time 2 attained the highest mean score on the MASC and answered 5 more questions 
correctly than the adult group in Ritter et al. (2011) who had a mean age o f 33.2 years. 
However, types of MASC errors and IQ scores are not reported by Ritter et al. so these
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cannot be compared. A higher MASC Total score for the Older group in the present 
study compared to the adult group in Ritter et al. (2011) may reflect the decline in 
emotion recognition over adulthood. Mill, Allik, Realo and Valk (2009) assessed 18 to 
84 year olds on visual static and auditory tests of emotion recognition and reported a 
decline in recognition o f sadness and anger commencing around age 30, possibly due to 
age related cognitive decline although this was not assessed.
In the present results, the Younger group scored lower on IRI Personal Distress at Time 
2 compared to Time 1. This finding supports Davis and Franzoi (1991) who reported 
Personal Distress decreased in 15 and 16 year olds when tested over three consecutive 
years. No other developmental changes were found on the IRI Fantasy, Empathic 
Concern or Perspective Taking scales indicating these aspects of empathy are relatively 
stable across late adolescence and early adulthood. This finding is partly supported by 
Haker, Schimansky, Jann and Rossler (2012) who administered the IRI to a control 
group with a mean age o f 32 years (SD 11) in a longitudinal study with a mean interval 
o f 38 months (SD 6.4) between testing and reported no significant longitudinal changes 
on any subscale suggesting stability over time. The present data show Younger, Middle 
and Older groups at both time points attained a lower Perspective Taking and higher 
Personal Distress means compared to adult data reported by Hassenstab et al. (2007). 
This indicates that self-report Perspective Taking may continue to develop beyond early 
adulthood. Personal Distress may be higher in the late adolescent / early adulthood 
sample than later adulthood in the Hassenstab et al. sample due to specific challenges in 
late adolescence and early adulthood for example changing living arrangements and 
friendship groups and commencing employment or higher education.
One issue with longitudinal research is practice effects, better performance on tests due 
to previous completion and becoming accustomed to the study in general (Jonsson et al., 
2006). Practice effects were reduced in the present study by giving participants no 
feedback about whether answers were correct. Alternate forms of tasks reduce practice 
effects and an interval o f a year between testing minimised memory contributing to 
practice effects (Hausknecht et al., 2007). Therefore, alternative letters and cards were 
used in the D-KEFS Letter Fluency and Sorting Tests at Time 2. Scores did not all 
improve at Time 2 compared to Time 1 indicating that practice effects are not a problem
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in the present study. Another issue with longitudinal research is a decrease in power due 
to attrition between time points. Power o f 0.8 or above is classed as high (Dancey & 
Reidy, 2004). Power for the effect o f time in the ANOVAs was very high; for example 
0.99 on the Hayling and Brixton Tests and 1.00 on Tower time per move with several 
significant longitudinal task score changes evident in these analyses.
To conclude, results o f the Time 2 cross sectional analyses show group differences on 
strategy generation, concept formation (free sort %  accuracy), planning (time per move) 
and tendency to relate to characters in books and films (IRI Fantasy). Results of 
longitudinal analyses show that executive functions and social cognition follow 
divergent trajectories with some functions improving between testing (inhibition, rule 
detection, strategy generation, planning and emotion recognition in dynamic stimuli and 
feelings of apprehension in stressful situations) and others declining (concept formation) 
or stabilising (emotion recognition with visual static and auditory stimuli, sympathetic 
feelings towards other people’s misfortune, tendency to associate with characters in 
books and films and tendency of a person to consider other peoples’ viewpoints). The 
protracted development o f functions may reflect continued brain maturation into late 
adolescence and early adulthood including myelination (Sowell et al., 2001) and 
functional connectivity (Stevens et al., 2007).
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Chapter 7 
IQ, mood, gender and executive function 
predictors of social cognition
7.1 Introduction
Cognitive processes involved in social cognition are currently o f  interest (Vetter, 
A ltgassen, Phillips, M ahy & K liegel, 2013) w ith particular attention on executive 
functions because they initiate, co-ordinate, m aintain and inhibit other functions 
(M iyake et al., 2000). Studies exam ining the relationship between executive function 
and social cognition have predom inantly focused on children (e.g. Henning, Spinath & 
Ascherslaben, 2011; Hughes & Ensor, 2007; Muller, L iebermann-Finestone, 
Carpendale, Hammond & Bibok, 2012) or atypical populations (e.g. Head Injury; 
Eslinger et al., 1992, and Autism ; Dziobek et al., 2006). Executive functions and social 
cognition may be related due to functions sharing some common frontal neural 
substrates (Hughes & Ensor, 2007), although social cognition, assessed w ith  the MASC 
(Dziobek et al., 2006), is thought to recruit more posterior regions (W olf et al., 2010).
Some researchers consider social cognition to be domain specific and independent from
other cognitive systems (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1995; Leslie, 1994), whereas a domain
general viewpoint suggests that social cognition depends on other cognitive functions
such as executive function and language (Apperly, Samson & Humphreys, 2005). The
Socio-cognitive Integration o f  Abilities Model (SOCIAL; Beauchamp & Anderson,
2010), described in Section 1.16.3, proposed that social cognitive developm ent is
influenced by internal factors (e.g. personality), external factors (e.g. fam ily
environment) and cognitive functions including an attention-executive component. The
SOCIAL model supports a domain general viewpoint o f  social cognition. The attention-
executive component comprises attentional control, cognitive flexibility and goal
setting, meeting Anderson's (2008) definition o f  executive function. However, this
definition o f  executive function om its inhibition and strategy generation and it is likely
that these executive functions are utilised in social cognition. In contrast, N elson et al.
(2005) incorporated inhibition in the cognitive-regulatory node o f  the Social
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Information Processing Network (see section 1.16.2). In social interaction it might be 
necessary to inhibit particular behaviour such as anger in order to execute a plan and 
achieve a particular goal (Nelson et al., 2005). Previous research in children aged 2 to 4 
has found a directional relationship o f executive functions (planning, inhibition, set 
shifting and working memory) predicting social cognition (deception, false belief and 
pretend play) rather than social cognition predicting executive function (Hughes & 
Ensor, 2007). Executive functions including self-monitoring and inhibition of behaviour 
allow the avoidance o f inappropriate behaviour, possibly resulting in more successful 
social interactions and social cognitive development.
Data reported in Chapters 5 and 6 indicate that executive functions and social cognition 
follow different developmental trajectories with social cognition appearing relatively 
stable by early adulthood. As social cognition is not greatly influenced by age in the 
present sample, it is o f interest which factors such as IQ, mood state and executive 
functions predict social cognition task ability. Whilst research on executive function and 
social cognition has focused on childhood, it is possible that different relationships are 
evident between executive functions and social cognition between childhood and 
adulthood. For example, executive functions may be necessary in the development of 
social cognition during childhood but not in adulthood or executive functions may 
continue to be crucial in adult social cognition (Apperly, Samson & Humphreys, 2009). 
It is important to establish the contribution o f domain general processes such as 
executive functions and language to social cognition in late adolescence / early 
adulthood when social cognition is more mature relative to childhood and adolescence 
(Apperly, Samson & Humphreys, 2009).
Similarly, Head Injury (HI) studies support the interplay of executive functions and 
social cognition. For example, Muller et al. (2010) reported that HI participants (mean 
age 32 years) scored lower than standard scores on strategy generation (Verbal 
Fluency), inhibition (Stroop Test) and mental flexibility (Trail Making Test) and 
significantly lower than a control group on second order false belief tasks, the Faux Pas 
Test and the Eyes Test. Whilst Muller et al. (2010) did not note whether there was a 
significant difference between participants’ executive function and standard scores, 
overall the results indicate HI is associated with deficits in executive function and social
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cognition suggesting some interplay between these processes. Furthermore, Eslinger et 
al. (1992) reported a case study of DT who suffered a haemorrhage at age 7 resulting in 
damage to the left prefrontal network. In childhood DT reached all normal 
developmental milestones, but then experienced a delayed onset o f deficits in 
adolescence including executive functions (planning and cognitive flexibility), empathic 
ability and moral development. Eslinger et al. concluded that executive functions and 
social cognition are closely related due to deficits in both following HI particularly 
during adolescence/early adulthood.
Some studies have reported executive function predictors o f social cognition. Ahmed 
and Miller (2011) administered all D-KEFS Tests (Delis et al., 2001), the Eyes Test 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), Strange Stories (Happe, 1994) and Faux Pas Test (Stone et 
al., 1998) to a sample o f 123 18 to 27 year olds (70 females and 53 males). Ahmed and 
Miller extended previous research by assessing a wider range of executive functions. 
The authors also investigated whether age, gender, ethnicity, family income, 
geographical region raised and Full Scale IQ estimated from the Wechsler Test o f Adult 
Reading (Wechsler, 2001) predicted social cognition task scores. Full Scale IQ 
significantly predicted the Eyes Test scores and gender significantly predicted 
performance on the Faux Pas Test with females scoring higher than males. Executive 
function scores did not predict performance on the Eyes Test. Strategy generation, 
assessed with the Verbal Fluency Test and deductive reasoning, assessed with the Word 
Context Test, significantly predicted performance on the Strange Stories Test. 
Successful strategy generation and deductive reasoning require flexible initiation of 
responses that are vital in social interactions to flexibly initiate behaviour (Ahmed & 
Miller, 2011). Strategy generation, assessed with the Verbal Fluency Test, and concept 
formation, indexed by the number of confirmed correct sorts on the Sorting Test, 
significantly predicted scores on the Faux Pas Test, requiring simultaneous 
consideration o f two people’s mental states. It is possible that working memory may be 
involved in remembering words produced in the Verbal Fluency Test, sorts made on the 
Sorting Test and consideration of two people’s mental states in the Faux Pas Test. These 
findings indicate that different sub-components o f executive function predict separate 
parts o f social cognition. However, the study did not assess some aspects o f social
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Vetter et al. (2013) investigated executive function predictors of social cognition in 139 
participants aged 12 to 23 years. Participants completed executive function tasks of 
inhibition (Antisaccade Task; Miyake et al., 2000), updating (Letter Memory Task; 
Miyake et al., 2000) and shifting (Colour-shape Task; Friedman et al., 2006). The 
Antisaccade Task required participants to focus on a fixation point on a computer screen 
and then inhibit attention to a black square, instead focusing on an arrow presented on 
the other side o f the computer screen and pressing a button to identify the arrow 
direction. Stimuli for the Letter Memory Task, a measure of updating, were lists 5 to 9 
letters long with participants required to recall the last 3 letters in each list. For the 
Colour-shape Task assessing shifting, participants classified objects by colour (green or 
red) or shape (circle or triangle) by pressing a button. Reaction times were recorded and 
a difference in mean reaction time between mixed blocks and single task blocks was 
calculated. Participants also completed the facial scale from the Cambridge 
Mindreading Face-Voice Battery (CAM; Golan et al., 2006), consisting of dynamic, 
silent clips 3 to 5 seconds long showing an actor portraying an emotion, to assess social 
cognition. The authors conducted this study to improve on previous ToM research in 
late adolescence that had small sample sizes (neuroimaging studies e.g. Burnett & 
Blakemore, 2009) and often employed static stimuli or assessed a narrow range o f 
executive functions. Age showed a significant positive correlation with inhibition, 
updating, shifting and CAM task scores indicating that these executive functions and 
mental state understanding in dynamic clips continue to develop between early 
adolescence and early adulthood. Vetter et al. found that inhibition was the only 
significant executive function predictor o f scores on the CAM and suggested that 
inhibition of the first spontaneous guess may be required to allow consideration o f the 
whole clip and a sensible answer to be given. A limitation o f this study is that social 
cognition was only assessed with one task and, whilst the task was dynamic, it omitted 
vocal information and social interaction.
An alternative method for investigating executive function predictors o f social cognition 
is the dual-task paradigm, when participants complete executive function and social
cognition e.g. empathy or social cognition with auditory or dynamic stimuli in this
sample.
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cognition tasks simultaneously. In a study by Bull, Phillips and Conway (2008), 
participants completed the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2001) and Theory o f Mind Stories Task (Happe, 1994; Stone et al., 1998) as single tasks 
and concurrently with inhibition, switching and updating tasks. Participants performed 
significantly worse on the Stories dual task with all executive function tasks compared 
to completing solely the Stories Task, possibly due to sharing attentional skills (Bull et 
al., 2008; McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007). Performance on the Eyes Test was 
significantly lower during inhibition dual task relative to completing the Eyes Test as a 
single task. Bull et al. (2008) concluded that inhibition was crucial to mentalising and 
proposed that when completing the Eyes Test it is necessary to inhibit social attributes 
associated with age and gender that might be automatically activated (Santos & Young, 
2005) and instead focus on mental states.
Previous research therefore shows that ability on some executive function tasks predict 
ability on measures o f social cognition across broad age ranges. For example, strategy 
generation (Letter Fluency Test) and deductive reasoning (Word Context Test) 
significantly predicted Strange Stories Task scores whilst strategy generation (Letter 
Fluency Test) and concept formation (Sorting Test) significantly predicted scores on the 
Faux Pas Test (Ahmed & Miller, 2011). In another study, Vetter et al. (2013) found that 
inhibition, measured by an Antisaccade Task, significantly predicted scores on the 
CAM Facial Task across adolescence and early adulthood. However, reviewed studies 
have assessed social cognition with a limited range of tasks, e.g. lacking dynamic 
stimuli: Reading the Mind in the Eyes, Strange Stories and Faux Pas Tests (Ahmed & 
Miller, 2011) or restricted to only one task (Vetter et al., 2012) and across broad age 
groups.
The effect o f IQ, age, mood and gender was also assessed in the present analyses by 
considering Verbal IQ, Performance IQ, Full scale IQ, age, Positive Affect and 
Negative Affect from the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988), Depression and Anxiety scores 
from the HADS (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) and gender. These were based on previous 
research reviewed in Chapters 1 and 2 that age, gender, IQ, affect, depression and 
anxiety may affect social cognition and executive function task performance. For 
example, Thomas et al. (2007) reported a main effect o f age on an emotion recognition
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task and Choudhury et al. (2006) reported a main effect of age in children, adolescents 
and adults in an emotion Perspective Taking Task. Gender differences have been 
reported on self-report empathy (Demtl et al., 2010). With regard to IQ, Golan et al. 
(2007) reported a significant correlation between WASI Verbal IQ and the Voice Test 
but not the Eyes Test possibly due to the Voice Test requiring more verbal processing 
than the Eyes Test. Ibanez et al. (2013) found that Performance IQ, assessed with Raven 
Progressive Matrices (Raven, 2000) predicted scores on the Eyes Test in early 
adolescence.
Mood has also been shown to affect executive function; capacity limitation theories 
(e.g. Seibert & Ellis, 1991) propose that both positive and negative mood impairs 
executive function by reducing available cognitive resources. In contrast, the “mood as 
information” model suggests that positive mood may result in a heuristic processing 
style that impairs executive function, whilst negative mood increases motivation and 
may lead to improved executive function ability. Phillips, Smith and Gilhooly (2002) 
found that positive mood compared to neutral mood resulted in poorer planning, 
indexed by solving fewer trials in the minimum number o f moves on the Tower o f 
London Task. Phillips, Bull, Adams and Fraser (2002) reported that participants in a 
happy mood showed better strategy generation, assessed with a Verbal Fluency Task, 
relative to participants in a neutral mood. This finding conflicts with the “mood as 
information” model because a broad search space is needed for successful strategy 
generation. Some studies have assessed mood and social cognition. For example, 
sadness related to better performance on the Director Perspective Taking Task 
compared to happiness (Converse et al., 2008) but lower emotion recognition relative to 
neutral mood (Chepenik et al., 2007). Mixed findings are evident for the effects o f 
depression on executive function and social cognition. Favre et al. (2009) found no 
group differences on set shifting (WCST), strategy generation (Letter Fluency) and 
inhibition (Stroop Test), whereas Uekermann et al. (2008) reported a depressed group 
scored lower than a control group on strategy generation (Verbal Fluency). The 
inconsistent findings may be explained by differences in symptom severity and 
measures used. Mild to moderate depression (dysphoria) is associated with greater 
visual emotion recognition accuracy, assessed with the Eyes Test, compared to a control 
group (Harkness et al., 2005). Airaksinen et al. (2005) compared different anxiety sub
groups and found no group differences between controls and participants with 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder on strategy generation (Letter Fluency) whereas 
individuals with obsessive compulsive disorder and panic disorder showed impairments 
on motor tracking (Trail Making Test).
The present study adds to the literature by examining executive function predictors o f 
social cognition using a range of executive function tasks with social cognition assessed 
in different task formats including emotion recognition in static visual stimuli (Eyes 
Test), auditory stimuli (Voice Test), dynamic stimuli (MASC) and self-report empathy 
(IRI). The following executive functions were assessed in the present study: inhibition 
(Hayling Test), rule detection (Brixton Test), strategy generation (D-KEFS Letter 
Fluency), concept formation (D-KEFS Sorting Test) and planning (D-KEFS Tower 
Test). Inhibition might allow a person to inhibit their mental states and consider another 
person’s viewpoint, or to inhibit their first guess and consider the whole clip (Vetter et 
al., 2013) in the MASC. Rule detection could be relevant to social cognition because 
detecting patterns in stimuli may assist with detecting patterns in social situations e.g. 
attending to facial expressions, body language and prosody could result in successful 
mental state understanding. Strategy generation and concept formation may relate to 
social cognition because social situations require flexible initiation of responses (Ahmed 
& Miller, 2011). Planning may relate to social cognition by participants being better 
able to plan how to act in social situations. The age range of participants in the present 
study is more constrained than previous studies to focus more on late adolescence and 
early adulthood when brain maturation is dynamic (Sowell et al., 2001; Gogtay et al., 
2004).
7.2 Method
7.2.1 Participants
This chapter presents data from the same participants as in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. The 
sample at Time 1 consisted o f 98 participants (77 females and 21 males) with 58 
participants (47 females and 11 males) completing the study at Time 2, a mean o f 15 
months (SD = 3.67 months) after Time 1. Age groups were collapsed to allow whole
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group analysis resulting in a mean age at Time 1 o f 18 years 4 months (SD = 9.15 
months) and a mean age at Time 2 of 19 years 6 months (SD = 9.54 months).
7.2.2 Measures
The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale o f Intelligence provided Verbal, Performance and Full 
Scale IQ scores. The Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) and the Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) measured mood state and anxiety and 
depression respectively. Participants completed the Hayling and Brixton Tests assessing 
inhibition and rule detection. Three tests were selected from the D-KEFS: the Letter 
Fluency Test, a measure o f response generation, the Sorting Test, a measure o f concept 
formation and the Tower Test, a measure o f planning. Participants completed social 
cognition tasks assessing emotion recognition in visual static stimuli (Reading the Mind 
in the Eyes Test), auditory stimuli (Reading the Mind in the Voices Test) and dynamic, 
visual and auditory stimuli (Movie for the Assessment o f Social Cognition; MASC) and 
self-report empathy (Interpersonal Reactivity Index; IRI). Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3 shows 
a diagram of the task battery. Alternative versions o f the D-KEFS Letter Fluency and 
Sorting Tests were administered at Time 1 and Time 2 to reduce practice effects.
7.2.3 Plan of analyses
Data analyses explored age, IQ, gender and mood state and executive function 
predictors o f social cognition task scores at Time 1 and Time 2 separately. The variables 
considered were age, gender, Verbal IQ, Performance IQ, Full scale IQ, Positive Affect 
and Negative Affect from the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988), and Depression and 
Anxiety scores from the HADS (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). Other variables, such as 
drug use, were not included as predictors because analyses in Chapter 5.9 indicate that 
drug use does not affect social cognition task scores in the present sample. Correlations 
were conducted between age, IQ and mood state variables (see Appendix section 13) 
and executive function variables (see Appendix section 14) to check for 
multicollinearity, when variables correlate highly (0.8 or above; Dancey & Reidy, 2004; 
Field, 2005). If  variables correlated highly then one variable would be removed 
because a high level o f collinearity indicates that the variables are measuring the same 
construct (Dancey & Reidy, 2004) and would make it difficult to identify which o f the
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two variables contributes more to criterion variable variance (Miles & Shevlin, 2011). 
Full Scale IQ was not included as a predictor in the multiple regression due to high 
multicollinearity with Verbal IQ (r = 0.82,/? <0.01) and Performance IQ (r = 0.80,/? < 
0.01) shown in the correlation matrix in Appendix section 13. Verbal and Performance 
IQ were retained to examine whether different aspects of IQ predict social cognition. It 
is possible that Performance IQ, assessed with block design and matrix reasoning, may 
relate to visual social cognition tasks due to the visuospatial nature of the both 
measures. The correlation matrix in Appendix section 14 shows that the greatest 
correlation between executive function variables was r  = 0.24 for Letter Fluency and 
Brixton Scaled scores showing no indication of multicollinearity and that variables 
assess different aspects o f executive function.
Separate regressions were conducted with Eyes, Voices, MASC Total score, MASC 
excessive mental state inference errors, IRI Fantasy and IRI Personal Distress as 
dependent variables. These tasks assess the following aspects o f social cognition: 
emotion recognition in visual stimuli (Eyes Test), auditory stimuli (Voices Test), and 
dynamic visual and auditory stimuli (MASC Total score). MASC excessive mental state 
inference errors refer to errors when the participant has over-attributed the mental state 
content. These MASC variables are o f interest because Middle and Older groups scored 
higher at Time 2 compared to Time 1 on MASC Total score due to fewer MASC 
excessive inference errors. Other MASC error variables were not included as dependent 
variables in a multiple regression due to small variance. Personal Distress and Fantasy 
were selected from the IRI self-report measure o f empathy because an interaction was 
found between age group and time for Personal Distress and Time 2 group differences 
were evident on the Fantasy scale (Younger and Older groups scored higher than the 
Middle group).
Multiple regressions were conducted for each dependent variable to explore whether 
age, IQ, mood and gender predicted social cognition task performance. The following 
variables were entered into multiple regressions as independent variables: age, gender, 
Verbal IQ, Performance IQ, Positive Affect, Negative Affect, Depression and Anxiety. 
Following this, the age, IQ, gender and mood state variables that significantly predicted 
social cognition were entered into Step 1 to account for any effects and executive
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function task scores (Hayling Scaled, Brixton Scaled, Letter Fluency, Free Sorts 
Description and Tower Achievement Scores) were entered into Step 2 o f hierarchical 
regressions. The forced entry method was used to enter all predictors into regressions 
meaning no decision about the order of variables was required (Field, 2005).
A score from each executive function task was selected to reflect the range o f executive 
functions measured and assess whether inhibition, rule detection, strategy generation, 
concept formation and planning predict social cognition task scores. Executive function 
variables included in the analyses were Hayling Scaled scores, Brixton Scaled scores, 
Letter Fluency scores, Sorting Test free sort description scores and Tower Achievement 
scores. Hayling and Brixton Scaled scores were selected because these are the most 
frequently used measure o f performance for these tasks reported in the literature (Barker 
et al., 2010; Frangou, Donaldson, Hadjulis, Landau & Goldstein, 2005; Joshua, Gogos 
& Rossell, 2009; Wood & Liossi, 2005). Primary measures (Letter Fluency, Free sort 
description score and Tower Achievement scores) were selected from the D-KEFS 
Tests because these are often reported in the literature and provide an overall indication 
of task performance (Strauss et al., 2006).
7.3 Results
Predictors o f Time 1 social cognition data are presented in Section 7.3.1 and Time 2 
data in Section 7.3.3.
7.3.1 Time 1 data
7.3.1.1 Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test: Static visual stimuli
The model with age, IQ, gender and mood state variables as predictor variables and 
Eyes Test score as the dependent variable is presented in Table 7.1.
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Table 7.1. Results of multiple regression analysis for age, IQ, gender and mood
state predictors o f the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test at Time 1
P t P
Age 0.20 1.83 0.072
Gender -0.05 0.52 0.606
Verbal IQ 0.24 2.15 0.035*
Performance IQ 0.18 1.69 0.095
PANAS Positive Affect -0.22 2.08 0.041*
PANAS Negative Affect -0.02 0.17 0.868
HADS Depression -0.11 0.95 0.348
HADS Anxiety -0.03 0.24 0.812
R = 0.44, R '* = 0.19, Adjusted ^  = 0.11
Results presented in Table 7.1 show that the model containing age, IQ, gender and 
mood state variables significantly predicted performance on the Eyes Test (F  (8, 79) = 
2.32, p  = 0.027) and accounted for 11% of variance (Adjusted R 2 = 0.11). Verbal IQ (/? 
= 0.24, t = 2.15, p  = 0.035) positively predicted Eyes Test scores whilst Positive Affect 
negatively predicted Eyes Test scores (/? = -0.22, t = 2.08, p  = 0.041). A hierarchical 
regression was conducted with Verbal IQ and Positive Affect entered into Step 1 and 
executive function variables entered into Step 2 with the Eyes Test score as the 
dependent variable (see Table 7.2).
Table 7.2. Results o f hierarchical multiple regression analysis for the prediction of 
the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test at Time 1
P t P
Model 1 -  IQ and Positive Affect
Verbal IQ 0.24 2.38 0.019*
Positive Affect -0.16 1.63 0.107
Model 2 -  IQ, Positive Affect and executive function predictors
Verbal IQ 0.14 1.30 0.196
Positive Affect -0.11 1.16 0.250
Hayling Scaled 0.05 0.52 0.605
Brixton Scaled 0.33 3.22 0.002*
Letter Fluency 0.06 0.54 0.594
Free sort description score -0.04 0.42 0.675
Tower Achievement score 0.03 0.33 0.743
Model 1: R = 0.29, R2 = 0.08, Adjusted R J = 0.06 
Model 2: R  = 0.44, R2 = 0.19, Adjusted i?2 = 0.13
Results presented in Table 7.2 show that Model 1 significantly predicted Eyes Test
scores ( F (2, 94) = 4.25,/? = 0.017) with Verbal IQ (fl = 0.24, t = 2.38,/? = 0.019) being
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a significant predictor. Model 2 also significantly predicted Eyes Test scores (F  (7, 89) 
= 3.03, p  = 0.007, F change = 2.41, p  = 0.043, R2 change = 0.11) and accounted for 13% 
of variance (Adjusted R2 = 0.13). Rule detection assessed with the Brixton Test (J3 = 
0.33, t = 3.22, p  = 0.002) was a significant predictor. The Brixton Test, a measure o f 
rule detection in a visuospatial format, requires participants to identify the pattern 
followed by a coloured circle on subsequent page turns in an array o f blank circles. 
Successful pattern identification and rule detection could improve emotion recognition 
in visual stimuli because a particular pattern o f facial expressions or body language may 
be associated with a certain mental state. The Brixton and Eyes Tests are also both 
visual tasks.
7.3.1.2 Reading the Mind in the Voice Test: Auditory stimuli
Table 7.3 presents the regression analysis with age, IQ, gender and mood state variables 
as independent variables and scores on the Voice Test as the dependent variable.
Table 7.3 Results of multiple regression analysis for age, IQ, gender and mood 
state predictors o f the Voice Test at Time 1
P t P
Age 0.02 0.22 0.829
Gender -0.05 0.46 0.648
Verbal IQ 0.38 3.43 0.001*
Performance IQ 0.17 1.56 0.122
PANAS Positive Affect -0.04 0.38 0.704
PANAS Negative Affect -0.02 0.19 0.852
HADS Depression 0.11 0.95 0.347
HADS Anxiety
n n  a c  n 2  a j- . . i
-0.09
n2 n
0.78 0.437
R = 0.45, R2 = 0.20, Adjusted R2 = 0.12
The model with age, IQ, gender and mood state variables significantly predicted Voice 
Test scores (F  (8, 80) = 2.50, p  = 0.018) with Verbal IQ being a significant predictor (fl 
= 0.38, t = 3.43, p  = 0.001). A hierarchical regression is presented in Table 7.4 with 
Verbal IQ in Step 1 and executive function task scores in Step 2.
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Table 7.4. Results of m ultiple regression analysis fo r the prediction  of to ta l score
on the Reading the M ind in the Voice Test a t T ime 1
P t P
Model 1 -  IQ
Verbal IQ 0.38 4.04 <0.001*
Model 2 -  IQ and executive function predictors
Verbal IQ 0.32 3.03 0.003*
Hayling Scaled 0.14 1.53 0.130
B rixton Scaled 0.25 2.64 0.010*
Letter Fluency -0.09 0.85 0.396
Free sorts description score 0.07 0.71 0.482
Towers Achievement score
A K  1 1 1  n  r. or, A i r
-0.04
a 1 ■  . , m ---------
0.38 0.703
Model 1: R  =  0.38, R 2 =  0.15, Adjusted R J =  0.14 
Model 2 : R =  0.48, R 2 = 0.23, Adjusted R 2 = 0.18
Results presented in Table 7.4 show  that the model w ith Verbal IQ significantly 
predicted Voice Test scores (F  (1, 96) =  16.32, p  <0.001) w ith Verbal IQ being a 
significant predictor (ft = 0.38, t = 4.04, p  <0.001). The model w ith Verbal IQ and 
executive function variables also predicted Voice Test scores (F  (6, 91) = 4.58, p < 
0.001) w ith Verbal IQ (P = 0.32, t = 3 .03 , p  = 0.003) and rule detection, assessed w ith 
the B rixton Test (ft = 0.25, t = 2.64, p  = 0.010), significantly predicting Voice Test 
scores. Good pattern identification would result in successful rule detection on the 
B rixton Test that m ay be relevant when detecting patterns in auditory stimuli inform ing 
emotion recognition.
7.3.1.3 MASC Total score: Dynamic visual and auditory stimuli
Table 7.5 shows the regression analysis w ith  age, IQ, gender and mood state variables 
entered as predictor variables and MASC Total score as the dependent variable.
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Table 7.5. Results of multiple regression analysis for age, IQ, gender and mood
state predictors o f MASC Total score at Time 1
P t P
Age 0.16 1.42 0.159
Gender -0.20 1.89 0.062
Verbal IQ 0.18 1.64 0.104
Performance IQ 0.23 2.16 0.034*
PANAS Positive affect -0.13 1.28 0.203
PANAS Negative affect 0.07 0.63 0.532
HADS Depression -0.26 2.33 0.022*
HADS Anxiety 0.02 0.17 0.864
R  = 0.45, RJ = 0.21, Adjusted R J = 0.13
Results presented in Table 7.5 show that the model with age, IQ, gender and mood state 
variables significantly predicted MASC Total score (F  (8, 80) = 2.59, p  = 0.014) that 
accounted for 13% of variance (Adjusted R 2 = 0.13). Performance IQ (/? = 0.23, t = 
2.16, p  = 0.034) and HADS Depression scores (fi = -0.26, t = 2.33, p  = 0.022) were 
significant predictors o f MASC Total score.
A hierarchical regression was conducted with Performance IQ and HADS Depression 
scores entered in Step 1 and executive function variables in Step 2 with MASC Total 
score as the dependent variable (refer to Table 7.6).
Table 7.6. Results o f hierarchical multiple regression analysis for the prediction of  
MASC Total score at Time 1
P t P
Model 1: IQ and Depression
Performance IQ 0.24 2.41 0.018*
HADS Depression -0.26 2.60 0.011*
Model 2 : IQ, Depression and executive function predictors
Performance IQ 0.15 1.38 0.173
HADS Depression -0.26 2.66 0.009*
Hayling Scaled -0.07 0.72 0.477
Brixton Scaled 0.17 1.57 0.120
Letter Fluency 0.22 2.17 0.033*
Free sort description score -0.02 0.20 0.841
Tower Achievement score 0.14 1.37 0.176
Model 1: R  = 0.35, RJ = 0.12, Adjusted RJ = 0.10 
Model 2: R  = 0.48, R 2 = 0.23, Adjusted R 2 = 0A7
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Overall, Model 1 was significant (F  (2, 86) = 5.93, p  = 0.004) with Performance IQ 06 = 
0.24, / = 2.41,;? = 0.018) and HADS Depression scores (fl = -0.26, t = 2.60, p  = 0.011) 
significantly predicting MASC Total score. Table 7.6 shows that with the addition of 
executive function variables in Step 2 the model remained significant (F  (7, 81) = 3.49, 
p  = 0.003, F change = 2.33, p  < 0.05, R2 change = 0.11) and accounted for 7% more 
variance than model 1 (Adjusted R2 = 0.17). HADS Depression score 
(/? = -0.26, t = 2.66, p  = 0.009) and strategy generation, assessed with the Letter Fluency 
Test, were significant predictors (J3 = 0.22, f = 2.17,/? = 0.033) o f MASC Total score, an 
assessment of social cognition with dynamic stimuli that included visual and auditory 
information. Successful strategy generation may require flexible behaviour that allows 
participants to work through words beginning with a particular letter in a methodical 
way. Flexible behaviour is relevant in social situations to allow the generalisation of 
concepts to different situations (Ahmed & Miller, 2011).
7.3.1.4 MASC excessive mental state inference errors
The model with age, IQ, gender and mood state variables as predictors o f MASC 
excessive mental state errors is presented in Table 7.7.
Table 7.7. Results of multiple regression analysis for age, IQ, gender and mood 
state predictors of MASC excessive mental state inference errors at Time 1
P t P
Age -0.14 1.23 0.221
Gender 0.33 3.20 0.002**
Verbal IQ -0.16 1.49 0.141
Performance IQ -0.24 2.29 0.025*
PANAS Positive affect 0.05 0.50 0.616
PANAS Negative affect -0.12 1.06 0.291
HADS Depression 0.16 1.45 0.151
HADS Anxiety
n a  n  ^  * i- . _ i
0.09
— TTTa-------
0.78 0.435
Table 7.7 shows that the model with age, IQ, gender and mood state variables 
significantly predicted MASC excessive mental state inference errors (F  (8, 80) = 2.79, 
p  = 0.009, R  = 0.47, R2 = 0.22 Adjusted R2 = 0.14) and accounted for 14% of variance 
(Adjusted R2 = 0.14). Gender (/? = 0.33, t = 3.20,/? = 0.002) and Performance IQ
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(fl = -0.24, t = 2.29, p  = 0.025) were significant predictors o f MASC excessive mental 
state inference errors, w hen mental state content is over-interpreted. M ales (median =
6.00, range = 9.00) made significantly more MASC excessive mental state errors than 
females (median = 5.00, range = 12.00, U =  510.50, z = 2 .6 0 , p  = 0.009, r  = 0.26).
A  hierarchical regression was conducted w ith Performance IQ and Gender in Step 1, 
executive function variables in Step 2 and MASC excessive mental state inference 
errors as the dependent variable (see Table 7.8).
Table 7.8. Results of hierarchical multiple regression analysis for the prediction of 
MASC excessive mental state inference errors at Time 1
p t P
Model 1: IQ and Gender
Performance IQ -0.26 2.79 0.006*
Gender 0.31 3.28 0.001*
Model 2 : IQ , Gender and executive function predictors
Performance IQ -0.19 l . 84 0.069
Gender 0.32 3.28 0.001*
Hayling Scaled -0.01 0.05 0.957
Brixton Scaled -0.06 0.57 0.571
Letter Fluency -0.10 0.97 0.332
Free sort description score -0.15 l . 47 0.145
Tower Achievement score
r. ni ^ !
0.12
r r r - — T75— r r
l . 20 0.198
Model 1: R  =  0.39, R 2 =  0.16, Adjusted R 2 = 0.14 
Model 2: R  =  0.46, R2 = 0.22 ,  Adjusted R2 = 0 .15
Results in Table 7.8 show  that M odel 1 significantly predicted MASC excessive mental 
state errors ( F  (2, 95) = 8.71, p  < 0.001) w ith Performance IQ = -0.26, t  =  2.79, p  = 
0.006) and Gender {ft = 0.31, t  = 3.28, p  = 0.001) being significant predictors. W ith the 
addition o f  executive function variables in Step 2 the model remained significant ( F  (7, 
90) = 3.53, p  = 0.002, F change = 1.39, p  = 0.237, R2 change = 0.06) although this did 
not result in a significant F Change indicating that the addition o f  executive function 
variables did not explain significantly more variance in MASC excessive mental state 
inference errors than model 1. Gender was a significant predictor (/? = 0.32, t  =  3 .28 , p  = 
0.001) whilst no executive function variables significantly predicted MASC excessive 
mental state inference errors.
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7.3.1.5 Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) Fantasy
The model with age, gender and mood state variables as predictors and IRI Fantasy as 
the dependent variable is presented in Table 7.9.
Table 7.9. Results o f multiple regression analysis for age, IQ, gender and mood 
state predictors o f IRI Fantasy at Time 1
P t P
Age 0.02 0.15 0.885
Gender 0.05 0.50 0.617
Verbal IQ 0.15 1.37 0.173
Performance IQ 0.04 0.39 0.698
PANAS Positive affect -0.07 0.65 0.520
PANAS Negative affect -0.10 0.81 0.418
HADS Depression -0.18 1.50 0.137
HADS Anxiety 0.37 3.08 0.003*
R  = 0.38, R J = 0.15, Adjusted R? = 0.06
Whilst the model with age, IQ, gender and mood state variables did not significantly 
predict Fantasy scores (F  (8, 79) = 1.70, p  = 0.112), HADS Anxiety score was a 
significant predictor (fi = 0.37, t = 3.08, p  = 0.003). A hierarchical regression was 
conducted with HADS Anxiety scores in Step 1 and executive function variables in Step 
2 .
Table 7.10. Results of hierarchical multiple regression analysis for the prediction 
of IRI Fantasy at Time 1
P t P
Model 1: Anxiety
Anxiety 0.26 2.53 0.013*
Model 2 : Anxiety and executive function predictors
Anxiety 0.23 2.20 0.031*
Hayling Scaled 0.09 0.88 0.384
Brixton Scaled 0.21 1.99 0.050
Letter Fluency 0.12 1.11 0.269
Free sort description score -0.05 0.49 0.628
Tower Achievement score -0.10 0.91 0.367
Model 1: R  = 0.26, RJ = 0.07, Adjusted R2 = 0.06
Model 2 :R  = 0.38, R2 = 0.15, Adjusted R2 = 0.08
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The results in Table 7.10 show that Model 1 with Anxiety scores (ft = 0.26, t = 2.53, p  = 
0.013) significantly predicted IRI Fantasy scores (F  (1, 86) = 6.38, p  = 0.013). Model 2 
also significantly predicted IRI Fantasy scores (F  (6, 81) = 2.28, p  = 0.043, F  change = 
1.44, p  = 0.220, R  change = 0.08) although Anxiety was the only significant predictor. 
Rule detection, assessed with the Brixton Test, approached significance (ft = 0.21, t = 
1.99, p  = 0.050), with no other executive function variables contributing to IRI Fantasy 
scores. The Brixton Test assesses rule detection in visual stimuli. It is possible that this 
relates to IRI Fantasy, the tendency to associate with characters in books and films, by 
evaluating information e.g. participants evaluate the movement o f coloured circles to 
ascertain the pattern and predict where the coloured circle will move to next. 
Participants who score highly on IRI Fantasy would evaluate characters in books and 
relate to them. Anxiety may predict IRI Fantasy because people who score highly on 
HADS Anxiety may relate to characters in books and films as a coping strategy.
7.3.1.6 IRI Personal Distress
Table 7.11 presents the model with age, IQ, gender and mood state variables as 
predictors and IRI Personal Distress as the dependent variable.
Table 7.11. Results of multiple regression analysis for age, IQ, gender and mood 
state predictors of IRI Personal Distress at Time 1
P t P
Age 0.28 2.57 0.012*
Gender -0.33 3.29 0 . 0 0 1 * *
Verbal IQ 0.05 0.45 0.656
Performance IQ -0.07 0.70 0.488
PANAS Positive affect -0.15 1.52 0.133
PANAS Negative affect 0.16 1.51 0.136
HADS Depression -0.05 0.43 0.671
HADS Anxiety
n  ^  / - - I  W2 r .  *  1 -  ^  1
0.22
A 1 A
2.00 0.049*
R = 0.51, R ' = 0.26, Adjusted R 2 = 0.19
The regression analysis o f age, IQ, gender and mood state variables resulted in a 
significant model that accounted for 19% of variance in IRI Personal Distress (F  (8, 79) 
= 3.53,/? = 0.002, R = 0.51, R2 = 0.26, Adjusted R2 = 0.19). Table 7.11 shows that age 
in months (ft = 0.28, t = 2.57, p  = 0.012), gender (ft = -0.33, t = 3.29, p  = 0.001) and
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HADS Anxiety scores (/? = 0.22, t =  2.00, p  = 0.049) were significant predictors o f  IRI 
Personal D istress scores. Data analysis presented in Chapter 5 showed that females 
(median = 14.50, range = 24.00) scored significantly higher than m ales (median =
10.00, range = 16.00) on Personal D istress ( U  = 440.00, z = 3.15 , p  = 0.002, r  =  0.32) 
indicating females reported greater uneasiness in tense social situations.
A  hierarchical regression w ith age, gender and HADS Anxiety scores entered in Step 1 
and executive function variables entered in Step 2 w ith Personal D istress as the 
dependent variable is presented in Table 7.12.
Table 7.12. Results of hierarchical multiple regression analysis for the prediction 
of IRI Personal Distress at Time 1
(3 t P
Model 1: Age, Gender and Anxiety
Age 0.19 1.91 0.059
Gender -0.33 3.34 0.001*
HADS Anxiety 0.25 2.47 0.016*
Model 2: Age, Gender, Anxiety and executive function predictors
Age 0.17 1.67 0.100
Gender -0.38 3.77 <0.001**
HADS Anxiety 0.28 2.74 0.008**
Hayling Scaled -0.20 2.04 0.045*
Brixton Scaled -0.09 0.92 0.362
Letter Fluency -0.03 0.33 0.745
Free sort description score 0.14 1.30 0.198
Tower Achievement 
T T T T 7 T — T7T T T ~
-0.13
^  - . 1  a  1 -  .  1 r . 2  ^  a  r
1.29 0.201
Model 1: R  = 0.46, R 2 = 0.21, Adjusted R 2 =  0.18 
Model 2: R  =  0.54, R 2 = 0.29, Adjusted R 2 = 0.22
Results o f  the hierarchical regression analysis presented in Table 7.12 showed that 
Model 1 significantly predicted Personal D istress (F (3, 84) = 7.39, p < 0.001) w ith 
gender (p = -0.33, t = 3.34, p = 0.001) and HADS Anxiety scores ((3 = 0.25, t =  2.47, p = 
0.016) being significant predictors. The addition o f  executive function variables in 
model 2 again resulted in a significant model (F (8, 79) = 3.99, p = 0.001, F change = 
1.74, p -  0.134, R2 change = 0.08) w ith gender (P = -0.38, t = 3.77, p < 0.001), HADS 
Anxiety (P = 0.28, t  = 2.74, p =  0.008) and inhibition, indexed by Hayling Scaled score, 
(P = -0.20, t = 2.04, p = 0.045) being significant predictors. Scores on the Hayling Test,
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an assessment o f inhibition, negatively predicted self-report Personal Distress, personal 
feelings of apprehension in stressful situations. A lower level o f Personal Distress 
suggests better social functioning, possibly as a result o f inhibition appeasing the 
situation e.g. inhibition would reduce the likelihood of a person becoming angry or 
upset in a stressful situation.
A summary of predictors o f social cognition task performance is presented in Table 
7.13.
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7.3.2 Summary of Time 1 data
7.3.2.1 Age, IQ, gender and mood state predictors
At Time 1, Verbal IQ predicted scores on the Eyes and Voices Tests, measures of 
emotion recognition in visual static and auditory stimuli, possibly due to the verbal task 
requirements. Performance IQ, assessed with Block Design and Matrix Reasoning, 
positively predicted MASC Total score and negatively predicted MASC excessive 
mental state inference errors. Block design requires the ability to analyse abstract visual 
stimuli and visual-motor coordination and Matrix Reasoning requires visual information 
processing and abstract reasoning (Wechsler, 1999). Performance IQ may relate to the 
MASC by both requiring visual processing. Age predicted self-report Personal Distress, 
the tendency to feel anxious and uneasy in tense interpersonal situations. Gender 
predicted MASC excessive mental state inference errors (males higher) and IRI 
Personal Distress (females higher). Mood state predicted some aspects o f social 
cognition; Positive Affect negatively predicted Eyes Test scores, HADS Depression 
scores negatively predicted MASC Total score and HADS Anxiety scores predicted IRI 
Fantasy and Personal Distress scores indicating that mood state can influence social 
cognition in a non-clinical sample.
13.2.2 Executive function predictors
Rule detection, assessed with the Brixton Test, was a significant predictor o f scores on 
the Eyes and Voices Tests, measures of emotion recognition in visual static and 
auditory stimuli possibly due to shared pattern recognition processes across tasks. 
Strategy generation, assessed with the Letter Fluency Test, predicted MASC Total 
score. No executive function variables significantly predicted scores on the IRI Fantasy, 
indicating that functions assessed in the present study did not contribute to IRI Fantasy. 
Inhibition, assessed with the Hayling Test, negatively predicted IRI Personal Distress.
7.3.3 IQ, gender, mood state and executive function contributions to social 
cognition at Time 2 (M = 15 months, SD = 3.67 months after Time 1)
Correlations between age, IQ and mood state variables at Time 2 are presented in
Appendix section 15. Correlations between executive function variables are presented in
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Appendix section 16. The correlation matrices were inspected for variables with a 
correlation of 0.80 or higher indicating multicollinearity. Age, IQ and mood state 
variables were not correlated above 0.8 indicating no mutlicollinearity. The highest 
executive function correlation was r = 0.30 for Brixton Scaled scores and Tower 
Achievement indicating no multicollinearity for executive function predictors.
7.3.3.1 Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test: Static visual stimuli
The model with age, IQ, gender and mood state variables did not predict scores on the 
Eyes Test (F  (9, 48) = 1.45, p  = 0.193, R  = 0.46, R2 = 0.21, Adjusted R2 = 0.07). A 
multiple regression with executive function scores as predictor variables and the Eyes 
Test as the dependent variable is presented in Table 7.14.
Table 7.14. Results o f multiple regression analysis for the prediction of the 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test at Time 2
P t P
Hayling Scaled -0.08 0.67 0.513
Brixton Scaled 0.19 1.41 0.166
Letter Fluency -0.07 0.51 0.613
Free sorts description score -0.18 1.37 0.176
Tower Achievement score 0.34 2.56 0.014*
Results in Table 7.14 show that the regression model was significant (F  (5, 52) = 2.43,/? 
= 0.047) and accounted for 11% of variance in scores on the Eyes Test (Adjusted R = 
0.11). Planning, indexed by Tower Achievement score, significantly predicted 
performance on the Eyes Test (J3 = 0.34, t = 2.56, p  = 0.014). Completion of the Tower 
Test requires planning and monitoring of behaviour ensuring adherence to task 
instructions (Wagner et al., 2006). Planning and monitoring may relate to social 
cognition because during social interaction people monitor their actions to ensure they 
fulfil their intentions and are appropriate in the current situation (Amodio & Frith, 
2006).
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There were no significant age, IQ, gender or mood state predictors o f performance on 
the Reading the Mind in the Voice Test (F  (9, 48) = 2.06, p  = 0.053). A multiple 
regression with executive function scores as the predictor variables and Voice Test 
score as the dependent variable is presented in Table 7.15.
7.3.3.2 Reading the Mind in the Voice Test: Auditory stimuli
Table 7.15. Results o f multiple regression analysis for the prediction o f the 
Reading the Mind in the Voice Test at Time 2
P t P
Hayling Scaled 0.93 0.67 0.355
Brixton Scaled 0.08 0.55 0.585
Letter Fluency -0.08 0.57 0.572
Free sorts description score <-0.01 <0.01 0.994
Tower Achievement score 0.29 2.08 0.043*
R = 0.35, R2 = 0.12, Adjusted R 2 == 0.04
Whilst the overall model was not significant, (F  (5, 52) = 1.47,/? = 0.215, R = 0.32, R 2
= 0.10, Adjusted R  = 0.09), Tower Achievement score significantly predicted scores on 
the Voices Test (fl = 0.29, t = 2.08, p  = 0.043) and accounted for 4%  o f variance, 
indicating that planning contributes to emotion recognition in auditory stimuli. 
Following the initial regression model, another regression was conducted excluding any 
variables that were not significant to examine whether this resulted in a more 
parsimonious model that accounted for more o f the variance (Field, 2005).
Table 7.16. Results of regression with Tower Achievement scores as the predictor 
variable and Voice Test scores as the dependent variable
P t V
Tower achievement score 0 . 3 2
r .  o  o o  o  1 0  *  J - 1 t ^ 2  o  ™
2 . 5 0 0 . 0 1 5 *
R  = 0.32, R 2 = 0.10, Adjusted R2 = 0.09
The results in Table 7.16 show that Tower Achievement score significantly predicted 
and accounted for 9% of variance of scores on the Voice Test (F  (1, 56) = 6.27, p  = 
0.015, R = 0.32, R 2 = 0.10, Adjusted R1 = 0.09, P  = 0.32, / = 2.50, p  = 0.015).
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Table 7.17 presents the multiple regression w ith demographic predictors o f  MASC 
Total score.
7.3.3.3 MASC to tal score: Dynam ic stimuli showing social in teraction
Table 7.17. Results of multiple regression analysis for age, IQ , gender and mood 
state predictors of MASC Total score at Time 2
0 t P
Age 0.24 1.90 0.063
Gender -0.23 1.90 0.063
Verbal IQ -1.98 1.86 0.070
Performance IQ -1.68 1.62 0.112
Full Scale IQ 3.26 2.01 0.050
PANAS Positive affect -0.13 1.01 0.316
PANAS Negative affect 0.09 0.63 0.529
HADS Depression -0.11 0.64 0.526
HADS Anxiety -0.06 0.37 0.717
R  = 0.60, R 2 = 0.37, Adjusted R 2 = 0.25
Whilst the model w ith age, IQ, gender and mood state variables significantly predicted
MASC Total score overall (F  (9, 48) = 3.07 , p  = 0.006, R  =  0.60, Ru? = 0.36, Adjusted R 2
= 0.25), the individual variables did not significantly predicted MASC Total score
possibly indicating a lack o f  power. Full Scale IQ was a marginally significant predictor
(P = 3.26, t = 2 .01,/? = 0.050) o f  MASC Total score.
A  regression was conducted w ith executive function task scores as independent
variables and MASC Total score as the dependent variable (see Table 7.18).
Table 7.18. Results of multiple regression analysis with executive function
predictors of MASC Total score at Time 2
p t P
Hayling Scaled -0.02 0.13 0.901
Brixton Scaled 0.32 2.40 0.020*
Letter Fluency -0.12 0.90 0.375
Free sorts description score -0.02 0.18 0.857
Tower Achievement score 0.22 1.65 0.105
R  =  0.43, R 2 = 0.18, Adjusted R 2 = 0.11
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The model significantly predicted MASC Total score (F  (5, 52) = 2.35, p  = 0.054) and 
accounted for 11% of variance (Adjusted R  =0 .11) with rule detection, assessed with 
Brixton Scaled scores, being a significant predictor (/? = 0.32, t = 2.40, p  = 0.020) of 
MASC Total score. This finding suggests that pattern recognition could be beneficial 
when identifying the rule on the Brixton Test and this aids mental state attribution in 
dynamic stimuli.
7.3.3.4 MASC excessive mental state inference errors
Age, IQ, gender and mood state variables (F  (9, 48) = 1.38, p  = 0.225) and executive 
function task scores (F  (5, 52) = 1.00, p  = 0.425) did not predict MASC excessive 
mental state inference errors, when mental state content is over-interpreted.
7.3.3.5 IRI Fantasy
Age, IQ, gender and mood state variables did not significantly predict IRI Fantasy 
scores (F  (9, 48) = 1.86, p  = 0.081). Table 7.19 presents the multiple regression with 
executive function variables as predictors and IRI Fantasy as the dependent variable.
Table 7.19. Results of regression analysis with executive function scores as 
predictors of IRI Fantasy at Time 2
P t P
Hayling Scaled 0.06 0.45 0.654
Brixton Scaled 0.08 2.55 0.582
Letter Fluency 0.28 2.10 0.040*
Free sorts description score 0.10 0.77 0.444
Tower Achievement score
r, n -> /-■  n 2  n  a j- A _ t W2
0.05 0.39 0.699
Results presented in Table 7.19 show that whilst the overall model was not significant 
(F  (5, 52) = 1.57, p = 0.185), Letter Fluency was a significant predictor o f Fantasy 
scores (fi = 0.28, t = 2.10 p  = 0.040) and accounted for 5% of variance in IRI Fantasy 
scores (Adjusted R  = 0.05). Following the initial regression model, another regression 
was conducted excluding variables that were not significant to examine whether this 
resulted in a more parsimonious model.
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Table 7.20. Results o f regression analysis with Letter Fluency as the predictor
variab le and IRI Fantasy as the dependent variable
p t P
Letter Fluency 0.32 2.53 0.014*
R  = 0.32, RJ = 0.10, Adjusted R2 = 0.09
Results in Table 7.20 show that Letter Fluency was a significant predictor o f Fantasy 
scores (F  (1, 56) = 6.41, p  = 0.014, R  = 0.32, R2 = 0.10, Adjusted R2 = 0.09, /? = 0.32, t 
= 2.53 p  = 0.014) and accounted for 9% of variance in IRI Fantasy scores (Adjusted R2 
= 0.09).
7.3.3.6 IRI Personal Distress
Table 7.21 presents a multiple regression with IQ, age, gender and mood state variables 
as predictors and IRI Personal distress as the dependent variable.
Table 7.21. Results of multiple regression analysis for age, IQ, gender and mood 
state predictors of IRI Personal distress at Time 2
P t P
Age 0.30 2.21 0.032*
Gender -0.36 2.79 0.008**
Verbal IQ -0.84 0.74 0.461
Performance IQ -1.04 0.95 0.348
Full Scale IQ 1.54 0.89 0.376
PANAS Positive affect -0.21 1.59 0.119
PANAS Negative affect 0.05 0.31 0.756
HADS Depression -0.02 0.12 0.907
HADS Anxiety 0.19 1.06 0.292
R = 0.53, R2 = 0.28, Adjusted R2 = 0.15
The model with IQ, age, gender and mood state variables significantly predicted 
Personal Distress (F  (9, 48) = 2.09, p = 0.049) and accounted for 15% o f variance 
(Adjusted R2 = 0.15). Results presented in Table 7.21 show that age (J3 = 0.30, t = 2.21 
p  = 0.032) and gender {ft = -0.36, t = 2.79 p  = 0.008) were significant predictors o f IRI 
Personal Distress scores. Increasing age was associated with more Personal Distress and
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females (median = 14.00, range = 20.00) scored significantly higher than males (median 
= 10.00, range = 15.00, U=  141.50, z = 2.33, p  = 0.02, r = 0.24).
Table 7.22 presents a multiple regression analysis with executive function scores as 
predictors and IRI Personal Distress as the dependent variable.
Table 7.22. Results of multiple regression analyses with executive function scores 
as predictors o f IRI Personal Distress at Time 2
P t P
Hayling Scaled -0.26 1.97 0.054
Brixton Scaled -0.16 1.16 0.250
Letter Fluency 0.18 1.37 0.178
Free sorts description score -0.08 0.59 0.555
Tower Achievement score
n A  r , 2  n n  a j- j
0.07 0.49 0.624
R = 0.34, R J = 0.11, Adjusted RJ = 0.03
Results presented in Table 7.22 show that the model with executive function task scores 
did not significantly predict IRI Personal Distress scores (F  (5, 52) = 1.33, p  = 0.265), 
although Hayling Scaled was a marginally significant predictor (ft = -0.26, t = \ . 91 p  = 
0.054), supporting the findings at Time 1.
Table 7.23 presents a summary of demographic and executive function predictors at 
Time 2.
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7.3.4 Summary of Time 2 data
7.3.4.1 Age, IQ, gender and mood state predictors
Age, IQ, gender and mood state variables were not significant predictors o f scores on 
the Eyes Test, Voices Test, MASC excessive mental state inference errors and IRI 
Fantasy at Time 2. Full Scale IQ was a marginally significant predictor o f MASC Total 
score. Similar to Time 1, age and gender were significant predictors o f IRI Personal 
Distress, with increasing age associated with greater personal distress and females 
reporting greater personal distress than males.
7.3.4.2 Executive function variables
Planning, indexed by Tower achievement score, was a significant executive function 
predictor o f performance on the Eyes and Voices Tests with better planning ability 
associated with higher scores on emotion recognition tasks with static visual and 
auditory stimuli, possibly due to monitoring o f behaviour. Rule detection, assessed by 
the Brixton Test, significantly predicted MASC Total score with pattern recognition 
being a possible explanation. Strategy generation, assessed with the D-KEFS Letter 
Fluency Test, was a significant predictor o f IRI Fantasy.
7.3.5 Comparing Time 1 and Time 2 predictors
Similarities and differences between Time 1 and Time 2 predictors are now discussed. 
The only similarity is that age and gender significantly predicted IRI Personal Distress 
at both time points. Several differences are evident with some mood state variables and 
executive functions predicting social cognition at only one time point. For example, 
HADS Depression scores predicted MASC Total score and Positive Affect predicted the 
Eyes Test scores at Time 1, but not at Time 2. At Time 1 rule detection, assessed with 
the Brixton Test, significantly predicted scores on the Eyes and Voices Tests, whereas 
at Time 2 rule detection predicted MASC Total score. At Time 2, planning, assessed 
with the Tower Achievement score, significantly predicted scores on the Eyes and 
Voices Tests. A possible explanation for different predictors of Eyes and Voices Tests 
across time points is that at Time 2 participants were less reliant on pattern 
identification due to a more automatic strategy developing in late adolescence and early
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adulthood (Burnett & Blakemore, 2009). A further difference is that at Time 1 
inhibition, assessed with the Hayling Test, significantly predicted IRI Personal Distress, 
but not at Time 2. Different variables may predict social cognition task scores at Time 1 
and Time 2 because of the smaller sample size at Time 2 that may reduce power.
7.4 Discussion
The present findings suggest that different IQ and mood state variables and executive 
functions contribute to performance on social cognition tasks. Disparate executive 
functions predicting scores on social cognition tasks provide evidence for social 
cognition being a multidimensional construct (Dziobek et al., 2006) with different 
cognitive processes contributing to task performance. These findings indicate that social 
cognition is domain general and other cognitive functions, such as executive functions 
and language, contribute to social cognition (Apperly et al., 2005).
Verbal IQ predicted scores on the Eyes Test and Voices Test at Time 1. The finding of 
Verbal IQ predicting scores on the Eyes Test supports Ahmed and Miller (2011), who 
reported that IQ, assessed with the Wechsler Test o f Adult Reading, predicted Eyes Test 
scores. Verbal IQ also predicted scores on the Voices Test replicating the findings of 
Golan et al. (2007). A likely explanation is that the Eyes and Voices Tests require 
verbal processing. Performance IQ predicted MASC Total score and negatively 
predicted MASC excessive mental state inference errors at Time 1. Previous studies 
have often reported Full Scale IQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Dziobek et al., 2006) and 
omitted Performance IQ. The present findings indicate that Performance IQ predicts 
mental state understanding in naturalistic stimuli and could be explained by visuospatial 
abilities.
Age and gender were significant predictors o f Personal Distress, personal feelings o f
apprehension in stressful situations, at both time points. Gender being a significant
predictor of Personal Distress, with females scoring significantly higher than males, is
consistent with gender analysis in Chapter 5 and previous research (Davis, 1983; Demtl
et al., 2010; Kramer et al., 2010). The finding o f increasing age being associated with
greater Personal Distress is inconsistent with Davis and Franzoi (1991) who reported
that Personal Distress decreased in 15 and 16 year olds over three consecutive years.
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The present findings do not support Hoffman’s (1975; 1976) theory o f empathy that 
during childhood Personal Distress and Perspective Taking develop and then Personal 
Distress decreases with age because self-oriented distress is transformed to other 
oriented distress, or Empathic Concern. Increasing Personal Distress with age in the 
present study may be due to the slightly older participants, compared to Davis & 
Fanzoi’s (1991) sample, who experienced changes in education, living arrangements 
and friendship groups.
At Time 1 Positive Affect negatively predicted Eyes Test scores supporting Converse et 
al. (2008) who reported participants induced to feel happy scored lower than sad 
participants on a modified false belief task and the Director Perspective Taking Task, 
indicating poorer Theory of Mind and more egocentric behaviour. Greater Positive 
Affect predicting lower Eyes Test scores supports the “mood as information” model 
whereby positive mood leads to a heuristic processing style (Park & Banaji, 2000) that 
is not rigorous and results in shortcuts (Mitchell & Phillips, 2007). A heuristic 
processing style may explain the poorer performance on the Eyes Test associated with 
Positive Affect.
At Time 1 HADS Depression scores negatively predicted MASC Total scores. The 
finding of depression being associated with poorer social cognition task performance 
supports Uekermann et al. (2008) who reported participants with depression were 
impaired on affective and cognitive aspects o f humour processing in a social cognition 
stories task relative to controls. Furthermore, participants with major depressive 
disorder scored lower on the MASC than a control group with group differences not 
thought to be due to deficits in attention, short term memory or Verbal IQ (Wolkenstien, 
Schonenberg, Schirm & Hautzinger, 2011). MASC Total scores correlated with number 
of categories completed on the WCST, a measure o f concept formation, indicating that 
poorer mental state understanding could be due to deficits in executive function. The 
depressed group scored similarly to the control group on the Eyes Test, a measure of 
emotion recognition, so it is possible that participants experienced difficulties in 
integrating contextual information in the MASC (Wolkenstien et al., 2011).
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The finding that executive functions contribute to social cognition partly supports the 
SOCIAL model (Beauchamp & Anderson, 2005) that proposed internal factors (e.g. 
personality), external factors (e.g. family environment) and executive functions 
(attentional control, cognitive flexibility and goal setting) influence social cognition. 
Current findings extend the SOCIAL model by informing that rule detection (Brixton 
Test), strategy generation (Letter Fluency), inhibition (Hayling Test) and planning 
(Tower Test) contribute to different aspects of social cognition. The findings also 
support Tager-Flusberg’s framework (2001) consisting of social-perceptual and social- 
cognitive components o f Theory of Mind (see Chapter 3.5). The Eyes and Voices Test 
are considered to assess the social-perceptual component, requiring interpretation of 
information from faces and voices. The MASC is considered an assessment o f social 
perceptual processes to interpret facial expressions, speech and body language and 
social cognitive processes to remember what has happened in previous scenes. At Time 
1, rule detection (Brixton Test) predicted scores on the Eyes and Voices Tests, assessing 
the social perceptual component, and strategy generation (Letter Fluency) predicted 
MASC Total score, assessing social perceptual and social cognitive Theory o f Mind. 
Flexible behaviour would result in good performance on strategy generation and the 
MASC. Perhaps strategy generation predicts the MASC not the Eyes and Voices Tests 
because the MASC is a closer approximation to real life social situations by requiring 
consideration of facial information, vocal information, speech, body language and 
memory.
A notable finding is that rule detection, assessed with the Brixton Test, was a significant 
predictor at Time 1 for emotion recognition in visual static stimuli (Eyes Test) and 
emotion recognition in auditory stimuli (Voices Test) and at Time 2 for mental state 
attribution in dynamic stimuli (MASC Total score). The Brixton Test assessed rule 
detection and requires the ability to successfully identify patterns. Rule detection might 
be utilised to assess patterns in social cognition e.g. a person may notice a certain 
expression relates to a particular emotion so they can respond in an appropriate way. 
This may be attributed to configural processing (Maurer, Le Grand & Mondloch, 2002) 
when relations between features o f a stimulus are perceived.
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Higher scores on the Hayling Test at Time 1, indicating better inhibition, were 
associated with lower Personal Distress, personal feelings of apprehension in stressful 
situations. It is plausible that better inhibition was associated with lower Personal 
Distress due to another mediating factor such as coping. Matud (2004) reported that 
emotional inhibition, assessed with the Emotion Control Questionnaire (Roger & 
Najarian, 1989) positively correlated with emotional coping, assessed with the Coping 
Styles Questionnaire (Roger, Jarvis & Najarian, 1993). Therefore better inhibition may 
be associated with more successful emotional coping resulting in lower Personal 
Distress.
At Time 2 strategy generation, assessed with the Letter Fluency Task, significantly 
predicted Fantasy scores, the tendency to relate to characters in books, films and plays. 
To complete the Letter Fluency Task, participants must flexibly initiate responses to 
provide a series of words starting with the same letter (Ahmed & Miller, 2011). 
Cognitive flexibility, assessed with the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Heaton et al., 
1993), alternate uses (Lezak, 1993) and design fluency (Jones-Gotman & Milner, 1977) 
significantly correlated with cognitive empathy, comprising IRI Fantasy and Perspective 
Taking scales (Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Goldsher, Bergen & Aharan-Peretz, 2004). 
Davis (1983) proposed that people who scored highly on the Fantasy scale may 
frequently engage with books and films. Frequent engagement with books and films 
could improve cognitive flexibility because several characters must be considered 
simultaneously to understand the plot and this may be beneficial for performance on the 
Letter Fluency Task.
The finding of some executive functions contributing to performance on social 
cognition tasks may be explained by executive functions and social cognition sharing 
some common neural substrates (Hughes & Ensor, 2007). For instance, the Brixton Test 
was a significant predictor o f the Eyes Test at Time 1 and MASC Total score at Time 2, 
with similar brain regions associated with these tasks. Performance on the Brixton Test 
often results in a guess about where the blue circle will move to in the first move, 
followed by a rule search when there may be incorrect responses and then ideally the 
rule is discovered. The rule search is associated with activation in the mid dorsolateral 
prefrontal networks and rule following is associated with activation in temporal, motor
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and medial/anterior prefrontal networks (Crescentini et al., 2011). The Eyes Test is 
associated with activation in the posterior temporal sulcus (Moor et al., 2011) and the 
MASC is associated with activation in temporal and prefrontal networks (Wolf et al., 
2010). Therefore, the Brixton Test and Eyes Test both utilise temporal networks and the 
Brixton Test and MASC utilise medial prefrontal and temporal networks.
Another plausible explanation is that executive functions predict social cognition task 
performance because social cognition tasks are not process pure and require executive 
function (Dziobek et al., 2006; Heavey et al., 2000; Hughes & Ensor, 2007). Baron- 
Cohen et al. (1997) suggested that the Eyes Test did not involve executive functions. 
However, the present results indicate that the Brixton Test predicted scores on the Eyes 
Test at Time 1 and Tower achievement score predicted scores on the Eyes Test at Time 
2. Tasks may share working memory processes and that could be the process 
contributing to ability across tasks. Working memory might be involved in considering 
a person’s current and previous mental states (Vetter et al., 2013), keeping in mind the 
pattern of the coloured circle in the Brixton Test and re-designing plans in the Tower 
Test according to whether the goal is attained.
Whilst inhibition has been found to predict performance on appearance reality and false 
belief tasks in childhood (Carlson, Moses & Claxton, 2004), Ahmed and Miller (2011) 
found inhibition did not predict performance on the Eyes, Strange Stories or Faux Pas 
Tests in adults. Following Apperly et al. (2009) that some executive functions may be 
required in social cognition development during childhood and not in adulthood, this 
suggests inhibition is crucial while social cognition is developing but not during 
adulthood, although Ahmed & Miller (2011) noted that inhibition may be necessary for 
other social cognition tasks not employed in their study. Present findings indicate that 
inhibition does predict social cognition in adulthood, specifically IRI Personal Distress 
at Time 1, supporting Vetter et al. (2013) who found inhibition predicted scores on the 
CAM Facial Task. Whilst in childhood, planning assessed with the Tower o f Hanoi, did 
not contribute to performance on appearance reality and false belief tasks (Carslon et 
al., 2004), in the present adult data planning assessed with the D-KEFS Tower Test 
predicted scores on the Eyes and Voices Tests at Time 2. Therefore these data indicate 
possible differential contribution of executive functions to social cognition task
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performance over childhood and late adolescence / early adulthood and suggest that 
inhibition predicts social cognition in childhood (Carlson et al., 2004) and late 
adolescence (Time 1) whilst planning predicts social cognition in early adulthood (Time 
2).
To conclude, the analyses in this chapter show that different IQ, mood state and 
executive function variables predict performance on social cognition tasks assessing 
emotion recognition in visual static (Eyes Test), auditory (Voices Test), dynamic visual 
and auditory stimuli (MASC) and self-report empathy (IRI). The present study extends 
Ahmed and Miller’s (2011) findings by examining a wider range o f social cognition 
tasks. Executive functions may predict social cognition due to similar neural substrates 
associated with task performance or due to task impurity (Hughes & Ensor, 2007).
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Chapter 8 
General discussion
8.1 Chapter overview
This chapter will summarise the main findings o f Time 1 cross sectional data, Time 2 
cross sectional data, longitudinal analyses and executive function predictors o f social 
cognition. Findings will be discussed in relation to previous studies and theories. 
Following this, implications o f the research including Head Injury rehabilitation, social 
cognition assessment, education and the concept o f adolescence will be discussed and 
then limitations and future research ideas will be outlined.
Previous research into executive function and social cognition has focused on childhood 
(Golan et al., 2008: age 8-12; Pennequin et al., 2010: age 4-7), middle adolescence 
(Prencipe et al., 2011: age 8-15) or wide age ranges in adulthood (Ahmed & Miller, 
2011: age 18-27; Barker et al., 2010: age 20-59; Dumontheil, Apperly & Blakemore, 
2010: age 19-27; Dziobek et al, 2006: age 22-62). However, the use o f wide age ranges 
may mask non-linear development o f functions (peak in ability followed by a trough). 
Subsequently, fine-grained age groups were selected following the previous 
recommendation that broad age groups decrease sensitivity (De Luca et al., 2003).
In Chapter 3, executive function and social cognition tasks were reviewed and a 
rationale given for the selected task battery. The Hayling and Brixton Tests (Burgess & 
Shallice, 1997) assessed inhibition and rule detection respectively. The D-KEFS Letter 
Fluency, Sorting and Tower Tests assessed strategy generation, concept formation and 
planning (Delis et al., 2001). Social cognition tasks included the Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and Reading the Mind in the Voice Test 
(Golan et al., 2007) to assess emotion recognition in static visual and auditory stimuli. 
The MASC (Dziobek et al., 2006) provided a dynamic measure o f social cognition 
including social interaction and the IRI (Davis, 1983) assessed self-report empathy.
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8.2 Summary of overall findings
8.2.1 Time 1 cross sectional results
Chapter 4 described IQ and mood state cross sectional data when participants aged 17 
years 0 months -  17 years 8 months, 18 years 0 months -  18 years 8 months and 19 
years 0 months -  19 years 8 months completed executive function and social cognition 
tasks. Age groups did not differ on Full Scale IQ or drug and alcohol use indicating that 
these did not contribute to observed age group differences on some executive function 
tasks. Seventeen and 18 year olds scored significantly higher than 19 year olds on 
Negative Affect, although scores are similar to normative PANAS data by Crawford 
and Henry (2004). Seventeen and 18 year olds scored significantly higher than 19 year 
olds on the Anxiety scale of the HADS (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) although scores fell 
within the mild range or lower. Seventeen and 18 year olds had experienced more 
changes to friendship groups and living arrangements in the preceding 12 months.
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 show a summary of Time 1, Time 2 and longitudinal executive 
function data analyses.
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Chapter 5 presented Time 1 cross sectional executive function and social cognition data. 
The main findings are that executive functions and social cognition follow divergent 
developmental trajectories in late adolescence and early adulthood. At Time 1, some 
functions showed no age group differences (inhibition, rule detection, planning, self- 
report empathy and emotion recognition from visual static, auditory and dynamic 
stimuli) whereas there was evidence of developmental change indicating a non-linear 
trajectory for response generation and concept formation, specifically between 17 and 
18 years. Response generation and concept formation, assessed with the D-KEFS Letter 
Fluency and Sorting Tests, showed a peak at age 17, dip in performance at age 18 and 
slight upturn in ability on these measures in the 19 year old group, although the 
difference between 18 and 19 year olds was not significant. Seventeen year olds scored 
significantly higher than 18 year olds on a number o f indices o f concept formation: 
number o f free sorts correct, free sort description score, sort recognition description 
score and perceptual sorts description score.
In a meta-analysis o f executive function studies, Romine and Reynolds (2005) 
concluded that strategy generation (Verbal Fluency Test) continues to develop between 
17 and 22 years. In the present study, strategy generation (Letter Fluency Test) showed 
non-linear development with 17 year olds scoring significantly higher than 18 year olds. 
The difference in findings may be due to the present study employing a design with 
more fine-grained age ranges that enabled the identification of non-linear development.
Non-linear development of performance on the D-KEFS Sorting Test supports Kalkut et 
al. (2009) who reported that 18-24 year olds scored worse than 16-17 year olds on D- 
KEFS Sorting Test description scores. The present results extend previous findings by 
identifying that the dip in performance occurs specifically at age 18 and indicates that 
non-linear development is evident on free sorts correct and free sort description score.
Analyses in Chapter 6 compared 18 year olds at Time 1 with 18 year olds at Time 2 to 
examine whether group differences were due to the sample. Eighteen year olds at Time 
1 scored significantly higher than 18 year olds at Time 2 on sort recognition description
8.2.1.1 Executive function
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score and description score for perceptual sorts, indicating that group differences on 
these indices may be due to the sample. No cohort group differences were found on 
Letter Fluency, free sorts correct or free sorts description score indicating that group 
differences between 17 and 18 year olds are age effects and not due to the sample.
Non-linear development may reflect several dynamic maturational processes including 
synaptic pruning, increased white matter connectivity (Lebel et al., 2008; Paus, 2005; 
Sowell et al., 2003) and functional synchronisation (Uhlhaas et al., 2009). During 
adolescence, long range fibres are myelinated, leading to connectivity between distant 
brain regions (Uhlhaas et al., 2010). In an EEG study with participants aged 6 to 21, 
Uhlhaas et al. (2009) found performance on a perception task improved until early 
adolescence accompanied by increases in neural synchrony of theta, beta and gamma 
frequencies. Groups o f 6-8, 9-11, 12-14, 15-17 and 18-21 year olds were compared and 
a dip in performance was evident in 15 to 17 year olds with a concurrent decrease in 
beta neuronal synchrony. Following this, synchrony improved and synchronisation 
patterns changed from widespread to focal activations. In addition, beta phase 
synchronisation was strengthened between parietal and occipital regions and theta phase 
synchronisation increased in frontal brain regions and between anterior and posterior 
regions. Uhlhaas et al. concluded that there is a transitory destabilisation o f functions 
during late adolescence due to functional network re-organisation. The non-linear 
development o f strategy generation and concept formation in the present research may 
parallel neural re-organisation with a transitory destabilisation of select functions 
followed by adult levels o f task performance due to further maturation o f neural 
networks.
It is possible that non-linear development o f strategy generation and concept formation 
may be due to interplay of maturational, social and environmental factors (Taylor et al., 
2013). Seventeen and 18 year olds reported greater changes to living arrangements and 
friendship groups during the previous 12 months, indicating greater environmental 
change. Tuvblad et al. (2013) reported that non-shared environmental factors 
contributed to 54% of variance in Iowa Gambling Test scores at age 16-18, indicating 
that environmental factors influence individual differences in decision making during 
adolescence. Non-shared environmental influences are not shared by all members o f the
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same family (Plomin et al., 2001) and include differences between siblings in their 
relationships with each other, their peers and their parents and also events specific to the 
individual, e.g. illness and accidents (Hughes et al., 2005).
Another plausible explanation for 17 year olds showing better strategy generation and 
concept formation compared to 18 year olds is that the younger age group may have 
found participating in research at university to be an unusual and novel experience, 
whereas the 18 and 19 year old groups were primarily university Psychology students. 
Executive function is thought to be associated with creativity (Benedek, Franz, Heene & 
Neubauer, 2012; Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony & Wynn, 2007). Ritter et al. (2012) 
reported that active engagement in an unusual event facilitated creativity, assessed with 
the Unusual Uses Task (Guilford, 1967) when participants gave as many responses as 
possible in one minute to a question e.g. “What makes a sound?” In one study, 
participants experienced either a virtual reality environment that distorted speed and 
size o f objects, a normal virtual reality environment or watched a film with distortions 
of speed and size. Participants in the distorted virtual reality environment scored 
significantly higher in the Unusual Uses Task, indicating better cognitive flexibility, 
compared to participants who had experienced a normal virtual reality environment and 
watched a film. A second study employed an alternative paradigm and included a group 
who actively violated a schema about breakfast making and a group who followed a 
normal schema. Participants who had actively engaged in a different activity and broke 
their breakfast making schema showed better cognitive flexibility relative to participants 
who had followed a normal schema. Ritter et al. (2012) suggested that unusual events 
lead to a thinking style characterised by cognitive flexibility. Therefore 17 year olds 
may have found participating in research at a university to be an unusual and novel 
experience, resulting in a thinking style characterised by cognitive flexibility that 
enhanced strategy generation and concept formation. Furthermore, 17 year olds could 
have been more motivated when participating compared to 18 and 19 year olds. Pessoa
(2009) suggested that motivation re-allocates attentional resources to focus on the 
present task, possibly leading to enhanced behavioural performance on executive 
function tasks.
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Group differences in strategy generation and concept formation between 17 and 18 year 
olds may be explained by academic preference. Doherty and Mair (2012) compared 
participants aged 16 to 18 years who had a preference for Science subjects with 
participants who preferred Social Science subjects on three versions o f the Ambiguous 
Figures Test (vase / faces, duck / rabbit and the Necker cube), a measure o f creativity. 
Participants with a preference for Science subjects attained a higher number of 
reversals, alternative interpretations o f the ambiguous figure, relative to participants 
with a preference for Social Sciences. Doherty and Mair (2012) suggested that the 
findings would likely be replicated on performance of the Alternative Uses Task. As 
creativity has been associated with executive function, specifically strategy generation 
assessed with the Letter Fluency Task (Gilhooly et al., 2007), it is possible that 17 year 
olds scored significantly higher than 18 year olds because they differed in academic 
preference. Forty five per cent o f 17 year olds were taking AS Levels and 52% were 
studying for A2 Levels, when a range of subjects are studied. Therefore, it is possible 
that the 17 year olds were studying more Science based subjects than the 18 and 19 year 
olds who were mostly Psychology degree students. However, it is not clear whether 
academic preference leads to more reversals on the Ambiguous Figures Test or reversal 
influences academic preference (Doherty & Mair, 2012).
Romine and Reynolds (2005) reported no change on set maintenance (categories 
achieved) and perseverative errors on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test after age 14. 
However, in the present Time 1 cross sectional data, Chi square analyses showed that 
perseverative sorts decreased with age, indicating more accurate concept formation. It is 
possible the inconsistent findings are due to the different tasks employed because in the 
WCST participants must only remember the current sorting rule (Strauss et al., 2006) 
whereas in the D-KEFS Sorting Test participants must remember all previous sorts. 
Leshem and Glicksohn (2007) found that greater impulsivity was associated with more 
WCST perseverative errors so the decrease in D-KEFS Sorting Test perseverative errors 
with age may be related to a decrease in impulsivity.
8.2.1.2 Social cognition
Table 8.3 summarises Time 1, Time 2 and longitudinal social cognition data analyses.
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No age group differences were evident on social cognition tasks at Time 1 indicating 
that the functions assessed in the present study are relatively stable in late adolescence 
and early adulthood. Imaging studies have found that different neural regions are 
recruited during social cognition task performance with a shift from frontal to posterior 
regions between adolescence and adulthood. Moor et al. (2010) found that performance 
on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test recruited different neural substrates in 
children, adolescents and adults. Performance was associated with activation in medial 
prefrontal networks only in early adolescence (10 to 12 years), not mid adolescence (14 
to 16 years) or adulthood (19 to 23 years), although the posterior superior temporal 
sulcus was recruited in all age groups. The adult group also recruited the inferior frontal 
gyrus, indicating that different neural substrates contribute to performance on this task 
between adolescence and adulthood. Sebastian et al. (2012) proposed that the medial 
prefrontal cortex may be associated with social cognition during childhood, and 
recruited less in adulthood when social cognitive functions may be more automatic. 
There is extensive evidence that myelination occurs in a posterior to anterior direction 
(Kinney et al., 1994; Lebel et al., 2008; Sowell et al., 2003; Yakovlev & Lecours, 1967) 
so that occipital networks and posterior frontal networks mature earlier than anterior 
networks which might explain why no age group differences were evident in late 
adolescence on social cognition measures in the current study.
There were gender differences on social cognition tasks with females making fewer 
excessive mental state inference errors on the MASC compared to males possibly due to 
females being more accurate at recognising emotions portrayed at mid intensity 
(Hoffman et al., 2010) as they are in the MASC that approximates real life social 
situations. Females also rated themselves significantly higher than males on the 
Empathic Concern and Personal Distress scales o f the IRI supporting previous research 
(Banissy et al., 2012; Davis, 1983; Demtl et al., 2010; Kramer et al., 2010). Possible 
explanations are that participants conformed to gender stereotypes (Demtl et al., 2010) 
or social desirability (Laurent & Hodges, 2009).
The effect o f puberty on executive function and social cognition task performance was 
examined by comparing participants who had reported completing puberty on the Self- 
Administered Rating Scale for Pubertal Development with those who had not. For the
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sample overall there were no group differences on executive function or social cognition 
tasks indicating that stage of pubertal development did not contribute to age group 
differences on task performance. Burnett et al. (2011) found a relationship between 
pubertal development and emotion understanding in participants aged 9 to 16 years. 
Studies that found no relationship between pubertal development and performance on 
an emotion recognition task (Thomas et al., 2007; 14 to 18 year olds) and executive 
function tasks (Magar, Hosie & Phillips, 2010; 11 to 17 year olds) had participants o f a 
closer age to the present study. Participants in the Burnett et al. (2011) study were 
younger than in the present study, indicating that hormones influence social cognition 
more around puberty than later in adolescence. In the 19 year old group, participants 
who had finished puberty scored lower on the MASC than those who were still 
progressing. During adolescence, there is a drive for peer acceptance and an increase in 
sensitivity to peer evaluation (Scherf, Behrmann & Dahl, 2011; Sebastian et al., 2010). 
A plausible explanation for this finding is that participants who had not finished puberty 
experienced an urge for peer acceptance and as a result were more successful at 
attributing mental states in the naturalistic clips of the MASC. Following the 
development o f social cognition around puberty (Burnett et al., 2011; McGivem et al.,
2002), the present social cognition data suggest that social cognition is relatively stable 
by late adolescence.
8.2.2 Time 2 cross sectional results
Time 2 age groups were re-named Younger, Middle and Older groups because some 
participants changed age groups due to different time intervals between testing. 
Younger, Middle and Older refers respectively to participants who were originally in 
17, 18 and 19 year old groups at Time 1.
Analyses comparing Younger, Middle and Older groups at Time 2 showed that the
Younger group scored significantly higher, indicating better strategy generation, than
the Middle group on the Letter Fluency Test. This group difference was evident at Time
1 indicating that the group differences on Letter Fluency scores may be due to the
sample and not age related change, e.g. the Younger group finding the study an unusual
and novel experience or being more motivated resulting in better executive function
relative to the other groups (Ritter et al., 2012; Pessoa, 2009). The Younger group
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scored significantly lower on free sort %  accuracy, indicating poorer concept formation, 
relative to the Older group. Non-linear development is evident with the Younger group 
showing a significantly quicker time per move compared to the Middle and Older 
groups on the Tower Test. Protracted myelination into late adolescence may result in 
faster reaction times due to the myelin sheath increasing transmission speed around 
brain regions (Sowell et al., 2001). The increase in time per move in the Middle group 
could be explained by disruption due to neural re-organisation (Uhlhaas et al., 2009). 
The group difference on time per move could be due to an executive function difference 
or underpinned by faster processing speed due to more effective neural connectivity. 
Kochunov et al. (2010) reported that processing speed was associated with white matter 
integrity in frontal regions and this continues to develop into late adolescence and early 
adulthood (Schmithorst & Yuan, 2010).
The only social cognition group difference was found on IRI Fantasy with the Younger 
group scoring significantly higher than the Middle group and the Older group on this 
measure. However, Davis (1983) commented that the Fantasy scale was the least 
theoretically driven of the IRI subscales, being more related to Verbal IQ than social 
functioning. Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004) suggested that the Fantasy scale 
assesses imagination or emotional self-control and whilst these may correlate with 
empathy, the Fantasy scale may not assess empathy.
Time 2 cross sectional group differences were analysed between 18, 19 and 20 year olds 
on executive function and social cognition tasks. Twenty year olds attained significantly 
higher free sort % accuracy on the D-KEFS Sorting Test indicating a more accurate 
concept formation strategy, compared to 18 year olds. This supports existing adult data 
(Greve et al., 1995) indicating that concept formation improves into early adulthood.
Executive functions o f inhibition, rule detection and planning showed no group 
differences at Time 1 and Time 2. Other factors may contribute to executive function 
scores that showed no age group differences including individual differences in 
attention (Friedman et al., 2007; Magar et al., 2010). Friedman et al. (2008) reported a 
substantial genetic component to inhibition, updating and shifting, although the authors 
acknowledged that environmental factors can also influence executive functions e.g. a
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person with good executive functions may select a suitable environment to further 
develop executive functions.
8.2.3 Longitudinal results
The Younger and Middle age groups had a significantly longer time interval between 
testing compared to the Older age group. Uneven time interval can be accounted for in 
analysis by using this variable as a covariate (Locascio & Atri, 2011). As a covariate 
should have a linear relationship with the dependent variable (Dancey & Reidy, 2004), 
correlations were conducted between time interval and task change scores to examine 
whether time interval would be a suitable covariate. Perspective Taking change score 
and time interval showed a significant correlation with no other correlations significant. 
This indicated that time interval was not a suitable covariate because there was not a 
linear relationship for the majority o f variables and varying time interval did not 
contribute to change score. Repeated measures ANOVAs using a within subjects factor 
o f Time 1 and Time 2 task scores and a between group factor o f age group at Time 1 
(17, 18 and 19 year olds) were conducted because they allow between group 
comparisons, comparisons across time points and interactions to be examined.
8.2.3.1 Executive function
Longitudinal changes were evident on the Hayling and Brixton Tests (Middle and Older 
groups) with higher scores indicating better inhibition and rule detection at Time 2 
compared to Time 1. The Younger group scored significantly higher on the Letter 
Fluency Test o f strategy generation at Time 2 compared to Time 1. There were several 
significant longitudinal changes on the D-KEFS Sorting Test, a measure o f concept 
formation, with lower scores at Time 2 compared to Time 1 evident on free sort 
description score (Younger group), sort recognition description score (Younger and 
Older groups) and description score for perceptual sorts (Younger, Middle and Older 
groups). Longitudinal changes were evident on the D-KEFS Tower Test measure o f 
planning including number o f towers completed (Middle group higher, indicating better 
planning, at Time 2), tower achievement (Older group higher, indicating better 
planning, at Time 2), mean first move time (Younger and Older groups shorter at Time 
2) and time per move (Younger, Older and Middle groups shorter at Time 2).
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Given the non-linear findings for concept formation and strategy generation at Time 1 
with 18 year olds scoring significantly lower than 17 year olds, it could be expected to 
find that the Younger age group would score significantly lower on Sorting and Letter 
Fluency Tests at Time 2 than at Time 1. Indeed, the Younger age group scored 
significantly lower at Time 2 compared to Time 1 on free sort description score, sort 
recognition description score and description score for perceptual sorts. However, the 
Middle and Older groups also scored significantly lower on description score for 
perceptual sorts and 19 year olds scored lower on sort recognition description score at 
Time 2 relative to Time 1 indicating the Time 2 cards may have been more challenging 
than the Time 1 cards. Non-linear findings were not evident between time points on the 
Letter Fluency Test with the Younger group scoring significantly higher at Time 2 
compared to Time 1. Romine and Reynolds (2005) reported that Verbal Fluency and 
planning continue to develop into early adulthood. The present longitudinal data 
analyses support Romine and Reynolds (2005) and the notion o f Letter Fluency 
continuing to develop into early adulthood. Whilst there were no age group differences 
at Time 1 or Time 2, longitudinal analyses showed better performance at Time 2 
compared to Time 1 on the D-KEFS Tower Test for number o f towers completed 
(Middle group), achievement score (Older group), mean first move time (Younger and 
Older groups) and time per move (all age groups), again supporting Romine and 
Reynolds (2005).
8.2.3.2 Social cognition
For social cognition, no longitudinal change was evident on the Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes or Voice Tests. Total MASC score showed significant longitudinal change with 
Middle and Older groups scoring higher at Time 2 due to fewer MASC excessive 
inference mental state errors. These findings can be considered in relation to Tager- 
Flusberg’s (2001) conceptual framework, consisting o f social-perceptual and social- 
cognitive components o f ToM. The Eyes and Voices Tests are considered assessments 
of social-perceptual ToM, understanding and interpreting information from faces, 
voices and body posture and attributing mental states. The MASC is considered to 
assess social-perceptual and social-cognitive components o f ToM. Social-cognitive
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ToM refers to the use o f information over time and events in the attribution of mental 
states. The present findings indicate that social-cognitive ToM development is more 
protracted than social-perceptual, supporting the notion of social-perceptual and social- 
cognitive ToM components having different developmental trajectories (Tager- 
Flusberg, 2001).
The Social Information Processing Network (Nelson et al., 2005) reviewed in Chapter 1 
posits that social information processing involves detection, affective and cognitive 
regulatory nodes. The cognitive-regulatory node, comprised of the medial and dorsal 
prefrontal networks and the orbitofrontal network, involved in mental state 
understanding, inhibition of prepotent responses and generation of goal-directed 
behaviour, is considered to have the most protracted development into late adolescence. 
This model is partly supported by the longitudinal data analyses showing that Middle 
and Older groups scored significantly higher on the MASC at Time 2. Development of 
inhibition is partly supported by the longitudinal data showing that Middle and Older 
groups scored significantly higher on the Hayling Test, indicating better inhibition, at 
Time 2 compared to Time 1.
It is o f note that the cross sectional and longitudinal analyses are not consistent. For 
example, results of Time 1 and Time 2 cross sectional data analyses showed no group 
differences on the Tower Test measure o f planning. Longitudinal analyses showed that 
the Middle age group completed significantly more towers and the Older group attained 
a higher Achievement score at Time 2, indicating better planning, compared to Time 1. 
Longitudinal and cross sectional findings are sometimes not consistent because cross 
sectional analyses show inter-individual (group) differences, whereas longitudinal 
analyses show intra-individual change (Schaie, 2005). Furthermore, Schaie (2005) 
considered cross sectional age comparisons are only appropriate in a stable 
environment. The stability o f the environment could be questioned in the present sample 
because participants reported considerable changes to living arrangements and 
friendship groups.
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8.2.4 IQ, mood, gender and executive function predictors o f social cognition
Previous research has found IQ and executive function task scores significantly 
predicted social cognition task scores in late adolescence and early adulthood (Ahmed 
& Miller, 2011; Vetter et al., 2013). The analyses in Chapter 7 extended previous 
research by examining IQ, mood and executive function predictors on a wide range of 
social cognition task scores with the task battery consisting of tasks assessing emotion 
recognition in visual static stimuli (Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test), auditory stimuli 
(Reading the Mind in the Voice Test), dynamic stimuli (MASC) and self-report 
empathy (IRI). The main finding was that different IQ, mood state and executive 
function task scores contribute to social cognition task scores, indicating that domain 
general processes contribute to social cognition task performance and social cognition is 
a multidimensional construct (Dziobek et al., 2006).
Apperly, Samson and Humphreys (2009) suggested that executive functions may be 
necessary in the development o f social cognition during childhood but not in adulthood 
or executive functions may continue to be crucial in adult social cognition. Through 
consideration o f previous research with children and the present analyses, there may be 
differential contribution of executive functions to social cognition task performance 
over childhood and late adolescence / early adulthood. Carlson et al. (2004) found that 
inhibition predicted children’s performance on false belief tasks and the present data 
show inhibition contributes to IRI Personal Distress in late adolescence (Time 1). In 
contrast, Carlson et al. found that planning did not contribute to appearance reality and 
false belief tasks in childhood, whereas the present data suggest planning predicts scores 
on the Eyes and Voices Test at Time 2. This suggests inhibition contributes to the 
development o f social cognition during childhood and in late adolescence, while 
planning only predicts social cognition in early adulthood. Planning and monitoring 
may relate to social cognition because during social interaction people monitor their 
actions to ensure their actions are appropriate in the current situation and that they fulfil 
their intentions (Amodio & Frith, 2006).
Positive Affect negatively predicted Eyes Test scores at Time 1, indicating Positive 
Affect impairs performance on tasks requiring emotion recognition in static visual 
stimuli. This supports the “mood as information” model whereby positive mood leads to
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a heuristic processing style (Park & Banaji, 2000) resulting in shortcuts and poorer 
performance (Mitchell & Phillips, 2007). HADS Depression scores negatively predicted 
MASC Total score, indicating that depression impairs performance on a social cognition 
task with dynamic, naturalistic stimuli, supporting Wolkenstien et al. (2011).
The finding of the Brixton Test significantly predicting scores on the Eyes Test and 
Voices Test at Time 1 and MASC Total score at Time 2 may be explained by configural 
processing when relations between shapes and features o f a stimulus are perceived 
(Maurer, Le Grand & Mondloch, 2002). This indicates that participants who are 
successful at detecting rules on the Brixton Test are also successful when considering 
emotion recognition in visual and auditory stimuli. An alternative explanation is that 
social cognition and executive function may both utilise rule based reasoning (Pemer & 
Lang, 1999).
Previous research has found inhibition, assessed with an Antisaccade Task, significantly 
predicted scores on the Cambridge Mindreading Face Voice Battery (CAM; Golan et 
al., 2006) comprised of silent short clips o f an actor portraying an emotion (Vetter et al., 
2013). In the present study inhibition, assessed with the Hayling Test, did not 
significantly predict scores on the Eyes Test or MASC, social cognition tasks similar to 
the CAM. A possible explanation for the inconsistent finding is that different types o f 
inhibition may be related to social cognition. The Antisaccade Task may be associated 
with visual social cognition tasks because o f the task’s visual nature that requires 
effortful suppression of a reflexive saccade (Nigg, 2000) whereas the Hayling Test 
assesses inhibition in the vocal domain.
Executive functions and social cognition may be related due to functions sharing 
common frontal neural substrates (Hughes & Ensor, 2007). Alternatively, executive 
functions may predict social cognition task performance because social cognition tasks 
are not process pure and require executive function (Dziobek et al., 2006; Heavey et al., 
2000; Hughes & Ensor, 2007). Working memory processes may contribute to executive 
function and social cognition tasks but this was not assessed in the present study. Future 
research could assess working memory with the Letter Number Sequencing Test from 
the WAIS (Wechsler, 2008) that requires participants to recall and organise stimuli e.g.
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state the numbers first in numerical order and then the letters in alphabetical order for 
these stimuli 9L2A. Working memory might be involved in considering a person’s 
current and previous mental states (Vetter et al., 2013), keeping in mind the pattern of 
the coloured circle in the Brixton Test, card sorts generated in the Sorting Test and re ­
designing plans in the Tower Test according to whether the goal is attained.
8.3 Evaluation of research
This research aimed to fill a gap in knowledge about the developmental trajectory of 
executive function and social cognition in late adolescence and early adulthood. A 
strength o f the design was the fine grained age groups that allowed comparison of 
behavioural data during a period o f dynamic brain maturation. Previous research in 
social cognition and executive function during late adolescence has recommended a 
longitudinal design (Kalkut et al., 2009; Romine & Reynolds, 2005; Tonks et al., 2007; 
Waber et al., 2007). This allowed the same participants to be assessed at two time 
points, exploring whether performance remained constant, declined or improved across 
time points.
This thesis contributes to knowledge by the finding o f non-linear development of
concept formation and strategy generation with 17 year olds scoring significantly
higher, indicating better performance, than 18 year olds. Social cognition data indicate
that social cognition remains relatively stable during late adolescence and early
adulthood on measures o f emotion recognition with visual static and auditory stimuli
and self-report empathy. More specifically, Time 1, Time 2 and longitudinal data
analyses showed no change in scores on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes and Reading
the Mind in the Voice Tests, assessments o f emotion recognition in visual static and
auditory stimuli. Self-report empathy showed some change, with Younger and Older
groups scoring higher than the Middle group on the Fantasy subscale at Time 2.
Longitudinal data analyses showed that the Younger group scored lower at Time 2 than
Time 1 on Personal Distress. Results of longitudinal analyses showed Middle and Older
groups scored higher at Time 2 relative to Time 1 on MASC Total score due to fewer
MASC excessive mental state inference errors. Comparing the present data to existing
adult data indicates that emotion recognition in auditory stimuli (Voices Test) and the
tendency to consider others’ viewpoints (IRI Perspective Taking) continue to develop
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beyond early adulthood. This thesis also contributes to knowledge on executive function 
predictors o f social cognition by employing a wider range o f tasks than previous 
research (e.g. Ahmed & Miller, 2011; Vetter et al., 2013).
A limitation of this research is the attrition rate despite taking measures to limit this 
such as collecting participants’ email addresses, phone numbers and postal addresses. 
To arrange Time 2 testing, participants were contacted twice by email, twice by phone, 
leaving an answer phone message and a letter sent to participants who had changed their 
phone numbers. Despite some participants not taking part at Time 2, the retention rate is 
similar to other longitudinal studies (Novack et al., 1991; Zipparo et al., 2008).
Chapter 4 examined whether Time 1 demographic data o f participants who only took 
part at Time 1 differed from participants who took part at both time points. Analyses 
showed that participants who took part at both time points had a higher Time 1 Verbal 
IQ compared to participants who only took part at Time 1, although Verbal IQ scores 
were in the average range. The finding of higher Time 1 Verbal IQ in participants who 
took part at both time points relative to participants who took part only at Time 1 is 
consistent with some previous longitudinal studies (Beaver, 2013; Jacomb, Jorm, 
Korten, Christensen & Henderson, 2002). At Time 1, Verbal IQ significantly correlated 
with scores on the Eyes, Voices and MASC Total score and the following executive 
function scores: Brixton Test, Letter Fluency, free sort correct, free sort description 
score, description score for verbal and perceptual sorts and Towers completed. It is 
possible that because the Time 2 sample had a higher Time 1 Verbal IQ than those who 
did not take part again, this may have inflated the social cognition and executive 
function task scores that correlated with Verbal IQ. In the present sample, there were no 
differences for Performance IQ, Full IQ, affect or HADS comparing Time 1 data for 
participants who took part at both time points relative to participants who took part only 
at Time 1 indicating that the Time 2 sample is generally representative o f the Time 1 
sample.
The sample included more female than male participants, although the gender ratio was 
broadly balanced across age groups and gender differences were analysed. Other 
research in late adolescence and early adulthood has included a predominantly female
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sample (77% female in Vetter, Altgassen, Phillips, Mahy, & Kliegel, 2012; 82% in 
Vetter et al., 2013). Furthermore, no gender differences have been reported on executive 
function tasks of phonological fluency (Harrison et al., 2000; Riva et al., 2000; Waber et 
al., 2007) and inhibition, updating and switching (Magar et al., 2010). Demtl et al.
(2010) found gender differences apparent on self-report empathy not behavioural social 
cognition tasks and Ahmed and Miller (2011) found gender did not predict scores on the 
Eyes Test.
A small number of participants reported mental illness providing an accurate 
representation o f this age range because late adolescence and early adulthood represents 
a period of vulnerability to mental illness (Paus et al., 2008). The inclusion of 
participants who reported a mental illness is in line with other published normative data 
samples (e.g. Pena-Casanova et al., 2012; Pedraza et al., 2005) that included participants 
with mental illness and mild Head Injury if  a doctor considered their illness to be 
controlled. Participants in the present sample were all students or in employment and so 
were functioning appropriately for their age group. Whilst positive affect, negative 
affect, depression and anxiety were assessed, no data on medication use was collected.
Whilst the D-KEFS has been widely used in executive function research (e.g. Bava et 
al., 2010; Ahmed & Miller, 2011; Kalkut et al., 2009), this task battery has been 
criticised because there is no rationale or theory explaining why the nine tests were 
included in the task battery (Strauss et al., 2006). The Sorting Test has low test-retest 
reliabilities (Strauss et al., 2006) which may be because the tasks are less novel when 
completed a second time (Lowe & Rabbitt, 1998). This was considered in the present 
study by employing alternate versions o f Letter Fluency and Sorting Tests. There are 
low correlations between tasks indicating weak convergent validity (Salthouse et al.,
2003), although this could reflect the unity and diversity o f executive functions (Miyake 
et al., 2000). Task specificity, measuring the function o f interest, is another issue in 
executive function assessment (Burgess, 2003). The Letter Fluency Test requires 
cognitive flexibility, memory, initiation and psychomotor speed (Beilen et al., 2004) so 
it could be questioned what is the main executive function this task assesses. Miyake et 
al. (2000) found that performance on the Tower o f Hanoi Task, purported to measure
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planning, was associated with inhibition, possibly due to participants inhibiting their 
initial disc movement and planning their strategy to achieve the particular tower.
Some researchers have criticised executive function tasks for lacking ecological validity 
and not reflecting everyday executive function abilities. Odhuba et al. (2006) examined 
whether the Hayling and Brixton Tests correlated with an assessment o f executive 
functioning in daily life, the Dysexecutive Questionnaire (Wilson et al., 1996) and the 
Iowa Collateral Head Injury Interview (Martzke, Swan & Varney, 1991) in Head 
Injured participants. Odhuba et al. concluded that the Hayling and Brixton Tests 
correlated moderately with measures o f everyday executive functioning indicating 
modest ecological validity and should be used with other executive function measures. 
Chaytor, Schmitter-Edgecombe and Burr (2006) assessed epileptic or Head Injured 
participants with the COWAT Letter Fluency Task and two assessments o f functioning: 
the Dysexecutive Questionnaire (Wilson et al., 1996) and Brock Adaptive Functioning 
Questionnaire (Dywan & Seqalowitz, 1996). Letter Fluency Task scores were not 
significantly related to everyday functioning (Odhuba et al., 2006). However, these 
studies recruited Head Injured patients whilst the present study excluded Head Injury so 
future research could examine whether executive function measures relate to everyday 
functioning in non-clinical samples.
The social cognition task battery was selected to assess a range of social cognition 
including visual static stimuli, auditory stimuli, dynamic stimuli and self-report 
empathy. Whilst some studies have included shortened versions o f the Eyes Test (e.g. 
Hassenstab et al., 2007), the present study included the full version to maximise the 
possible range of scores. It is of interest that the longitudinal data analyses show the 
Middle and Older groups scored significantly higher on MASC Total score indicating 
better social cognition. The MASC is a more naturalistic measure o f social cognition 
than the Eyes and Voices Tests because it includes social interaction and visual and 
vocal information. This information, together with body language, must be interpreted 
correctly to complete the task. Whilst a self-report measure of perspective taking was 
included, future research should include a behavioural measure o f perspective taking. 
The Director Perspective Taking Task was not available for use in the present study, but
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Dumontheil et al. (2010) found a significant trend with performance improving on this 
task between late adolescence and early adulthood.
8.4 Implications
8.4.1 Head injury rehabilitation
Normative data is particularly important in clinical neuropsychology because it allows 
the comparison o f an individual with a representative group to determine whether there 
are deficits in cognitive functions (Lezak, Howieson & Loring, 2004; Strauss et al., 
2006). The present normative data demonstrate the executive function and social 
cognition capabilities o f 17 to 20 year olds. Understanding the development of 
executive functions in typically developing adolescents is necessary because this has 
implications for rehabilitation following Head Injury (Reynolds & Horton, 2008). The 
effectiveness o f rehabilitation could be assessed by participants completing executive 
function and social cognition tasks prior to and after treatment. Executive function 
deficits specifically in concept formation at age 18 following Head Injury may be 
typical o f that age group and not a result o f injury. Non-linear development could reflect 
functions going offline temporarily during periods o f steep maturational change before 
more efficient neural networks are formed resulting in adult levels o f task performance 
(Uhlhaas et al., 2009).
8.4.2 Social cognition assessment
Brent et al. (2004) suggested that advanced Theory o f Mind Tasks could be included as 
part o f a clinical assessment o f individuals referred for possible Autistic Spectrum 
Disorder (ASD). Therefore the social cognition normative data could be relevant in 
assessing individuals with ASD and assessing the effectiveness o f interventions. Golan 
and Baron-Cohen (2006) found Mind Reading (Baron-Cohen et al., 2004), a taxonomy 
of 412 emotions, each exemplified in six film clips and six sound clips o f a single 
person portraying the emotion, improved emotion recognition in participants with ASD 
who used the CD for two hours each week over ten weeks. Golan and Baron-Cohen 
(2006) suggested that Mind Reading could be the first stage of a training programme, 
followed by the introduction of context and integration o f mental states. Participants 
with ASD could complete the Eyes Test, Voice Test and MASC before and after an
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intervention. The MASC could provide an example o f a naturalistic context with social 
interaction. The MASC is computer based and computers appeal to individuals with 
ASD because o f their predictability making it possible to learn about social situations in 
a stress-free environment (Moore, McGrath & Thorpe, 2000).
8.4.3 Education
Blakemore (2010) proposed that the teenage years are a sensitive period for teaching 
due to protracted neural reorganisation and that education should focus on cognitive 
functions that are still developing. The findings of this thesis support the idea o f late 
adolescence / early adulthood being a sensitive period because some functions show 
developmental change during this age range. For example, longitudinal analyses showed 
Middle and Older groups improved on inhibition and rule detection and the Younger 
group showed a decrease in concept formation (free sort description score, sort 
recognition score and description score for perceptual sorts) at Time 2 compared to 
Time 1. Sensitive periods can inform education policy by suggesting at what ages 
particular skills should be included in the curriculum to optimise learning (Thomas & 
Knowland, 2009). As 18 year olds scored significantly lower than 17 year olds on 
concept formation (Sorting Test) at Time 1 and the Younger group scored significantly 
lower at Time 2 compared to Time 1, perhaps this executive function could be 
incorporated more into university curriculum. Given that longitudinal studies (e.g. 
Miller & Hinshaw, 2010) indicate that executive function contributes to academic 
achievement, Best et al. (2011) proposed that executive function training may promote 
academic achievement. It could be argued that concept formation may relate 
academically to developing ideas for essays.
8.4.4 Concept of adolescence
It is o f interest that the 18 year old group performed significantly poorer on strategy 
generation and concept formation compared to 17 year olds because in the UK 18 is 
considered a legislative marker o f adulthood. The finding of a trough in executive 
function performance at age 18 seems inconsistent with the responsibility given at this 
age and possibly indicates that responsibility should be delayed until executive 
functions have returned to their previous level. Indeed, the age considered as
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adolescence has changed over time; in preindustrial societies, adolescence was thought 
to extend into the 20s and 30s, when males and females reached maximum height 
(Tanner, 1973). Similarly, Hall (1915) viewed adolescence as spanning between 12 and 
22 to 25 years. Arnett (2001) proposed that the late teenage years and early twenties 
were emerging adulthood, when people considered themselves to be gradually 
becoming an adult, with participants aged 26 to 35 year olds more likely to consider 
themselves as adults compared to 18 to 25 year olds. These data suggest that adulthood 
has not been reached by age 18.
Roenneberg et al. (2004) investigated a biological marker for the end o f adolescence 
and noted that the end of puberty is defined by attaining maximum height, whereas the 
end of adolescence is more difficult to define. The authors studied chronotypes, 
preferences in the timing of sleep and wakefulness, by administering the Munich 
Chronotype Questionnaire (Roenneberg, Wirz-Justice & Merrow, 2003) to 25,000 
participants, aged between 15 and 80 years. Roenneberg et al. (2004) suggested that 
adulthood could be defined around the age of 20, when chronotypes stop delaying and 
begin advancing (i.e. sleep patterns change so that people go to sleep earlier and wake 
up earlier, instead of the stay up late/wake up late pattern o f sleep in adolescence). The 
present findings of poorer performance at age 18 on some executive function tasks, 
indicating that adulthood has not yet been reached, support Roenneberg et al.'s 
suggestion that adulthood begins around age 20.
8.5 Future research
The results of this thesis have shown that fine-grained age groups are an effective way 
of investigating executive function development. Future data collection with 16 year 
olds, particularly on the D-KEFS Letter Fluency and Sorting Tests, would elucidate 
whether functions increase, decrease or plateau between 16 and 17 years. Furthermore, 
it would be of interest to test younger participants with the social cognition measures 
employed in this study to ascertain at what age adult levels o f performance are attained.
Future research could consider the implications that non-linear development o f letter
fluency and concept formation executive functions have on academic achievement. A
dip in academic performance has been reported at Key Stage 3 (11 to 13 years). This
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has been attributed to commencing secondary school (Whitby, Lord, O’Donnell & 
Grayson, 2006), but might also reflect non-linear functional development. Executive 
functions and academic achievement correlate from 5 to 17 years (Best, Miller & 
Naglieri, 2011) so it might be useful to establish how executive function relates to 
academic achievement beyond age 17.
Another possibility for future research is to investigate the effects o f menstrual cycle 
phase on executive function and social cognition task performance in late adolescence 
and early adulthood. A study reviewed in Chapter 3 by Maki et al. (2002) found that 
oestrogen correlated positively with Phonological and Category Fluency Task scores 
and correlated negatively with mental rotation. Verbal fluency and fine motor 
performance, assessed with the Grooved Pegboard Test, were better in the luteal phase, 
associated with high oestrogen levels, compared to the follicular phase. Mental rotation 
was significantly better in the early follicular phase, associated with low oestrogen 
levels, compared to the luteal phase. These findings could influence participants’ 
performance on the D-KEFS Letter Fluency and Tower Test so future research should 
collect data on participants’ menstrual cycle phase.
The present work could be extended by collecting EEG and MRI data because it is 
possible that whilst there were few cross sectional behavioural executive function 
differences, there may be changes in neural network activation over late adolescence 
and early adulthood. For example, Guevera et al. (2011) found no group differences 
between 11-13 year olds, 18-20 year olds and 26-30 year olds on first move time and 
number o f moves on the Tower o f Hanoi. More participants aged 18-20 and 26-30 
completed the task in the time limit compared to 11-13 year olds. There was greater 
synchronisation between prefrontal and parietal regions in the older age groups 
compared to the younger group allowing faster task completion. Burnett and Blakemore 
(2009) reported a decrease in functional connectivity between the medial prefrontal 
cortex and left posterior temporal sulclus / temporo-parietal junction between 
adolescence (11-18 year olds) and adulthood (22-32 year olds) in a social cognition 
study. These findings indicate changes in functional connectivity associated with 
executive function and social cognition task performance between adolescence and 
early adulthood. Furthermore, reaction time data could be collected on social cognition
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tasks by presenting the stimuli in E Prime with task instructions informing participants 
to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. Vetter et al. (2012) found speed of 
processing on the Identical Pictures Test (Ekstrom, French, Harman & Dermen, 1976) 
increased significantly between early adolescence (12-15 years) and early adulthood 
(18-22 years). While speed of processing was unrelated to Eyes Test scores and a Story 
Comprehension Test, it is possible that processing speed could be related to dynamic 
stimuli that show emotional expressions for a short time (Vetter et al., 2012). Therefore 
assessing reaction time data on the MASC and processing speed would be an idea for 
future research.
8.6 Conclusion
Previous research in executive function and social cognition has focused on childhood 
(Pennequin et al., 2010), adolescence (Prencipe et al., 2011; Tonks et al., 2007) or broad 
age ranges in adulthood (Dziobek et al., 2006) resulting in scant data in late adolescence 
and early adulthood. This research employed a sequential design including cross 
sectional and longitudinal analyses with fine-grained age groups in late adolescence and 
early adulthood. Fine grained age groups were selected on the recommendation that 
broad age ranges decrease sensitivity (De Luca et al., 2003) and may mask non-linear 
development. Time 1 cross sectional data indicated linear social cognitive development 
and non-linear development o f strategy generation and concept formation, assessed with 
the D-KEFS Letter Fluency and Sorting Tests. Seventeen year olds scored significantly 
higher, indicating better performance, than 18 year olds on these tasks with a slight 
improvement at age 19. However, the Younger group continued to score significantly 
higher than the Middle age group on strategy generation at Time 2, indicating the group 
differences may be specific to the sample, such as the Younger group finding the study 
an unusual and novel experience (Ritter et al., 2012) or were more motivated (Pessoa, 
2009) resulting in better executive function task performance compared to the other 
groups. Group differences on concept formation were not evident at Time 2, indicating 
non-linear development is specific to age 18. Non-linear development may reflect 
several dynamic maturational processes including synaptic pruning, increased white 
matter connectivity (Lebel et al., 2008) and functional synchronisation (Uhlhaas et al., 
2009).
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Results o f longitudinal analyses indicate that some functions improved between testing 
(inhibition, rule detection, strategy generation, planning and emotion recognition in 
dynamic stimuli), whilst concept formation declined and other functions stabilised 
(emotion recognition in visual static and auditory stimuli, sympathetic feelings towards 
others’ misfortune, the tendency to associate with characters in books and films, the 
tendency to consider other peoples’ viewpoints and feelings of apprehension in stressful 
situations). Comparing the present data with existing adulthood data suggests that 
emotion recognition with auditory stimuli and IRI Perspective Taking continue to 
develop beyond early adulthood.
Chapter 7 analyses showed that different IQ, mood state and executive functions 
predicted scores on social cognition tasks assessing emotion recognition in visual static, 
auditory, dynamic visual and auditory stimuli and self-report empathy. Executive 
functions may predict social cognition task performance due to similar neural networks 
associated with task performance or due to task impurity (Hughes & Ensor, 2007).
Future research with 16 year olds would elucidate whether functions improve, decrease 
or stabilise between 16 and 17 years. Collecting EEG and MRI data would inform 
which neural networks were associated with executive function and social cognition 
task performance, possibly showing changes to functional connectivity in this age 
range.
Overall, these findings provide evidence o f concept formation following a non-linear 
trajectory specific to age 18 whereas, social cognition develops linearly. Some 
functions, such as inhibition, rule detection, strategy generation, planning and emotion 
recognition in dynamic stimuli show longitudinal development into early adulthood. 
The protracted development o f functions may reflect continued brain maturation into 
early adulthood including myelination (Sowell et al., 2001) and function connectivity 
(Stevens et al., 2007).
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Appendices
Appendix Section 1. Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983)
The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of 
situations. For each item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the appropriate 
letter on the scale at the top of the page: A, B, C, D, or E. When you have decided on 
your answer, fill in the letter next to the item number. Read each item carefully before 
responding. Answer as honestly as you can. Thank you.
ANSWER SCALE:
0 1 2  3 4
DOES NOT DESCRIBES
DESCRIBE ME ME VERY
ME WELL WELL
1. I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to 
me. (FS)
2. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. (EC)
3. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point o f view. (PT) (- 
)
4. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems. 
(EC)
(-)
5. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel. (FS)
6. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease. (PD)
7. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don't often get 
completely caught up in it. (FS) (-)
8. I try to look at everybody's side o f a disagreement before I make a decision. (PT)
9. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind o f protective towards 
them. (EC)
320
10. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle o f a very emotional situation. 
(PD)
11. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from 
their perspective. (PT)
12. Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for me. 
(FS) (-)
13. When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm. (PD) (-)
14. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. (EC) (-)
15. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other 
people's arguments. (PT) (-)
16. After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters.
(FS)
17. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me. (PD)
18. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity 
for them. (EC) (-)
19. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies. (PD) (-)
20. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. (EC)
21. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.
(PT)
22. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. (EC)
23. When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place o f a leading 
character. (FS)
24. I tend to lose control during emergencies. (PD)
25. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while. 
(PT)
26. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if  the 
events in the story were happening to me. (FS)
27. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces. (PD)
28. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if  I were in their 
place. (PT)
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NOTE: (-) denotes item to be scored in reverse fashion 
PT = perspective-taking scale 
FS = fantasy scale 
EC = empathic concern scale 
PD = personal distress scale
Appendix Section 2. Demography measure
Please answer the following questions. All answers are anonymous and will be kept 
confidential.
Have you ever sustained a head injury which led to you being unconscious for 30 
minutes?
YES / NO
Have you ever used cannabis? YES / NO
If YES: How old were you when you first used cannabis?  years
How often do you use cannabis? __________
When was the last time you used cannabis?  ________
Have you ever used ecstasy? YES / NO
If YES: How old were you when you first used ecstasy?  years
How often do you use ecstasy? _________
When was the last time you used ecstasy? __________
Do you drink alcohol? YES / NO
The recommended weekly limit o f alcohol consumption is 14 units for women and 21 
units for men. One unit o f alcohol is equal to half a pint of beer, lager or cider, a small 
shot o f spirits or 125 ml glass of wine.
Do you drink over the recommended weekly limits o f alcohol consumption? YES / NO
Do you have any of the following: Depression YES / NO
Obsessive compulsive disorder YES / NO
Autism / Asperger's Syndrome YES / NO
ADHD YES / NO
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Are you a student? YES / NO
If YES:
What are you studying for? GCSE / BTEC / apprenticeship / AS levels / A2 Levels / 
degree
Do you have a job? YES / NO
If YES:
What is your j ob title? _______________
How many hours a week do you work?  hours
Who do you live with? parent(s) / friends / partner / on
own
Please state whether the following have changed over the last year, and if  so how they 
have changed:
Living arrangements (e.g. have you moved away from home to live in university 
accommodation?)
Friendship groups
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Appendix Section 3. Examples of box plots for executive function and  social
cognition tasks a t Time 1 in 17 ,18  and  19 year olds.
Box plots for Letter Fluency Task scores in 17 ,18  and 19 year olds
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Appendix Section 5. Means and standard deviations for executive function task  
performance of participants who reported cannabis use and participants who did 
not
Participants who reported 
cannabis use (n = 30)
Participants who reported 
no cannabis use (n = 68)
Measures o f response inhibition and rule detection
Hayling scaled 5.97(1.65) 5.47(1.43)
Brixton scaled 7.53 (1.57) 7.13 (1.84)
Measure of strategy generation
Verbal fluency 36.43 (9.01) 36.46 (7.65)
Measures of concept formation
Free sorts correct 11.40(1.75) 11.07(1.98)
Free sort description score 42.47 (8.71) 42.21 (7.44)
Sort recognition description 
score
47.17(6.93) 45.63 (7.40)
Verbal sorts description score 30.90 (6.93) 29.94 (8.15)
Perceptual sorts description 
score
60.03 (8.98) 57.71 (9.44)
Measures o f planning
Number of Tower items 
completed
8.30 (0.84) 8.29 (0.85)
Tower achievement score 17.77 (2.57) 18.18(2.95)
Mean first move time 3.46(1.48) 3.75 (1.75)
Time per move 2.66 (0.59) 2.74 (0.66)
Move accuracy 1.62 (0.31) 1.63 (0.46)
p  > 0.05
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Appendix Section 6. Means and standard deviations for social cognition task  
performance of participants who reported cannabis use and participants who did 
not
Participants who reported 
cannabis use {n = 30)
Participants who reported 
no cannabis use (n = 68)
Static visual stimuli
Eyes 28.27 (2.99) 27.48 (4.23)
Auditory stimuli
Voices 17.10(2.04) 16.90 (2.51)
Dynam ic visual and auditory stimuli with social interaction
MASC correct 35.60 (2.72) 35.49 (3.71)
MASC excessive mental 
state inference errors
5.40 (2.51) 5.68 (2.67)
MASC insufficient mental 
state inference
2.50(1.41) 2.54(1.59)
MASC no ToM errors 1.50(1.01) 1.29 (0.99)
Self-report empathy
IRI Fantasy 
IRI Perspective Taking 
IRI Empathic Concern 
IRI Personal Distress
17.45 (5.17) 
16.52 (3.53)
20.45 (2.97) 
12.86 (4.23)
17.71 (5.34) 
17.19(4.09) 
20.82 (3.56) 
14.12 (4.92)
all p  > 0.05
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Appendix Section 7. Descriptive statistics for executive function task  performance 
participants who reported alcohol use and participants who did not report alcohol
use
Participants who reported 
alcohol use (;n = 85)
Participants who reported 
no alcohol use ( n =  13)
Measures of response inhibition and rule detection
Hayling scaled 5 .68 (1 .51) 5.23 (1.54)
Brixton scaled 7.31 (1.62) 6.92 (2.60)
Measure of strategy generation
Verbal fluency 36.24 (8.35) 37.85 (5.74)
Measures of concept formation
Free sorts correct* 10.99 (1.83) 12.38 (2.06)
Free sort description score* 41.49 (7.55) 47.46 (7.76)
Sort recognition description 
score*
45.41 (7.15) 50.62 (6.58)
Verbal sorts description 
score*
29.53 (7.47) 34.85 (8.44)
Perceptual sorts description 
score
57.82 (9.19) 62.31 (9.60)
Measures of planning
Number o f  Tower items 
completed
8.29 (0.87) 8.31 (0.63)
Tower achievement score 18.06 (2.83) 18.00 (2.97)
Mean first move time 3.73 (1.74) 3 .20 (1 .04 )
Time per move 2.70 (0.65) 2.80 (0.61)
Move accuracy 1.62 (0.44) 1.65 (0.32)
* p <  0.05
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Appendix Section 8. Descriptive statistics for social cognition task performance 
participants who reported alcohol use and participants who did not report alcohol 
use
Participants who reported 
alcohol use (n = 85 )
Participants who reported 
no alcohol use (n = 13 )
Static visual stimuli
Eyes 27.88 (3.48) 26.58(6.16)
Auditory stimuli
Voices 16.96 (2.24) 16.92 (3.20)
Dynamic visual and auditory stimuli with social interaction
MASC correct 35.56 (3.20) 35.23 (4.82)
MASC excessive mental 
state inference errors
5.62 (2.60) 5.38 (2.79)
MASC insufficient mental 
state inference
2.51 (1.47) 2.69(1.93)
MASC no ToM errors 1.31 (0.96) 1.69(1.18)
Self-report empathy
IRI Fantasy 
IRI perspective 
IRI empathic 
IRI personal distress
17.70 (5.27) 
17.12(4.00) 
20.49 (3.28) 
13.43 (4.70)
17.15 (5.40)
16.15 (3.44)
22.15 (3.78) 
15.77 (4.66)
all p  > 0.05
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Appendix Section 9. Descriptive statistics o f executive function task performance 
for participants who reported consuming above and below the weekly alcohol 
guidelines
Participants who reported 
consuming above the weekly 
alcohol guidelines (n = 27)
Participants who reported 
consuming below the 
weekly alcohol 
guidelines (n = 70)
Measures o f response inhibition and rule detection
Hayling scaled 5.63 (1.60) 5.61 (1.50)
Brixton scaled 7.33 (1.98) 7.19(1.67)
Measure o f strategy generation
Verbal fluency 34.44 (8.80) 37.23 (7.72)
Measures o f concept formation
Free sorts correct 10.70 (1.77) 11.31 (1.93)
Free sort description 
score
40.89 (7.08) 42.71 (8.05)
Sort recognition 
description score*
43.59 (7.52) 46.87 (6.85)
Verbal sorts description 
score
30.11 (6.67) 30.16(8.19)
Perceptual sorts 
description score*
54.37 (9.52) 59.80 (8.79)
Measures o f planning
Number of Tower items 
completed
8.33 (0.62) 8.27 (0.92)
Tower achievement 
score
18.11 (2.74) 18.06 (2.89)
Mean first move time 3.90 (1.51) 3.59 (1.73)
Time per move 2.77 (0.48) 2.70 (0.69)
Move accuracy 1.56 (0.31) 0.65 (0.46)
* p < 0.05
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Appendix Section 10. Descriptive statistics of social cognition task  performance for 
participants who reported consuming above and below the weekly alcohol 
guidelines
Participants who reported 
consum ing above the weekly 
alcohol guidelines (n = 27)
Participants who reported 
consum ing below  the 
weekly alcohol guidelines 
i n  = 70)
Static visual stimuli
Eyes 28.15 (3.35) 27.59 (4.11)
Auditory stimuli
Voices 17.00(1 .94) 16.97 (2.53)
Dynamic visual and auditory stimuli with social interaction
MASC correct 35.52 (2.82) 35.60 (3.61)
MASC excessive 5.52 (2.16) 5.57 (2.77)
mental state inference
errors
2.81 (1.30) 2.41 (1.61)
MASC insufficient
mental state inference
1.15(1 .13) 1.41 (0.93)
MASC no ToM  errors
Self-report empathy
IRI Fantasy 16.85 (5.33) 17.87 (5.27)
IRI Perspective Taking 17.38 (3.68) 16.87 (4.05)
IRI Empathic Concern 20.85 (2.72) 20.64 (3.63)
IRI Personal D istress 13.65 (4.74) 13.71 (4.78)
all p  > 0.05
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Appendix Section 11. Descriptive statistics of executive function task performance 
for participants who reported completing puberty and participants who reported 
not completing puberty
Participants who 
reported completing 
puberty (n = 35)
Participants who reported 
not completing puberty 
(n = 63)
Measures o f response inhibition and rule detection
Hayling scaled 5.40(1.36) 5.75 (1.59)
Brixton scaled 7.00(1.83) 7.40(1.73)
Measure o f strategy generation
Verbal fluency 35.69 (8.34) 36.87 (7.91)
Measures o f concept formation
Free sorts correct 11.29(1.86) 11.11 (1.95)
Free sort description score 42.26 (8.57) 42.30 (7.41)
Sort recognition description 
score
45.80 (5.88) 46.27 (7.97)
Verbal sorts description 
score
30.40 (7.46) 30.14(8.00)
Perceptual sorts description 
score
58.43 (8.26) 58.41 (9.92)
Measures of planning
Number of Tower items 
completed
8.26 (0.89) 8.32 (0.82)
Tower achievement score 17.63 (2.61) 18.29 (2.94)
Mean first move time 3.68 (1.75) 3.65 (1.64)
Time per move 2.63 (0.60) 2.76 (0.66)
Move accuracy 1.65 (0.48) 1.61 (0.48)
a llp  > 0.05
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Appendix Section 12. Descriptive statistics o f social cognition task scores for 
participants who reported competing puberty and participants who reported not 
completing puberty
Participants who 
reported completing 
puberty (« = 35)
Participants who 
reported not completing 
puberty (n = 63)
Static visual stimuli
Eyes 27.85(4.11) 27.65 (3.80)
Auditory stimuli
Voices 16.74 (2.73) 17.08 (2.16)
Dynamic visual and auditory stimuli with social interaction
MASC correct 35.17(3.19) 35.71 (3.56)
MASC excessive mental 
state inference errors
6.03 (2.81) 5.35 (2.48)
MASC insufficient mental 
state inference
2.40(1.44) 2.60(1.58)
MASC no ToM errors 1.40 (1.06) 1.33 (0.97)
Self-report empathy
IRI Fantasy 
IRI perspective 
IRI empathic 
IRI personal distress
17.20 (5.20) 
16.86(4.49) 
20.31 (3.07) 
14.63 (4.61)
17.87 (5.32) 
17.06 (3.61) 
20.94 (3.55) 
13.24(4.78)
all p  > 0.05
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Appendix Section 13. Examples of h istogram s showing executive function and
social cognition ta sk  scores in 18 ,19 and 20 year olds a t Time 2.
H istogram s fo r H ay ling  T e s t  s c a led  s co res  in  18 y e a r  olds
H istogram  of H ay ling  T e s t  sca led  sco res  in  19 y e a r  olds
M ea n  =  6 .5 9  
S td . D e v . = .6 
N  *  17
6 -
6 .5  7 .0
H a y l i n g _ S c a l e d
7 .5  8 .0  8 .5
H istog r am  of H ay ling  T e s t  s ca led  sco re s  in  20 y e a r  olds
M ean  =  6 .5 8  
S td . D e v . =  1 .47 4  
N  *  26
H a y l i n g _ S c a l e d
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Histogram  o f descrip tion  score fo r v e ib a l so rts  in  18 yea r olds
Histogram of description score fo r verbal sorts in 19 year olds
H istogram o f description sco re fo r verbal so rts in 20 y ear olds
Mean = 31.81 
S td . D ev . *  8.653 
N *  26
20  30  4 0  50
D e s c r _ v e r b a l
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H is tog ram  of E y es  T e s t  sco res  in  18 y e a r  olds
Histogr am  of E yes T e s t sco res in 19 y e a r  olds
H istogr am  of E yes T e s t  s co res  in  20 year- olds
M ea n  ■  2 8 .0 4  
S td . D ev . = 3 .60 5  
N  *  2 6
6“
oH— — I— — I— I— I— — I— — I— — I— — I— — I— — I— —
1 5  1 6  1 7  1 8  1 9  2 0  21 2 2  2 3  2 4  2 5  2 6  2 7  2 8  2 9  3 0  31 3 2  3 3  3 4  35
e y e s
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H istog ram  of MASC  to ta l sco res in IS  yeai' olds
Mean « 35.53 
S td. Dev. *  6.802 
N *  15
— —i--- — i---—i---— i---— i---—i----r
15  20 25  30 35  40 45
M A S C _ c o r r e c t
Histogram o f M A SC to tal sco res in 19 year olds
M A S C  c o r r e c t
Histogram o f M A SC  to tal sco res in 20 year olds
341
A
pp
en
di
x
 
Se
ct
io
n
 
14
.
 
C
o
rr
el
a
tio
n
s 
be
tw
ee
n
 
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
fu
n
ct
io
n
 
an
d 
so
ci
a
l 
co
gn
iti
on
 
ta
sk
s 
at 
Ti
m
e 
2
ON
<N
nf
cn
cn
o VO cn
o
t"-
o m
o
H
o ON
o
r-H
o
O
m
CN
o'i O* o o1 o o1 o o o'i o' ^
VO O cn ooo CN nr o O n
*
o
O t— i 1—H o CN O cn
O o O o1 Oi o o O o t-H
<N
r->
(N
o
nt
o <N ON
*
00
*
nf
o O o CN cn
o1 o o1 o1 O o o O  r—l
* *
* *
o O n r-
CN cn cn
OO o o o
*
cn (N cn
r-H cn i
r- o' o o'
* * *
* * *
cn NO CN
m NO t"-
VO oi o1 O■
* *
* * *
nt- o
m cn
o o oin i i 1
* *
* * *
(N VO NO
N" CN r-
nt" Oi Oi o1
* *
* *
NO O n
VO nf
cn o O
*
*
NO
IT)
<N o
ON VO in
CN *■—' cn
Oi Oi oi
O n CN oo
O o
o' O o '
o
* 
* * VO tJ- 
CN nf 
O O
CN
O
<U C> -a
.a o
c/ 2
* 1 d .a
o
H
o
a
g u  u  u  u
5  C/3 oo oo c/)
<  <  <  <
H Hh pu
_ bD c
n  Q .S o
w  Q_, ^  J-‘
W
o
a
■ 4 -J
<L>
Vh
O
o
<ul-l
o
<Dl-i
<Do C /2 o O
o C/2 o J - i
a
o
C /2 o
C /2 o
o
o <D C /2
’ a
JO
C /2
o T3 <L>
o
ts ts o
J - I
0) inCDo
cn
o
C /2
<u
Jh
> & H
h  J i S i t :  w  «
' g  ^  ^ I  M  H  2  H  i  P 1 * - l  * - !  W| f f i pQfaant J - iC/DQQE~H
no
u
O h
£
o
o
c/ 2
J-I<o
£
o
( N c n ^ m v o ^ o o o \ c N c n ,a - i n N o r - - o o o \ 20
.
 
To
w
er
 
A
c
hi
e
v
e
m
e
n
t
21
.
 
To
w
er
 
m
ea
n 
fir
st
 
m
o
v
e
CN
O
CN
On
*
r- ON in
CN o i— i
d d d
*
* * *
in CN o
co co CO
d d d
in vo CO
o t—H 1-H
00
VO
in
m
CN
O n 'sf
O  i - H  
© ©
*
*
vo oo in
CN
t -H
oo
o
CN
O
in
o 00o
in
o
d
i
d
i
d
i
d
i d di
o
CN
©
oo in m 00 r^-
CO 1 -H T—H ^ H o
d d d d d
CO N" 
CN hh
o  o
o  o
CO 2
d  1— 1
CN
o  o
^  1-Ho  o  
© ©
CN
*
o o CN in m CO
T -H CO ^ H ^ H 1 -H CN o
d d d d d d d
CN CO
o  d
• o
O  O  O  I d
o
N"
O
CO CN N - o
^  °  °  s
©  O  O  I
VO
O  1-H
d  d
in  Oni-i o  
o  d
CN
CN in o CO
t".
o o f" _ CN in voT^ t -H o o • o o 1—H 1 -H O
di d d d d o1 d di d d d d d
* * *
r-- T -H in * * *
o ON OO m 0 0 in 0 0 CO CO
o t —H • 1 -H o CN m VO 0 0 CN
oi d d o1 o1 d d d d d d d t -H
* * *T_l CO * * *OO CN N" o o ON 1 -H m VO C"-
o t -H CN l - H <^H o VO r- m
d d d d o1 o1 d d d d d T—H
CN in
? 6 6 <? t?'c? d d <? 9
O n O n O n
*
*
o o
*
*
1 -H 1 -H t -H N" vo
d d d d d
1 _j_ „  in on
~  S  2  °.  9
9  d  d  9  9
oo in O n m
o 1 -H 1 -H o
d d d d
VO CN 
O  O
d  d
*
*
CN CN o
1 -H 1 -H O N
d d d
2  <N ~
d  §  di O i
C- o  o  o
d  d
00 CN ^ H m
1 -H CN < t -H
d d d d
CO
p
N"
O
CN
O
d d d
CN CN CO
O O o
di di di
*
*
m VO vo
CN ^H CO
d d d
t—H in
*
CN CN CO CO 00 CN
1 -H o CO O o t—H o CN
d oi d d d d d d O  1 -H
*
* # 
ON vo vo
1-1 CO CN
o d d
r- m vo
CO
oo
^H ^H o • o
d d d o1 d
<D
1) §
>  o  s  
8  \ £  o 
o 3 E-H
g 1 o
<L> .S G
O
O OT
C/3 O
<D
»H
O 
o
C/3 CJ
1/3
g u  u  u  u
u 7] !/][/) [/) h o S l  °
f c
O  vt/ 7T
°  ^  ^  ^  o
^  L _ .
E3 0 0 
ac   rS <-h’Hh £
^ t: ts& o ojh C/3 C/3
O  O 
>
O *S 
°  <  
Pi 52 ih 
o  o
J r l l i i l S S S
i—i CN CO N" vn vo r^ - OO O n
M M M 2  ^  ^  ^  2 2h O O J ^ O O
^ c i r i ’t ' n v d h o o  o ^ o
O
>
O
a
to
»H
W
P3
O
s
i-H
o
H
CN
CO
CO
*p 
< 
0.
05
, 
**
p 
< 
0.0
1 
A
bb
re
v
ia
tio
n
s:
 
IR
I 
F 
= 
Fa
n
ta
sy
,
 
IR
I 
PT 
= 
Pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
e 
Ta
ki
n
g,
 
IR
I 
EC 
= 
Em
pa
th
ic
 
C
o
n
c
e
rn
, 
IR
I 
PD 
= 
Pe
rs
o
n
al
 
D
is
tr
es
s,
 
fr
ee
 
so
rt 
de
sc
 
sc
or
e 
= 
fre
e 
so
rt 
de
sc
rip
tio
n
 
sc
o
re
, 
so
rt 
re
c 
de
sc
 
sc
or
e 
= 
so
rt 
re
co
gn
iti
o
n
 
de
sc
rip
tio
n
 
sc
o
re
,
 
de
sc
 
v
er
ba
l 
sc
or
e 
= 
de
sc
rip
tio
n
 
sc
or
e 
for
 
v
e
rb
a
l 
so
rts
 
, 
de
sc
 
pe
rc
 
sc
or
e 
= 
de
sc
rip
tio
n
 
sc
or
e 
for
 
pe
rc
ep
tu
al
 
so
rt
A
pp
en
di
x
 
Se
ct
io
n
 
15
.
 
C
o
rr
el
a
tio
n
s 
be
tw
ee
n
 
a
ge
, 
IQ 
an
d 
m
oo
d 
sta
te
 
v
a
ri
a
bl
es
 
in 
th
e 
w
ho
le
 
co
ho
rt
 
at 
Ti
m
e 
1
<0
*3
P
.2
'co
co
<D
CU
u
Q
pu,
ex
p£u
cx
l - HU-lin0)
PU
a
cd
•£o
>
*
m
<N
©
* *
<N r*H r-o
.-H
o * *
O
© oi o1 ©V
m
o
m
o
<N
*
*(N m o inCO o CN *“H T-H
O o © © ©
O nO
m C N ©
© 1—H
©
i
© ’
i
©
i
* *
* *
r \ o00 00
o © 1- H
(NO
*
*
m
co
o
<u
c d
<
a
cd
J-H
a>
>
cx cx
t+H»h
a>
pu
S3PU <PU
<
£
m
o
o
V 
cu 
*
o
o
V
cu
*
*
o
o
S3
E
CD
.G
Id
o
*3
.S
o
oo
©
s
.G
<D
.G
CD
co
S3
O%->jd
13
fa
o
o
£
o
-Gco
O
.O
G  
• ^C/3
<u?H
P
CD
34
4
A
pp
en
di
x
 
Se
ct
io
n
 
16
.
 
C
o
rr
el
a
tio
n
s 
be
tw
ee
n
 
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
fu
n
ct
io
n
 
ta
sk
 
sc
or
es
 
at 
Ti
m
e 
1
i n
"3-
m
u
s - *
o
o
in
+ - >Co
ao
>
<D
23
O
<
«H
o
H
In
o
C/3
uT3
t:
o
C/3
<D
<L>JhPh
>»
O
S3<uJ3
PP
Ih0)
43
CD
► J
n3JU
O
oo
s3
o
+ - •
'G
PQ
<N VO (N
»—i o o 1
O o © o
o
m
<N
o
*
,st-O (N
o
T3y
*30
C/3
bD
.s
1  
ffi
TD
U
13
o00
S3
o
-t-JX 
• ^
Jh
pq
X
o
c
<D3
Pp
Jh
<L>
430)
hJ
o
l H
o
o
CO
C3
.2
c p
•
Jh
o
C O
O
T3
G
o
in
<D
<U
JhPp
<D
Jh
O
o
in
4 - >
S3
<D
s
<D
>
<U
iao
<
l- l
u
£
o
H
m
o
V
S3
mo
"+H
'Go
in
o
T3
G
o
<L>
<D
J HPp
d#o
c3
Jh
O
c
<L>
txO
bD0)
ts
Jh
>-»
O
S3
<D
J 3
Pp
Jh
<U43
<D
I—]
S3"
.2
o
u
H - >
u
T3
u
T3
J2
’S
OOO
c
o
-4 ->X
• Jh
PQ
S3"
o
T3
Jh13
o
oo
bD
S3
•
S'
ffi
co
S3
O
*+H
o
S3
a
<u
A
pp
en
di
x
 
Se
ct
io
n
 
17
.
 
C
o
rr
el
a
tio
n
s 
be
tw
ee
n
 
a
ge
, 
IQ 
an
d 
m
oo
d 
sta
te
 
v
a
ri
a
bl
es
 
at 
Ti
m
e 
2 
in 
th
e 
w
ho
le
 
co
ho
r
t
G
O
•
c/3
C/3
ut-H
D h
<DQ
<
P h
a
s
Ph
ahH
NfHVi
uCP
cx
O
(N OO COo
* *
o * *NO CN *-H "3-
o in v o
o
o1 o o
m(N
©
*
O n(N
©
r--
o CO
o
*
C"-
<N
*
VO
CN
CO o  r- 
o  ^
V  o
CN
©
oo
©
oo
r-H
o
in
o
o
o
*  *
oo * *O 00H r-
?  o  o
m
o
o
(N
r--
T“H
O
0)00
<
O'
CO
-s<u
>
O  OHH M
Pi -H
*-1 OO O 3 Pi Ph Ph
<
Z
c#o
"55C/3
a>
V i
D h<uQ
*
<d
in
©
©
V
o
o
V
*
*
34
6
A
pp
en
di
x
 
Se
ct
io
n
 
18
.
 
C
o
rr
el
a
tio
n
s 
be
tw
ee
n
 
ex
ec
u
tiv
e 
fu
n
ct
io
n
 
ta
sk
 
sc
or
es
 
at 
Ti
m
e 
2 
in 
th
e 
to
ta
l 
c
o
ho
r
t
P
<D
B
>
<D
’Mo
<
s-i
<D
£
O
S - i
omtU
t!
o
in
<D
<D
Sh
Ph
Op
<DJO
PP 
s—I 
<L>
<L>J
T3
Jh
’p
o
C /3
a
o
-+H
X
•
S - i
PQ
(N *o o in
*-H m H l-H
o o o o
<N
O
OO
o
00
o
<N (N
<N
<N
T3
Jh
13
o
C /3
00p
•
a
T3
J h
o
C /3
p
o
B
'Jh
PQ
o
a
<DJO
p p
Sh
<D
t i
<U
► J
<u <U
Sh Sh
o o
o o
c/3 in
P
O Pu
+-»
p
'Jh
o
u
>
C/3 <D
<D
Hp *J3o
t; <
o
1 /3
Sh
<D
o £
<u
Sh o
P h H
in
o
V
*
a
• wH
Shoon
U
T 3
ts
O
c/3
u
<D
ShPP
C
o
"S
Sh
p<u00
00
a>
o3
Sh
op
a>
JO
Pp
Sh
a>
t i<ui—l
p"
.2
o
«u
■ HoT3
<u
T3
JD
13
o
C/3
P
o
X
•
Sh
PQ
d
o
HP
J h
0
C /3
00
_p
1
 
as
c/3
P
.2
op
cS
<D
34
7
